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FIVE REASONS WHY YOU SHOULD VOTE ANC 
You have heard what various parties say. On 27 April you be the iudge. 
Here are the five important facts to remember: 
ONLY THE ANC HAS: 
1. A plan to build a better lile lor all 
The ANC has a concrete and workable plan to 
build a better life for all . Together, we can make the 
plan work. 
2. A track record of working with ordinary 
people lor freedom 
An ANC government will listen to ordinary people. 
We are firmly rooted among the people. We have 
' stood by the ideals of equality and democracy even 
under the most difficult conditions. 
3. A concrete plan to create jobs and 
provide Free quality education 
The ANC will create 2,5 million jobs within ten years 
through a public works programme. And many more 
opportunities through a growing economy. By 
building houses, schools and clinics, we will get 
South Africa working. We will immediately introduce 
one education system a nd ten years of free quality 
education for all children. 
4 . A programme to bring about equality 
and respect for women 
Under an ANC government, women will be given a 
voice. They will be respected and treated equally. 
At least one-third of our parliamentary candidates 
are women. 
5. Concrete steps to bring peace and 
security to our land 
The ANC will eliminate crime and violence. We will 
restructure the security forces and ensure that police 
work with communities. We will introduce strict gun 
control laws and promote political tolerance. 
A BE I I ER LIFE FOR ALL! 
A BEnER LIFE FOR ALL! 
On 27 April , go out and make your mark to change your life for the better. 
Your vote is your secret. It is your power. Use it. 
The first ballot paper you will receive is for national government. The second one is 
for provincial government. For both levels of government you are right to want 
a democratic organisation that will create a better life for al l. 
That organisation is the ANC. 
When you reach the polling booth, take your time. Look lower down iA the 
ballot paper. You w ill see the ANC flag, spear and shield and Mandela's face . 
Make your X in the empty box next to Mandela, 
and you will have secured a better life for yourself 
and your family. 
First vote ••• ANC 
ANC 
Second vote ••• ANC 
ANC 
Working together for jobs, peace and freedom! 
Issued by ANC Department of Information & Publicity, 51 Plein St, Johannesburg 2001 
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Abstract 
I have wrinen this dissertation as an empirical study of the African National 
Congress ' (ANC) 1994 election campaign in South Africa ' s Western Cape 
Province. Primarily, I address one overriding question: what are the principal 
reasons for and ramifications of the AN C's inability to win control of the 
province? I begin by exploring key factors concerning the history, demographics, 
electoral system and pre-campaign voter attitudes of the province that may have 
influenced how the party developed and implemented its strategy. I describe the 
evolution of the campaign, including strategic decisions made before and during 
its execution, and analyze the content of appeals to voters. I then assess the extent 
to which the above factors may have affected the campaign and examine the 
election results. I conclude by offering plausible implications of this case for 
future ANC campaigns in the Western Cape. 
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"Give us our own piece or we'll simply take it ourselves." 
Political leaders bicker over how to share the new South Africa 
Introduction 
April 23. 1994. The diminutive, coloured man in the impeccably tailored suit approached 
the microphone for the second rime. A technical glitch had disabled the public address 
system f or a few moments, but this had not rattled him. He confidently resumed his 
message to the thousand-strong gathering of ANC supporters who had come to this final 
pre-election rally in Mitchell's Plain, a predominantly coloured township near Cape 
Town. He was the Rev. Allan Boesak. He was the ANC's candidate for Western Cape 
premier in South Africa 's first democratic elections. And he had a sermon of hope to 
deliver. It seemed that many had come not to listen to him but rather to see the popular 
ANC Secretary General, Cyril Ramaphosa, who would speak next. But you would not 
have known this by listening to Boesak. The makeshift stage was his platform to the 
world. His zealous voice boomed with assurance: 
What you 'i ·e been fig hting for, what you've been working.for, what you've been suffering.for is 
coming rrue next Tuesday. What the ANC said 82 years ago will now come true next week. We 
will all be free next week.' Mandela will be president next week.1 And the ANC will win in the 
Wes tern Cape next week.11 
What Boesak failed to recognize, even on that -,unny afternoon on the eve of the 
elections, was that hi s party would not win in the Western Cape. In fact, the African 
National Congress (ANC), despite its leading role in the liberation struggle, would lose 
by 53 .3 to 33 percent to the very party that enacted apartheid, the National Party (NP). 
The surprise of the ANC's loss to the NP goes beyond the mere vote totals. Widely 
regarded as the country 's most liberal region, the Western Cape was one of only three 
1 Allan Boesak., remarks at a NEHA WU rally, Mondale School, Ponlands, Mitchell 's Plain, April 23. All 
events cited in thi s di ssertation took place in 199-+ unless otherwise indicated. 
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of South Africa's nine new provinces in which the Ai\C did not sweep to a comfortable 
victory.2 It marked what one campaign strategist described as the only "real contest" 
nationally. pitting the country's two largest parties against one another.3 Most 
important. the election outcome had hinged on a large proportion of apparently 
uncommitted, mostly so-called "coloured" voters.--l The coloured population had neither 
been the group most oppressed under apartheid nor the primary force behind the 
liberation movement. Yet it became the prize in a fierce competition between the 
"party of apartheid" and the "party of liberation." 
Analyzing the ANC's campaign 
I have written this dissertation to explore one overriding question: what are the principal 
reasons for and ramifications of the ANC's inability to win control of the Western Cape ? 
I outline below the structure of my chapters. 
In Part LI describe the general context in which the Western Cape elections would take 
place. Before turning to Chapter One, I would encourage the reader to refer to my 
re search methodology (see Appendix I) -- in it, I detail six main research questions used 
2The other two pro,inces in which the ANC failed to garner a comfonable victory were KwaZulu/Natal. in 
which it lost to the Inkatha Freedom Pany, and the Northern Cape, in which it barely avoided a "hung 
parliament" -- see Andrew Reynolds, "The Results," Election '94 South Africa: the Campaigns, Results and 
Future Prospects, Cape Town: David Philip, 199.t. 
3Cameron Dugmore, interview, December 12, 199.t. Note: Mr. Dugmore qualified this characterization by 
stating that the campaigns in KwaZulu/Natal, although hotly contested, were more like "barnstorming" than 
campaigning. In the Western Cape, the campaigns were more "traditional." involving debates over issues 
and a struggle for voters who had not yet decided for which pany to vote. 
--lJn thi s dissenation, I refer to various population groups using South African racial classifications. By 
"white," I mean South Africans who are of English, Afrikaner or other European descent; by "African," 
indigenous people such as Xhosa, Zulu, Sotho and Tsonga; by "Indian," those descending from ethnic 
groups in the Indian subcontinent; and by "coloured," those of either Khoi. San, Malay or other so-called 
"mixed race" descent. I do not employ these terms with respect to their "biological" definitions, but rather 
to the importance that such racial identities have assumed, particularly in the political context. Racial 
differentiation in the Western Cape both before and during apartheid left stark and profound social 
cleavages -- through segregated residential communities, schools, political representation, employment 
Foomotes continue on next page. 
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to guide my empirical data collection and analysis. For ease of understanding, I al so 
outline these questions here: 
• 
• 
How might the history , demographics and electoral system of the Western 
Cape have influenced ANC strategy, and how did they? 
What possible impact might knowledge of voters' political attitudes have had 
on ANC strategy, and what was the actual impact? 
• What key strategic decisions did the ANC make and why? 
• What were the internal political dynamics of these decisions at the 
provincial level ? 
How did the AN C's national campaign priorities affect the development of the 
provincial strategy'! 
· What was the role of race in shaping ANC strategy, and how did the ANC 
address the "coloured question ," given its commitment to nonracialism yet 
predominantly African membership? 
In Chapters One and Two, I explore critical aspects of the pre-campaign environment in 
the Western Cape. I offer information with which, in my concluding chapters, I will 
propose answers to the first two of the research questions above. I examine key historical 
events, a socioeconomic profile of the electorate, the nature of the electoral system, pre-
policies and "influx control." These deepened and entrenched real cultural differences between racial 
groups. 
Intnxluction Page-+ 
campaign public opinion data, and the possible implications that all of these had for ANC 
campaign strategy. 
Chapters Three through Five constitute Part II , in which I detail the evolution of the 
AN C's campaign. Relying mainly on qualitative data, I describe in Chapter Three the 
development of the party's objectives and strategy, and discuss in Chapter Four the main 
phases through which it implemented this approach. In Chapter Five, I utilize 
quantitative data to further characterize the ANC's efforts. Specifically, I analyze the 
content and delivery of campaign appeals in three areas -- speech themes, event locations 
and language . 
Part III involves assessing the campaign and identifying its potential implications. In 
Chapter Six, J evaluate the ANC's strategy. I begin by using the information presented in 
Part II to address my research questions. I then explore the election results and 
explanations ANC leaders give for the party's performance. 
Finally, in a postsc ript, J offer my own interpretation of the ANC's loss by discussing the 
strengths and weaknesses of its strategy, and proposing an alternative strategy that might 
have enabled the party to achieve a greater share of the vote. I address the following 
question s in particular: 
• Why did many undecided coloured voters choose the NP? 
• How appropriate was the ANC's strategy, given the nature of Western Cape 
society and the electoral system? 
• Did the ANC "lose" the province or was it "unwinnable?" 
Introduction Pages 
In addition, I offer possible implications of this case for future party competition in the 
Western Cape. 
Motivation 
One may well ask what has compelled me to undertake this endeavor. On a personal 
level , many South Africans have asked me why, as an American, 1 would want to study 
in their country when there are many universities available in the United States. Such 
questions always surprised me since part of the answer seemed obvious. Only in South 
Africa in 1994 could I have had the chance to study South African politics firsthand and 
in the context of the c~:mntry's first nonracial democratic elections. No classroom in the 
world could offer a comparable setting. 
Al so. I had written my undergraduate thesis on the difficult and often overwhelming 
subject of U.S. economic sanctions toward South Africa, and had worked on a voter 
education program in South Africa for the U.S. National Democratic Institute for 
International Affairs. Both of these experiences inspired me to return to the country and 
witness its historic transition from apartheid. 
On an intellectual level , two motives stand out. First, I hope that my description and 
analysis of the AN C's campaign will prove useful to other researchers. Perhaps it will 
serve as a basis from which they might examine future Western Cape elections or ANC 
election strategies. Second, more broadly, I seek indirectly to supplement understandings 
of party electoral competition in societies with deep racial or ethnic divisions. I admit that 
my tentative findings from this case may vary in their applicability elsewhere. However, I 
hope that analysts may, at least, be able to draw upon my data to test hypotheses. 
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Following a wave of other parties being created in the run-up to the election, 
popular cartoon figures Madam & Eve laurn:h their own party. 
PART I: 
Pre-Campaign Environment 
CHAPTER ONE: History, Demographics and Electoral System 
Key historical events, socioeconomic characteristics, type of electoral system and public 
opinion data all represent vi tal contextual information about the pre-campaign 
environment in the Western Cape. In this chapter, I explore the first three of these 
features in order to address an important hypothetical question: 
• How might the history, demographics and electoral system of the Western 
Cape have influenced ANC strategy? 
I begin by identifying historical events of the region that bore relevance to the 1994 
elections. I then offer a demographic profile of the electorate, based on data such as 
income , home language and religion. I also address the question of coloured voters' 
alleged "cultural" or "class affinity" toward whites, which some analysts claim is why 
man~ coloured voters supported the NP over the ANC. Finally, I examine the electoral 
system and its origins, and suggest possible incentives it provided for parties 
campaigning in the province. As many scholars have argued, electoral "rules of the 
game" can often influence how parties campaign. 
Critical historical events 
Several aspects of the Western Cape's past stood to influence the ANC's campaign in 
1994. Perhaps the most relevant trend in the province's contemporary history was a 
deepening social, cultural and economic divide between coloured and African people. 
Four interrelated events contributed to this phenomenon: 
J 
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1. the growth of the coloured population into the single largest racial group, its 
oppression, and the application of " ~ oloured preference" laws 
2. the boom in the African population in the 1980s, 
3. the adoption of apartheid "reforms" in 1983 that provided additional privileges 
to coloureds but denied them to Africans 
4. the "rise and fall" of the United Democratic Front (UDF)-5 
The importing of slaves into the Cape Province, which was the only region to experi ence 
slavery.6 greatly influenced the development of the Western Cape coloured population. 
Unlike many other parts of Africa colonized by Europeans, the labor force was not based 
primarily on the indigenous population, although some Khoi and San worked on farms. 
As hi storian Nigel Worden explains, "Until the 1830s the main source of labour was 
slaves, imported from Central Africa, Madagascar, India and the East Indies. '17 In 1834, 
when slavery was abolished in all British colonies, the import of slaves ceased. Large 
numbers of former slaves remained who had physical features generally darker than 
Europeans yet lighter than black Africans. 
The descendants of these slaves as well as other people with lighter characteristics than 
black Africans -- including indigenous Khoi and San, and so-called "bi-racial" or "mixed 
race" children -- were typically categorized under apartheid as "coloured." Coloureds 
were further subdivided into the official race classifications of Cape Coloured, Malay, 
Yrhe third and fourth of these events bore relevance not only to the province but to the nation as well. 
6Wilmot G. James and Mary Simons, eds., The Angry· Divide: Socicd and Economic History· of the Western 
Cape, Cape Town: David Philip, 1989, p. i. 
7Nigel Worden, "Adjusting to Emancipation: Freed Slaves and Farmers in the Mid-Nineteenth-Century 
South-Western Cape," in James, The Angry· Divide , p. 31. 
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Griqua and Other Coloured.8 Collectively, they developed into the region's largest racial 
group with a unique identity. Although the existence of this identity is often disputed as 
a gross overgeneralization, and criticized as an artificial apartheid construction, some 
scholars argue that it has become a reality for many coloured people "if for no other 
reason than for decades of common oppression. "9 
By the tum of the twentieth century, over 60 percent of South Africa's coloured 
population lived in the Western Cape. In what some analysts have termed "divide and 
rule" tactics,10 successive governments designed and implemented policies in the region 
that granted certain privileges to coloureds but denied them to Africans. One initial 
advantage given to coloureds, but not to Africans, was enfranchisement. Coloureds had 
the right to vote since 1853 in the Cape Province, and actually helped the NP win 
elections in I 928. However, the process of coloured disenfranchisement began almost as 
soon as the Union of South Africa was formed in 1910. It culminated in 1956 when the 
NP di senfranchi sed them completely, partly because they had swung their support to 
Engli sh parties. 
Further coloured preference policies were adopted from 1904 to 1935 in an effort aimed 
at what hi storian Ian Goldin describes as deflecting growing political opposition based on 
an alliance of coloured and African people. 11 Evidence of growing politicization among 
coloureds could be seen in the emergence in 1902 of the first major coloured political 
group, the African Political Organisation (APO). The APO rapidly gained over 20,000 
members, dwarfing the better-known ANC at least until the late 1940s. It failed, 
8Roben Manes, Hermann Giliomee and Wilmot James, "The Election in the Western Cape," paper written 
for inclusion as Chapter Five in R. W. Johnson and Lawrence Schlemmer, eds., wunching Democracy: 
South Africa's First Open Election, 1994, New Haven: Yale University Press, fonhcoming, p. 2. 
9Mattes, Giliomee and James, "The Election in the Western Cape," p. 2. 
10Ian Goldin, Making Race: The Politics and Economics of Coloured Identity in South Africa, London: 
Longman, 1987, p. xiii. 
11 Goldin , Making Race, p. xi ii. 
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however, to forge a lasting alliance between coloureds and Africans as some leaders of 
the white minority had feared, and it eventually faded from the political scene.12 
From 1935 to 1948, strict controls were imposed on African residence and employment 
in the Western Cape. 13 With the rise to power of the NP and its apartheid doctrine in 
1948, the Coloured Labour Preference Policy was put into motion. This further limited 
"the employment and residence of Africans" and granted "preference to the employment 
of Coloured people in an area west of what became known as the Eiselen Line.'' 14 From 
their conception to their general abandonment in the early 1980s, the coloured labor 
preference laws attracted many coloureds from other parts of South Africa to the Western 
Cape. Those who migrated came despite the imposition of the Group Areas Act, which 
limited in which communities they could live, and despite forced removals of one in six 
coloureds from "white" designated areas such as Cape Town's District Six.15 
In the face of increasingly stringent influx control laws, Africans also flooded into the 
region in search of better economic conditions than those they faced in the impoverished, 
so-called black "homelands" or "bantustans." From the late 1970s, although many had 
lived in the region already, a surge of between 800,000 and 1 million Africans moved to 
existing townships, created new <: :.·:., and established "squatter camps" on sand flats due 
east of Cape Town.16 Coloureds who came to the Western Cape could often find some 
form of housing and employment, whereas many black Africans were forced by necessity 
to live in overcrowded squatter communities and compete for scarce menial labor jobs. 
12J. S. Marais, The Cape Coloured People, 1652-1937, Johannesburg, 1939, p. 257, as cited in Gavin 
Lewis, Between the Wire and the Wall: A History of South African "Coloured" Politics, Cape Town: David 
Philip, 1987, p. l. 
13Goldin, Making Race, p. xiv. 
14Goldin, Making Race, p. x.iv. 
15Gerd Behrens, The Other Two Houses: The First Five Years of the Houses of Representatives and 
Delegates, unpublished Ph.D. dissenation, University of Cape Town, 1989, p. 238, as cited in Mattes, 
Giliomee and James, "The Election in the Western Cape," p. 3. 
16Mattes, Giliomee and James, "The Election in the Western Cape," p.2. 
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the Western Cape ANC in particular was dominated by "Africanists" such as regional 
Secretary General Tony Yengeni.25 
Historical implications 
These key events in Western Cape history seemed likely to affect the election campaigns 
of 1994. At least three main, possible ramifications can be identified. First, the 
preponderance of coloured voters meant that, quite obviously, their support would play 
an important role in the election outcome. Second, the African minority in the region 
represented the ANC's traditional support base. This raised the question of whether, and 
to what extent, the ANC's appeals to coloured voters would affect its support among 
Africans. Would appeals to both groups be mutually exclusive to a degree, and would 
this pose a perceived trade-off for ANC leaders?26 
Third , one might ask whether the absence of the UDF would limit the ANC's ability to 
win coloured votes. Seekings argues that it was probably easier for many coloured 
people to identify with the UDF through non-aligned civic organizations, than the ANC. 
In that way, they did not have to advocate a particular political agenda, like the AN C's, or 
participate in mass action if they felt uncomfortable doing so. He claims that even some 
general issues failed to galvanize the backing of many coloured UDF supporters. As an 
example, he cites a proposed, yet abandoned attempt in 1983-84 to hold anti-apartheid 
referenda among Indian and coloured voters. 27 Perhaps what hurt the ANC most was 
that, unlike the UDF, it did not represent a place for coloured people to be active in their 
25Tom Lodge, "The African National Congress and Its Allies," Election '94 South Africa: the Campaigns, 
Results ant1 Future Prospects, Andrew Reynolds, ed., Cape Town: David Philip, 1994, pp. 39-40. See 
Chapter Three below for a discussion of the tenn "Africanist." 
26See Chapter Three for a discussion of the debate on "nonracialism" versus "multiracialism" within the 
ANC. 
27Jeremy Seekings, comments to a postgraduate seminar on the ANC's 1994 campaign, Department of 
Political Studies, University of Cape Town, September 21, 1995. 
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communities but remain non-aligned. In the elections they would be forced to choose 
between the ANC and NP, parties with images -- as I shall illustrate in Chapter Two -- as 
a "white" party and an "African" one, respectively. 
Demographics 
The disparate histories of racial groups in the Western Cape, particularly with regard to 
social segregation and economic opportuni t · ~ s. perpetuated complex and far-reaching 
divisions between them. Whites, who historically enjoyed the greatest level of 
socioeconomic opportunities in the Western Cape were far better off materially in early 
1994 than the other two groups. Africans, who had experienced the most severe 
oppression, were the worst off. Coloureds, who had received certain advantages but had 
al so been victims of di sc rimination, were somewhere in the middle. 
Some scholars claim that coloured people have the most in common with whites, in 
terms of material conditions and culture. They argue that these similarities mark a kind 
of class or cultural "affinity" between the two groups, a sentiment that compelled 
coloured voters to choose the "white" NP over the "African" ANC. Do demographic 
data support the existence of such an affinity? It would be beyond the purview of this 
thesis to attempt to determine whether a cultural affinity exists between coloured and 
white Western Cape voters. Such an effort would probably require analysis of 
attitudinal data in addition to demographic information. In this section, I merely intend 
to review key demographic data and comment on the degree to which they may offer a 
foundation for claims of cultural affinity. 
The issue of cultural affinity is difficult to address, partly because definitive demographic 
data are hard to obtain. Survey research and government census data both have 
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limitations, whether sampling errors and biases, or problematic methodologies employed 
under apartheid. Nevertheless, surveys can provide a general demographic profile of the 
Western Cape and, in turn, suggest the extent to which coloured demographic features 
resemble those of whites and Africans. I examine below eight demographic factors 
outlined by Mattes, Giliomee and James: residential location, type of dwelling, migration 
patterns, level of education, employment, income, religion and language.28 These reveal 
considerable differences between all three major racial groups rather than a clear-cut 
parallel between coloureds and whites. Some similarities between coloureds and whites 
do exist, but in several cases coloureds have more in common with Africans. Tables 1-4 
and Figures 1-4 below illustrate how the three groups compare in terms of the eight 
demographic factors .29 I have adjusted table data in most cases for responses of "don't 
know:· "other· ' or "would not say." 
Residence 
Figure l depicts differences among racial groups according to residential status. At first 
glance, it might appear that whites and coloureds live in similar kinds of areas. However, 
it is important to note that these data fail to reveal differences in the quality of housing, 
which arguably varies greatly between white and coloured neighborhoods. Most voters 
fall into the "urban" category, but one cannot deduce from these data whether the house 
of a coloured "urban" person more closely resembles that of a white or African ''urban" 
person. Perhaps the most telling responses are from those who say they live in a 
"squatter" settlement -- Africans make up the overwhelming majority of these. 
28Mattes , Giliomee and James discuss these demographic factors in detail in "The Election in the Western 
Cape," p. 4, and the tables and figures I include below are borrowed directly from their paper. They derive 
their data from a February 1994 public opinion survey conducted for the Institute for Multi-Party 
Democracy by Market and Opinion Surveys. See Chapter Two for more information on this survey, also 
referred to as MPD/M&O. 
29The data for each figure have been rounded to the nearest whole number. 
Chapter One Page 17 
Table 1 provides some details about housing conditions. It suggests that most coloured 
and white voters live in "formal" houses. Most Africans do also, but nearly a third of 
them reside in shacks. As with the "urban" category of Figure 1, one cannot dete1mine 
from this information the quality of one person's formal house compared to another. In 
other words, it is unclear whether formal houses of whites are of far greater economic 
value than those of coloureds, and whether coloureds' dwellings might actually be closer 
in worth to those of Africans. Thus, the utility of residential data for comparing the 
socioeconomic status of the three racial groups seems limited. 
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Education 
Table 2 shows the level of education most recently attained by voters. Significantly, the 
category of coloured responses more closely matches those of Africans than whites. This 
is particularly evident in the middle four lines, including Standard 1-5, Standard 6-9, 
Matric and Diploma. On these lines, the gaps between coloureds and Africans are only 1, 
4, 5 and 6 respectively. The differences between coloureds and whites, on the other 
hand, are markedly wider: 14, 24, 15 and 13.30 These education data appear to indicate a 
greater coloured-African similarity than a coloured-white one. 
TABLE 2: Education 
Years of Education White African Coloured 
None ( 7 3 
SubNSubB 1 5 2 
Standard 1-5 1 16 15 
Standard 6-9 11 45 41 
Matric 35 15 2C 
Diploma 2S lC H 
Bachelors/Honours lA 2 2 
Masters/Ph.D. 3 ( 1 
TOTAL lut1 lUtJ ltJ(J 
Income 
Table 3 lists voters' monthly income levels in early 1994. Although over one-third of 
coloureds and nearly one-third of whites either would not say or were "uncertain," these 
data show the greatest similarities in income to be between coloureds and Africans. A 
sizable majority of coloureds and Africans fall into two of the lowest income levels, 
30 Although these data seem to indicate similarities in education attained by coloureds and Africans, I 
acknowledge that a key difference between these groups may be found in the 1994 provincial matric pass 
rates: 97 percent for whites and 88 percent for coloureds, but only 51 percent for Africans. "Standard Ten 
Examination Results, 1994," EduSource, no. 8, April 1995. 
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R 1-999, and R 1,000-1,999. By contrast, while some whites also fall into these levels 
' 
more than twice as many of them have incomes between R 2,000 and R 6,000. One 
possible exception to this concerns those earning over Rl0,000 per month -- no Africans 
fall into this group. However, very few coloureds are in this bracket, only 2 percent, 
compared to nearly one white in ten. 
TABLE 3: Monthly Income 
Joint Household In~Qme White African CQlO:lfil:Q W~st~rn Ca12~ 
None 1 i 2 3 
1-999 6 4S 21 25 
1,000-1,999 1( 25 18 17 
2,000-2,999 7 5 8 7 
3,000-3,999 12 ~ 6 6 
4,000-4,999 5 1 2 3 
5,000-5,999 13 ( 3 4 
7,500-9,000 7 ( 1 2 
10,000-14,999 5 ( . 1 2 
15,000-19,999 2 ( 0 0 
over 20,000 2 ( 1 1 
Won't Say/Uncertain 3( 11 37 30 
TOTAL 10~ 10~ 100 100 
Migration patterns 
Figure 2 illustrates racial migration patterns or, in other words, where voters lived longest 
before the age of 18. Like Figure 1 and Table 1, it suggests a strong parallel between 
white and coloured people -- in fact, these two pies are nearly mirror images of each other. 
Africans, conversely, show a different pattern. Over one-third of Africans fall into a 
category that, perhaps unsurprisingly, virtually no coloured or white voters did: "African 
rural area." How does this information relate to the other categories of data presented 
here? One could argue that it illustrates the different past relocations of each group, or 
lack thereof, whereas the other data reveal their more recent socioeconomic conditions. 
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Employment 
Employment data, shown in Figure 3, do not seem to present a clear parallel between any two of 
the three groups. Whites have the highest employment levels, Africans the lowest, and coloureds 
fall in between. In some cases, coloureds appear marginally closer to whites but in others seem 
marginally closer to Africans. For example, the percentage of "full-time" coloured respondents 
• 
is only 6 points higher than that of Africans, but 8 points below that of whites. "Unemployed" 
Africans are only 9 points more than coloureds, who are 18 points more than whites. 
Religion 
Information on religion, listed in Table 4, seems to indicate that coloureds have more in 
common with whites than with Africans. I have adjusted these data for responses of "would not 
say" or "don't know." The most significant sign of this is affiliation with the Dutch Reformed 
Church, which consists of 59 percent of whites and 35 percent of coloureds, but only 2 percent 
of Africans. In addition, affiliation with the next largest Christian denomination, Anglican, 
shows significant proportions of coloureds (32 percent) and whites (11 percent), 
notwithstanding a sizable share of Africans (23 percent). The data in Table 4 also suggest 
parallels between whites and Africans, particularly in Anglican, Catholic and Methodist 
affiliation. However, the key question may be with which group would coloureds most closely 
identify in terms of religion. The answer, according to these data, seems to be whites. 
Table 4: Religion 
Denomination White African Coloured Total 
Anglican 11 23 32 26 
Catholic 11 g 13 14 
Dutch Reformed 5~ 2 35 35 
Islam/Muslim ( ( 12 7 
Methodist g 5~ 8 18 
TOTAL lOU 10~ 100 100 
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3IJ have adjusted the data for these three charts to reflect the percentage of those providing answers other 
than "would not say" or "don't know." 
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La.nguage 
Figure 4 illustrates one of the most striking similarities between coloured and white 
respondents. Most coloureds and whites have either Afrikaans or English as their home 
language, whereas an overwhelming proportion of Africans speak Xhosa. These data, 
however, do not include second or third languages. It ~ay be that Africans speak English 
as a second language in a proportion close to or even greater than that of coloureds. 
Analysis: some evidence but no overwhelming affinity 
The demographic features above do not suggest a clear-:Cl!t "class" and "cultural affinity" 
" .. ··· 
" between whites and, coloureds. Whites and coloureds do have similarities in many 
categories, such as housing, migration, religion and language. However, these parallels 
do not exist in other important categories, including education and income. In addition, 
data in other areas, such as employment, seem inconclusive. This seems to call into 
question the notion that there exists an overwhelming affinity between whites and 
coloureds that can be measured in terms of demographic data. If one exists, it may be 
based more on perceptions than actual socioeconomic conditions, a possibility I shall not 
attempt to explore here. 
Interestingly, the very analysts from whom I borrow these demographic data reach a 
different conclusion. Mattes, Giliomee and James argue that a demographic basis exists 
for a cultural affinity between coloureds and whites. They contend, for example, that the 
housing and employment statistics, particularly with respect to the "housewife" category, 
show a great deal of socioeconomic similarity between whites and coloureds. 
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Africans, on the other hand, are much less educated, live in worse housing conditions 
and have lower incomes. The coloured population also lacks any "cultural markers" of 
its own and instead shares much in common with the white population, especially in 
regard to language and religion.32 
As I argue above, however, the housing data appear to have limits and one should vie\\l 
with caution any conclusions drawn from them. In regard to employment, the 
"housewife" category seems minor in comparison to the larger share of respondents who 
fall into the full-time category. If anything, the full-time data appear to suggest a 
marginal closeness bet,veen coloureds and Africans , rather than between coloureds and 
whites. In addition, income and education data also seem to indicate a similarity between 
32Mattes, Giliomee and James, 'The Election in the W esteru Cape," pp. -1--5. 
Chapter One Page 25 
coloureds and Africans. In terms of religious affiliation, I would agree that coloureds 
may have most in common with whites -- but it is important to note that the same data 
also suggest similarities between white and African voters. 
Electoral system 
Like the crucial historical event~ and key demographic data discussed above, the ground 
rules for contesting the election were an important part of the context in which the 
ANC's campaign would take place. Some would argue that they offered incentives that 
could shape the nature of party campaigning. Understanding these rules, and their 
origins. may shed light on the ANC's campaign strategy. Many scholars have theorized 
how electoral sy~tems influence political systems and party competition in general. 
Several. such as Donald Horowitz33, Arend Lijphart3-I and Andrew Reynolds, 35 have 
written on what kind of electoral system would be most appropriate for South Africa in 
1994. Although their theories diverge on particular issues, they tend to agree on at least 
one basic premise: that different types of electoral systems present different types of 
campaign incentives for parties. 
Origins 
South Africa's electoral system for the 1994 elections grew out of negotiations between 
the country's major political parties. At the Kempton Park muJtiparty talks in the latter 
part of 1993, the issue of what type of electoral system would be most suitable for South 
Africa seemed to draw little discussion. A great deal of debate, on the other hand, did 
33Donald Horowitz, A Democratic South Africa?: Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society, Cape 
Town: Oxford University Press, 1991. 
3-IArend Lijphart, Power-Sharing in South Africa, Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 
1985. 
35 Andrew Reynolds, Voting for a New South Africa, Cape Town: Maskew Miller Longman, I 993. 
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arise over certain features of the electoral law, ranging from who could vote to what the 
ballots would look like. In addition, despite approval at the negotiations of the AN C's 
proposed single regional /national ballot method of voting, renewed controversy on this 
issue emerged shortly before the elections. 
The negotiating parties deliberated only briefly at Kempton Park on selecting a type of 
electoral system.36 Certainly, each party initially advocated the type of system it 
expected would offer it the greatest electoral advantage. Also, a technical committee at 
the talks, responsible for recommending an appropriate electoral system, sought the 
advice of a "wide range of experts" on a variety of options.37 However, once the issue 
passed from technical committees to the task group level, it became largely a matter of 
whether parties would agree to the ANC's proposal (see below).38 The National Party 
(NP), for example, seemed with few exceptions to have put little thought into the choice 
of voting system. One ranking NP official even termed this issue as merely a matter of 
"sommetjies maak" -- Afrikaans for "malting sums. "39 
The ANC had adopted a position in October of 1990 calling for a 400-member national 
parliament elected by PR with two lists -- half the seats from the regions and half from 
36This does not necessarily reflect the extent to which both parties, and perhaps the ANC in particular, had 
intra-party debates outside of the formal negotiations on the choice of electoral system. 
37Bob Mattes, "The Road to Democracy: From 2 February 1990 to '1:7 April 1994," Election '94 South 
Africa: The Campaigns, Results and Future Prospects, Andrew Reynolds, ed., Cape Town: David Philip, 
1994, p. 6. 
38CJaire Robertson, "Contesting the Contest: Negotiating the Election Machinery," paper submitted to 
Ravan Press, 1994. Robertson describes some of the different levels at which issues were discussed in the 
negotiations. In reference to "task groups," in particular, she notes, "[they] were widely used at the talks, 
and were generally held to be useful not only because they allowed hard bargaining by small negotiating 
teams but also because they limited the power of technical committees by ensuring that negotiators were 
directly involved in thrashing out the details of planned laws. But they did not take precedence over 
bilaterals, as the task group on electoral legislation would discover when, toward the end of negotiations, its 
stance on a separate ballot for provincial elections was sacrificed in a bilateral trade-off between the ANC 
and DP" (p. 8). 
39Hennann Giliomee, "Trends of Past Show Likely Path to Future," Cape Times, January 27, 1994, as cited 
in Mattes , "The Road to Democracy," p. 8. 
Chapter One Page 27 
the national leveJ.-IO This system, on which Kempton Park negotiators eventually 
reached consensus, offered the ANC several potential advantages. For example, the 
concept of voting for parties and their national leaders provided a measure of simplicity 
for non-Iiterate41 voters, many of whom were believed to be ANC supporters. 
Negotiators on all sides seemed to agree, despite evidence to the contrary cited by critics, 
that such voters would only be able to understand and use the most basic voting 
procedures. 42 It was argued that having to choose between possibly less well-known 
candidates on a smaller, constituency basis would be confusing for them. In addition, the 
ANC as a large party could exert control over the nomination of candidates and 
potentially ensure their loyalty in parliament.43 
Some criticized the ANC's proposal as a move to solidify its power, but a few key ANC 
negotiators claim it chose PR actually to a) lower its chances of winning a two-thirds 
majority-+-t and b) lessen concerns that it sought to dominate the new govemment.45 They 
argue that the final system agreed upon at Kempton Park was an "inclusive approach" 
designed to enable participation by small parties and minimize political conflict -- it 
provided a seat to any party that gained just 25 percent of the national vote.46 In addition, 
as a gesture toward federalism, it included a senate as an upper house in parliament, 
consisting of ten senators from each of the provinces elected by their respective 
provincial parliaments. 47 
-IOReynolds, Voting for a New South Africa, p. -n. 
41 The term "non-literate" was used frequently during the pre-election period rather than "illiterate," which 
was \·iewed as having demeaning connotations. 
42 Robertson, p. 11 . 
43Mattes. "The Road to Democracy," p. 7. 
44Parties had agreed that a two-thirds majority or "super majority" would be required for making changes 
to the interim consticution and approving the new one. Some feared that the ANC with a two-thirds 
majority in parliament could simply impose whatever kind of constitution it wanted. 
45Kader Asma!, interview, July 5, 1994. 
46Essop Pahad, interview, December 1993, as cited in Robertson, p. 11 . 
47Martin Meredith , South Africa 's New Era: The 1994 Election, London: Mandarin Paperbacks, 1994, p. 
97. Arguably, the inclusion of the Senate may have also been a gesture toward bicameralism, in order to 
lessen fears of rampant centralized majoritarianism. 
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PR should not be seen as merely a "gift" from the ANC to other parties, however. 
Avoiding a two-thirds majority, lessening fears of ANC domination, and making 
gestures toward federalism would serve a purpose for the ANC. They might, for 
example, discourage parties like the IFP from "opting out" of the Government of 
National Unity. They might also enable the ANC to avoid shouldering full blame for 
any problems left unresolved after the first five years following the election. In addition, 
this might help the ANC "sell" the new South Africa to foreign investors, by portraying 
the country as a fairly unified, and possibly stable, participatory democracy. After all, 
the ANC probably would need considerable funds to finance the various facets of its 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP).-IB In addition, the ANC 
conceivably could govern with as little as 51 percent in Parliament under PR, if it had a 
tightly organized and disciplined caucus. 
Despite the accomplishments made at Kempton Park, not all issues were resolved at the 
conclusion of the talks in November 1993. Several questions continued to attract debate , 
some new and some re-emerging, up until just days before the elections. The issue of 
whether to use a "double ballot," one ballot for national parliament and another for the 
provincial one, emerged as one of the most contentious during the negotiations. Parties 
had agreed upon the ANC's proposed single ballot in November -- an accomplishment 
which Robertson credits to the ANC's skillful last-minute maneuvering49 -- but the matter 
resurfaced only a few weeks before the elections. 
-IBThis is not to argue, one way or the other, whether the ANC had the interests of the nation at heart in 
these proposals. I only wish to point out that, in the very least, a PR system seemed to serve the pany's 
interests. 
49Robertson, p. 15. 
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The ANC had argued that a single ballot offered simplicity and would avoid confusing 
voters into believing they had a second choice of whom to vote for. In particular, the 
ANC feared that some African voters might be "fooled" into supporting the PAC on their 
second ballot. ANC research had suggested that a mistaken second preference vote on 
the provincial ballot could give the PAC up to 30 percent of the vote. Smaller, more 
regionally-based parties, on the other hand. expected that a double ballot would benefit 
them since voters might select the ANC nationally but favor a regional party for 
provincial representation. They defended the double ballot as more democratic, giving 
voters a greater degree of choice than a single ballot. Finally, in a last-minute effort to 
coax the Freedom Alliance into participating in the election, the ANC capitulated and the 
double ballot became part of the electoral law in March 1994. 50 
At stake in the Western Cape were about 42 seats in the unicameral regional parliament. 
Befo re the election, the exact number of seats could only be an approximation since it 
would be determined by the proportion of provincial votes cast to votes cast nationwide --
no one knew precisely how many voters would turn out on election day. The parliament 
would hold responsibility for drafting a provincial constitution in accordance with the 
principles of the interim national constitution, and two-thirds approval would be required 
for its passage. As in every province, each party winning a minimum of ten percent of 
these seats would be able to name members to the regional cabinet, called the Executive 
Council. The composition of the Executive Council would include a premier and no 
more than ten other members. si 
50Robenson, p. 16. 
51 Meredith, p. 99. 
Chapter One Page 30 
Incentives 
The type of electoral system, and the use of separate national and provincial ballots, 
seemed to offer at least four main incentives for party campaigns. First, the major parties 
might be tempted to focus on urban areas, where the bulk of the provincial electorate 
lived. How could a party secure a majority in the legislature?52 Under a first-past-the-
post constituency-based system, a party probably would have to win a plurality of the 
vote in a majority of constituencies. This might require a party to expend resources over 
a wide geographic area.53 Under PR, however, a party simply had to win a majority of 
the provincial vote. It could target those places where most voters resided. Critically, the 
densest concentration of the Western Cape electorate was in the greater Cape Town area -;/j 
- main parties would possibly devote the bulk of their efforts there. 
Second. the electoral system gave parties an opportunity to pool funds, workers and 
candidates from some areas to be used in other areas. After all, winning in particular 
voting districts was not necessarily as crucial as simply winning votes anywhere in the 
province. For example, the ANC could pull volunteers and candidates from communities 
of strong support, like Khayelitsha and Guguletu, to be used in places with weaker yet 
potential support, like Delft and Mitchell's Plain.~ 
521 assume that the main parties wanted to win as many seats as possible , or at least a majority in the 
legislature, and that they were unlikely to form coalitions for shared legislative control. This is a critical 
assumption here since parties' reluctance to form coalitions is not necessarily self-evident from the factors I 
have presented thusfar. See Chapter Two for public opinion data that the Western Cape elections would 
likely prove a two-party contest between the ANC and NP, with all other parties trailing far behind. See 
also Chapter Three: perceptions by ANC and NP leaders that their respective party stood a chance of 
winning, coupled with deep ideological and historical differences with other parties, may have made a 
coalition very unlikely. 
53This incentive is often cited by those arguing for retaining the U.S. Electoral College instead of shifting 
to a system of directly electing the PresidenL The Electoral College generally makes it imperative for 
presidential candidates to spread at least some of their efforts across a broad geographic area, rather than 
simply focus on population centers. 
~This is not to argue that such pooling of resources could not also take place under a first-past-the-post, 
constituency-based electoral system. Rather, I only mean to suggest that PR may allow parties to pool 
resources more readily. 
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Third, the role of party leaders in campaign activities would be of potentially critical 
importance. As Hermann Giliomee argues, the electoral system "presidentialized" the 
campaigns.55 The absence of constituency voting for individual candidates meant that 
voters would be faced with a choice on election day between parties, represented on 
the ballot by their respective national leaders.56 Depending on the familiarity of voters 
with party candidates, many might base their vote -- at least partly -- on their 
perception of the party leader. The election might be, to some extent, a battle between 
presidential candidates. Thus, if the ANC made the Western Cape a priority 
nationally, then it would possibly schedule a significant number of appearances in the 
province by Nelson Mandela.57 
Fourth. the adoption of the double-ballot voting method also had possible implications 
for the ANC's campaign. Given the possibility that voters might mistake the provincial 
ballot for a second preference ballot, the ANC had an interest in educating voters or at 
least persuading them to support it on both ballots. Also, there was a chance that the 
ANC. with its widespread national appeal as a liberation movement, might lose 
provincial votes because of its popularity. Certain voters might vote ANC nationally but 
vote NP or IFP provincially in an attempt to avoid ANC domination at both levels of 
government. The ANC might see a need to address this issue in its appeals, and try to 
convince voters that it needed their support especially in the Western Cape and 
KwaZulu/Natal, where it faced close contests. 
55Giliomee, "Trends of the Past..", p. 6 . 
.56-rhe ballots also included the name of the pany and the pany's symbol. 
57Mandela proved to be less popular than de Klerk in the Western Cape. See Chapter Two for pre-election 
public opinion data on party leader support. 
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In addition, Sisk maintains that the electoral system offered advantages for the ANC in 
particular. For example, it simplified the voting process by having voters choose parties 
instead of, for example, several candidates from a long list. African ANC supporters 
were presumed to have the least familiarity with voting, and thus the simpler the ballot, 
the less the incidence of "spoilage. 11 58 
Possible impact on campaign 
To recapitulate , the history, demographics and the electoral system of the Western Cape 
all represented important parts of the environment parties faced in the run-up to the 
April 1994 elections. It was possible that each of these factors would influence the 
ANC's campaign strategy. 
The hi story of the region appeared to pose three potential effects. First, if the ANC 
wanted to control the provincial legislature, then it almost certainly needed to win a 
significant number of votes from the coloured majority. The ANC might direct a 
considerable share of its appeals toward coloured voters. Second, given that the African 
minority represented the bulk of the AN C's membership, conflicts within the party might 
arise over which of the two groups -- Africans or coloureds -- ought to be the principal 
target of the AN C's strategy. Third, the disbanding of the UDF might limit the interest of 
some coloured voters in supporting the ANC, or the ability of the ANC to take advantage 
of former UDF activists and structures in coloured areas. 
Demographic data seem to suggest two main, possible influences on the ANC's 
campaign. Major socioeconomic gaps between all three main groups in the province 
58Timothy D. Sisk, A New South African Social Contract?: Institutional Choice in a Divided Society, 
Washington, D.C. : The George Washington University, unpublished doctoral dissertation, September 30, 
1992, pp. 358-361. 
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I meant that the party might have to appeal to each of them cliff erentl y, if it desired their 
support. For example, issues that might resonate among African voters might not interest 
coloured voters to the same extent. Also, no overwhelming basis seemed to exist for an 
affinity among coloured people for whites. Perhaps coloureds were not as likely to 
support traditionally white parties such as the NP as some analysts had predicted, and the 
ANC might be able to attract some of their votes. Data on political attitudes of coloured 
voters toward the main parties might shed light on this possibility, and I explore that issue 
in the next chapter. 
In addition, as noted above. the electoral system appeared to pose four plausible 
effects on the ANC's strategy. First, the party might focus on urban centers since it 
did not necessari ly have to win votes across a broad geographic area. Second, for the 
same reason, the ANC might pool its resources and target them toward communiti es 
where it faced possible large net gains in support. Third, if the party made the 
Western Cape a national priority, then it might schedule a significant number of 
appearances in the province by Nelson Mandela. Finally, the use of the double ballot 
meant that the ANC had an interest in educating voters and persuading them to vote 
ANC on the provincial ballot. 
I have not yet discussed one critical piece of the pre-election context in the Western 
Cape, however. Even if the ANC recognized historical and material differences between 
racial groups, and saw a need to focus on urban areas, how would it decide which voters 
to target principally and why? In Chapters Two and Three, I examine how various ANC 
leaders viewed the race for the Western Cape, and what critical strategic decisions they 
made on the basis of this understanding. 
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Two tins of pickled gherkins and a bottle of English blueberry jam. I don 't th ink we 're going to survive 
the election siege. 
Some people panicked as the April 1994 elections approached, and 
began hoarding foodstuffs and other supplies. 
J CHAPTER TWO: Voter Attitudes 
In thi s chapter, I explore pre-campaign political views of the electorate in order to answer 
the following question : 
What impact might knowledge of voters' political attitudes have had on 
ANC strategy? 
A range of public opinion polls took place in the Western Cape in the period before 
campaigning began. I draw upon the findings of several of them in an attempt to 
detenni ne levels of party support, and examine the nature of this support. I begin by 
focusing on the extent to which voters identified with and favored parties, and 
characterize the support bases of the main parties in terms of key features such as race 
and economic status. I then explore how voters perceived parties with respect to key 
electi on issues. 59 I also suggest the degree to which the Western Cape electorate may 
han been "up for grabs" or available to the main parties and, finally, attempt to answer 
the question above. 
Identification with and support for parties 
Party identification proved generally low among most of the electorate. Although this 
limited its usefulness as a predictor of voting behavior, its significance remained: low 
59Scholars differ O\·er what factors influence how voters vote, and the extent to wtn.: h one should apply 
"Western" voting behavior theory to societies outside the West. I do not attempt to enter into these debates. 
However. I do discuss attitudes of the Western Cape electorate in tenns of Western theory, particularly the 
"party identification" and "issue voting" models. For an overview of these theories, see Martin Harrop and 
William Miller, Elections and Voters: A Comparative Introduction, London: MacMillan, 1987. For party 
identification theory, see Angus Campbell, P. Converse, W.E. Miller & D.B. Stokes, The American Voter, 
New York: Wiley, 1960. For issue voting, see Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, New 
York: Harper & Row, 1957. For a discussion of why Western theories seem to apply to South African 
rnters. see Roben Mattes. The Election Book: Reason and Judgment in South Africa's 1994 Election, Cape 
Town: Institute for Democracy in South Africa, 1995. 
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identification with parties meant that voting intentions possibly were more changeable 
than if identification had been high. Most voters, particularly those in the majority 
coloured population, exhibited only weak if any allegiance to parties. Only African and 
white voters showed notable levels of party identification. 60 
A series of polls in 1992 and early 1993 found that most voters supported the NP, at least 
among those who were not undecided. The NP consistently maintained support of 
between 43 and 61 percent of the electorate, compared to the ANC's 10 to 24 percent. 
Interestingly. there also seemed to be a wide gap in the popularity of party leaders.61 NP 
leader F. W. de Kl erk found favor with between 54 and 68 percent, and ANC president 
Nelson Mandela garnered a meager 9 to 22 percent. Despite the NP's apparent edge, 
however, its lead over the ANC seemed to shorten over time. Figures 5 through 7 below 
illustrate how the overall gap in both leader and party support narrowed slightly from 
February 1992 to February 1993. Interestingly. de Kl erk tended to gain higher ratings 
than hi s party , whereas Mandela received less than the ANC. 
Beyond these early measurements of party support and party leader popularity, polls 
conducted in mid to late 1993 revealed another crucial feature of the electorate -- a 
considerable number of Western Cape voters did not yet know, or would not say, for 
which party they would vote.62 Figure 8 depicts three surveys' estimates of the size of 
60Source: Research Initiatives. See below for funher information on the survey conducted by Research 
Initiatives in mid-1993. 
61 The extent to which party suppon was influenced by leader popularity, or vice versa, is a matter for 
debate. I note the data on leaders here at least to illustrate the strong apparent similarity to party suppon 
levels . 
62Different polls characterized these voters in different ways. Some had response categories of "don't 
know" and "undecided," whereas others used "uncenain" or "won't say." I do not attempt to equate these 
various categories with one another. as this would be methodologically problematic for many reasons. 
Rather, I lump them together under the umbrella of "undecided" in order to demonstrate broadly which 
voters did not. or refused to, indicate their party preference. 
Chapter Two 
Figure 5: Support for Partv Leaders. Februarv 199,., to Februarv 1993 












Feb-92 Apr-92 Jul-92 Oct-92 Feb-93 





40 --• NP 




Feb-92 Apr-92 Jul-92 CX:t-92 Feb-93 
Page 37 
63 As cited in Robert B. Mattes, "Appendix: Public Support for Parties and Leaders in South Africa: A 
Review of Poll Data," The Impact of Public Opinion Polling on South Africa's Transition to Democracy: A 
Report to the ''Investigation Into Research Methodology Project" of the Human Sciences Research Council, 
unpublished report, 1995, p. 185. yfattes' report includes data from five HSRC polls, the samples of which 
are indicated as n=[sample size]: February 1992, n=2,000; April 1992, n=2,000; July 1992, 11=2,000; 
September-October 1992, n=2,000; and February 1993, n=l ,999. These polls are attributed hereafter to the 
HSRC, with the specific poll-date also listed. The data cited here include those respondents who declined 
to express au opinion. 
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this "undecided" bloc. Each suggests that it was significantly large, encompassing from 
about one-fifth to as much as one-third of the electorate.64 Most undecided voters were 
also coloured. One poll put this number at a whopping 80 percent of coloured voters, 65 
although another indicated that it was closer to 58 percent. 66 Either way, about three-
fifths or four-fifths of coloureds appeared to have not yet decided which party to support, 
or would not tell. One could argue that thi's reflects the large lack of party identification 
among coloured voters, with those who identified little with a party being unlikely to 
know how they would vote. 
64r-.;early all of the analysis of the mid-1993 Research Initiatives poll that I cite below is borrowed directly 
from Jeremy Seekings' contribution to an unpublished paper that he and I co-authored: "An Uphill Battle: 
Voter Attitudes and Ar-.;C Strategy in the Western Cape in the 1994 South African Elections," unpublished 
paper, April 1995. I am indebted to him for that assessment of those data. The comparative analysis of that 
poll and others, however, is mine alone. 
65See description of Research Initiatives survey below. Sigillficantly, findings of this survey were not released 
publicly before the elections, and as Robert Mattes argues, it appears to have been commissioned by the A1'\JC 
as internal strategic intelligence. Mattes identifies a compelling, rare coincidence between the sample size and 
date of the "Al'<C" poll described Lodge in ''The African l'<ational Congress and Its Allies," and the "Matla 
Trnst" survey referred to in an article by Susan Booysen of Research Initiatives. See Robert Manes, The 
Impact of Public Opinion Polling on South Africa's Transition to Democracy: A Report to the ''Investigation 
into Research Methodology Project" of the Human Sciences Research Council, unpublished report, 1995. 
66See description of Argusi~fMR survey below. This poll does not explicitly estimate the percentage of 
1D1decided coloured voters in the Western Cape. It does , however, put the number of coloureds who were 
undecided at 33 percent. I use this number, with Independent Electoral Commission population figures of 
56 per.cent coloured, 18 percent African and 25 percent white, to derive the estimate of 58 percent. 
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Figure 8: Percentage of Undecided Voters67 
Source: Research Initiatives1Marketing ..\tledia Research,68 Argus/Marketing Media Research,69 and 















Surveys also suggested that the electoral contest would be a two-party race between the 
NP and ANC, with the Democratic Party (DP) trailing at a distant third place. Figure 9 
illustrates three voting intention estimates. All of these polls showed the NP leading the 
ANC to varying degrees. What is perhaps most important about these estimates, though, 
is that only two parties appeared to have a real chance of winning control of the province. 
67'This figure, and all others which list polling data from more than one source, should be viewed with 
caution. Given the methodological disparities between these polls, they do not necessarily lend themselves 
to direct comparisons with one another. For instance, some pose questions in different ways, which may 
lead to differences in how respondents answer. Thus, in this figure I do not attempt to use the data as a 
kind of "election meter" to illustrate how the percentage of m1decided voters may have .shifted over time 
from August 1993 to December 1993. Instead, I merely offer examples of surveys in mid to late 1993 
which sought to measure how many voters were undecided. What is most relevant to this dissertation is 
that a significant proportion, between about one-fifth and one-third, of the Western Cape electorate fell into 
this category. 
68As cited in Edridge and Seekings, "An Uphill Battle." This survey was conducted nationwide in July 
and August 1993, although tlle data cited here are from tlle Western Cape only. In the Western Cape, a 
total of 1,282 people were interviewed at home in the language of their choice -- including 382 Africans , 
800 coloureds and 100 whites . See tlle appendix of "Au Uphill Battle" for further details on tlle survey. 
1lris poll is referred to hereafter as Research Initiatives. 
69As cited in Mattes, "Appendix: Public Support," pp. 171-172. This poll took place during .:-.iovember 29 
to December 29, 1994, and is referred to hereafter as Argusi.!\t!YlR. 
70As cited in Mattes "Appendix: Public Support," p. 216. Tlris poll occurred during November to 
December 1993 with a sample of 2,500 people in tlle Western Cape. The sample included 1,425 coloureds, 
582 whites and .+93 Africans. Results were weighted to reflect tlle population of tlle province. This poll is 
referred to hereafter as ~fPDtM&O. 
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Despite Cape Town's significance as a historical stronghold of DP support, the DP did 
not appear to be a serious contender for more than a small share of the vote. 











HSRC '.?./93 Research tvfPDtM&O 
Initiatives 8/93 l'.?.!93 
These polls produced another significant finding -- there seemed to exist a strong 




suggested by party identification levels above, appeared to have already lined up behind 
the NP and ANC, respectively. Figure 10 shows how voters in each major racial (:{) 
category indicated their voting intention in rnid-1993. /coloured voters seemed largely ~ 
divided, although those who did indicate a preference chose the NP over the ANC by 
nearly three to one. The vast majority of Africans chose the ANC, with a small number 
opting for the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC). Two to three out of four whites, 
on the other hand, pref erred traditionally white parties, including the NP, DP and other 
right-wing groups. Figure 11 illustrates voting intentions among whites for these parties. 
Comparing survey results from mid-1993 to those of late 1993 offers a consistent pattern 
of ANC and NP voting intention according to race. As in August 1993, two December 
1993 polls suggest that the ANC's core constituency consisted primarily of African 
voters, and that the NP's support base comprised mostly white and coloured voters. 
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Figure 10: Voting Intention by Race. Mid-1 99371 




































Figure l'.2 shows the percentage of each racial group that preferred the ANC in each of 
these polls, and Figure 13 demonstrates this for the NP. 
Beyond looking at voting intentions within the three major racial groups, examining 
voting intentions for each party according to race illustrates how significant these support 
levels are. Table 5 offers a breakdown of these data in mid-1993. One important feature 
of these results is that more of those favo1ing the NP were coloured than white. 
71Totals do not add up to 100 due to rounding. 
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Even though most white voters intended to vote NP, there were many coloured voters 
who al so shared this intention. This becomes even more apparent when comparing 
mid-1993 survey resul ts to those of late 1993. Figure 14 juxtaposes two surveys' 
estimates of NP voting intentions by race, as a proportion of eligible voters. It 
indicates that the NP derived a third to more than three times as much of its backing 
from coloureds as compared to whites. 
72The "far right" parties included in these polls are as follows: Research Initiatives -- not specified; 
Argus/N~IR -- Conservative Party (CP); i\IIPDIM&O -- CP and Afrikaner Volksfront. 
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African coloured white 
Table 5: Voting Intention by Party. Mid-1993. According to Race 
~ NE 12£ Far Ii !?ht- ~ I.EE 
Wlll!? 
African 65 100 
Coloured '27 60 60 
White 8 40 40 100 100 
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Voting intentions did not correlate with race in all cases, however. Perhaps most 
important, a significant proportion of coloured voters did not favor the NP. More than 
one-quarter of coloured voters preferred the ANC to the NP in mid-1993 and, by late 
1993, more than one-fifth continued to prefer the ANC.73 This flew in the face of 
predictions that ooloured voters would overwhelmingly support traditionally white 
parties such as the NP. 
Class and race combined correlate more precisely to voting intention, than race or class 
alone. Although pre-election data on the relationship between occupational class and 
party preference are not available from any of the polls cited above,74 data are available 
on voting intention according to level of education, which I argue is a reasonable proxy 
for class. For example, working-class voters typically have fewer years of formal 
education than middle-class voters. Voters with education levels up to and including 
standard 8, can be reasonably considered "lower class," and those with standard 9 or 
above can be thought of as "higher class. "75 These notions of class apply most 
appropriately within each racial category rather than across all of them -- i.e., higher-class 
whites can generally be considered more well-off than higher-class Africans. 
Perhaps counter-intuitively, both the ANC and NP drew voting intentions in mid-
1993 from voters all along the range of education levels. No clear relationship seems 
to exist between education and voting intention, although the NP has slightly less 
backing than the ANC among "lower class" (lower education) voters and marginally 
73Late 1993 poll source: Argus!MMR. 
74Post-election data are publicly available, however. See Robert Mattes, "Dispelling Myth of Racism in 
Coloured Vote," OPINION POLL, Cape Town: Institute for Democracy in South Africa, vol. 1, no. 1, 
1995, pp. 1-2. 
75For nearly all white, most coloured, and many but not all African students, standard 8 in South Africa 
loosely represents the U.S. equivalent of grade 10, in which students are normally between 15 and 16 years 
old. Standard 9 is roughly grade 11, or ages 16 to 17. "Matric" is about grade 12, or ages 17 to 18. Post-
matric education includes instruction at a post-secondary institution, such as at a technikon (technical 
college) or university. 
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more support in the "upper class" (higher education) category. Table 6 demonstrates 
voters' preferences for each party according to "class" or level of education attained. 
Note that columns do not add to 100 due to rounding. 
Table 6: Voting Intention by Party. Mid-1993. According to "Class" (Education) 
ANC NP Other Parties Undecided 
std. 4 or less 19 13 23 
std. 5-8 42 43 11 59 
std. 9-10 23 23 33 12 
post-matric 15 20 56 6 
TOTAL 99 99 100 100 .•. 
@0 When combining class and race, however, and then comparing them to voting intention, 
an important relationship becomes clear. Among coloured voters, the NP gamers the 
bulk of its voting intentions from those who are "lower class." The ANC, on the other 
hand, attracts backing from predominantly "higher class" coloureds. This does not mean 
that "lower class" coloured voters did not back the ANC at all, but rather that more of 
them intended to vote NP. Figure 15 illustrates this pattern. 
There had seemed to be an enormous bloc of undecided coloured voters that might help 
the ANC close the gap with the NP. However, these data suggest that many undecideds 
actually had important economic and racial similarities with NP supporters. Most 
undecided voters were "lower class" coloureds, just like the majority of those who 
favored the NP. This might mean that undecideds would share many of the same 
political attitudes as NP supporters, and might also have the same voting intention on 
election day. 
Chapter Two 
Figure 15: Voting Intentions by Race and Class. Mid- 1993 
Source: Research Initiatives 
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Key election issues 
Political violence, jobs and the economy emerged as the most pressing concerns of the 
Western Cape electorate as a whole. Respondents mentioned unemployment and crime 
as things that were going wrong in South Africa, and two-thirds of them said that 
"nothing" was going right. Altogether, NP supporters and undecided voters were the 
most worried about violence and crime. 
Attitudes about violence, jobs and the economy generally favored the NP over the ANC. 
When asked which party had caused a lot of violence, only 6 percent of respondents 
named the NP, compared to 40 percent who named the ANC. Nearly one-third of 
coloured voters named the ANC a party which "cannot control its supporters." With 
respect to jobs and the economy, almost 50 percent of voters agreed that "an ANC 
government will mismanage the economy, " and another 6 percent were uncertain. 
Undecided voters agreed with this statement by 2 to 1. Thus, undecideds perceived the 
ANC negatively with regard to two critical issues. 
In addition, many coloured voters indicated that they viewed the ANC as unresponsive to 
their needs. Half of them agreed that "an ANC government will neglect the problems of 
coloureds, Indians and whites," and one-quarter named the A Casa party of which they 
were afraid. Only about 20 percent identified the ANC as a party "with a place for 
people like me." With respect to the NP, some expressed criticism of its past 
performance. However, most viewed it more positively than the ANC in terms of the 
future. About 33 percent of coloureds agreed with the statement "the NP has ruined our 
economy and created unemployment," but about the same number disagreed. Only one 
in five agreed that, "The NP cannot be trusted to improve our lives." Half said that the 
NP was the most capable of dealing with their most pressing concern, compared to only 
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20 percent who named the ANC -- and undecided voters named the NP over the ANC by 
three to one. 
An analysis of responses regarding most pressing concerns suggests a critical finding: 
most undecided voters had attitudes similar to those of NP supporters. Most viewed the 
ANC negatively, particularly with respect to jobs, violence and the economy. Many 
believed that the NP was more capable of addressing these problems. Thus, although 
they appeared to be undecided in terms of voting intention, their views of the parties with 
respect to key concerns showed them leaning away from the ANC. 
Other factors 
Mid-1993 survey data highlight several important aspects of the general mood among 
voters.76 NP supporters tended to be pessimistic about the future, whereas ANC 
supporters were optimistic. About 80 percent of Africans expected that they would enjoy 
better living conditions, a greater degree of peace and more freedom. Two-thirds of 
white voters, on the other hand, anticipated worsening living conditions. Coloured voters Bg 
seemed to be about 40 percent optimistic, 20 percent pessimistic and 40 percent unsure. 
Perhaps most important, undecided coloured voters appeared the least optimistic and 
most uncertain -- they had more in common with NP supporters than ANC supporters in 
this regard. 
Undecided voters' perceptions of party leaders offered another indication that they 
tended to favor the NP. Overall, as Figure 16 illustrates, 42 percent of the electorate 
named de KJerk as the leader who would make the best president, whereas only 26 
percent named Mandela. When examining undecided coloured voters, this disparity 
76Source: Research Initiatives. See Eldridge and Seekings, "An Uphill Battle," pp. 5-8. 
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widens. About 46 percent answered de Kl erk, compared to a mere 6 percent for 
Mandela. Figure 17 depicts this gap. 
Figure 16: Support for Partv Leaders, Mid-1993 
Source: Research Initiatives 
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de Klerk 
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Fiiure 17: Support for Partv Leaders amoni Undecided Coloured Voters. mid-1993 
Source: Research Initiatives 
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Further evidence of undecided voters' inclinations toward the NP can be found by 
Page49 
examining answers to the question, "Do you trust and believe what X says?" As Tables 7 
and 8 show, Mandela and Allan Boesak found wide support among African voters. On 
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the other hand, undecided coloured voters viewed them much less positively. About 18 
percent trusted Mandela, but 28 percent said that they did not trust him. Although de 
Klerk garnered little trust among African voters, a majority of undecided coloureds 
trusted him. 
Table 7: Do you trust and believe what X says? (Among Undecided Coloured Voters) 
F.W. de Klerk (%) Nelson Mandela(%) Allan Boesak (%) 
Undecided coloured 
voters 
Yes 54 18 13 
No 7 28 28 
Not sure 36 49 39 
Don't know him 3 5 20 
TOTAL 100 100 100 
Table 8: Do you trust and believe what X says? (Among African Voters) 
F.W. de Klerk (%) Nelson Mandela(%) Allan Boesak (%) 
African voters 
Yes 5 98 87 
No 74 1 3 
Not sure 21 1 10 
Don't know him 0 0 0 
TOTAL 100 lUU 100 
Implications for ANC strategy 
Possible imp~ct of knowledge of voter attitudes 
The ANC at the start of the campaign period found itself faced with at least three 
compelling findings from survey research: 1) most polls showed the NP ahead of the 
ANC in terms of voting intentions and stated support, 2) there seemed to exist a large 
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bloc of undecided voters, but 3) many of these undecideds appeared to be already leaning 
toward the NP.77 
In the impending struggle for undecided voters, the NP had an important advantage. @ 
Most undecided voters had much in common with existing NP supporters. The majority 
of undecideds were lower class coloured voters, with an economic and racial background 
similar to that of the NP's core constituency. Most viewed the ANC as responsible for 
political violence, and feared that it would not manage the economy well or provide jobs 
for coloured people. They saw the NP as more able to protect social stability and limit 
violence. Many, like NP supporters, felt generally pessimistic about the future and 
di strusted ANC leaders. 
The high number of undecided voters suggested, on its face, that both the ANC and NP 
had a chance of winning the Western Cape. However, the parallels in attitudes among 
undecideds and NP supporters meant that the NP stood a better chance of winning. 
Undecideds did not appear to be equally "available" to both parties. For the ANC to win , 
it seemed to face a daunting task -- to improve its image among undecided voters, 
particularly with respect to j bs, violence and the economy. 
The primary implications of these findings for ANC strategy seemed to be twofold. First, 
the party might make the province a national priority, perhaps depending on other 
considerations at the national level. If ANC leaders perceived the party to be winning 
elsewhere, and if they concluded from public opinion data that they had a chance of 
winning the Western Cape, then they might decide to make a special effort here. Second, 
771 hasten to highlight the fact that I base these conclusions largely on Research Initiatives data which, as 
indicated above, seem to have represented internal ANC strategic intelligence not available to the public 
until after the elections. Those not involved in ANC campaign strategy probably did not have access to this 
information, except for other main parties which very likely commissioned their own studies. Thus, one 
may not necessarily have drawn conclusions like mine from the publicly available data alone. I also base 
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the ANC might focus its appeals almost exclusively on undecided coloured people, since 
they represented arguably the pivotal group of voters, and the party already enjoyed 
overwhelming support among Africans. 
How did party leaders interpret these public opinion data, and to what extent did other 
factors influence their choice of strategy? In Chapter Three, I explore the decision 
making process out of which the ANC's approach emerged. 
my fi ndings on information from polling advisors to the ANC and party strategists, whose views I discuss 
in Chapter Three. 
The NP, represented here by de Klerk, was accused of pandering to Western Cape voters' 
fears of the ANC as a communist, violent African party. 

PART II: 
Evolution of the Campaign 
CHAPTER THREE: Strategic Choices, Competing Voices 
In this chapter, I explore the initial campaign strategy adopted by the ANC in the 
Western Cape.78 I begin by briefly outlining the general approach that national 
campaign organizers chose to use across the country. I then examine the internal 
dynamics of the AN C's provincial strategy formulation, with a look at the principal 
options under consideration. I also identify key developments that may have influenced 
the outcome. The information presented here and in Chapters Four and Five will enable 
me, in Chapter Six, to offer specific answers to my principal research questions -- in 
particular, the extent to which critical factors seem to have shaped ANC strategy before 
and during the campaign.79 
The national approach 
The ANC developed a strategy on the national level that seemed designed to accomplish 
two broad goals: first, consolidating votes among the party's core support base of 
Africans and, second, winning new support in non-African areas. Ostensibly in order to 
meet these objectives, national strategists selected two campaign slogans. Initially, they 
would use "Now Is the Time," a theme on which they had relied for nearly a year.80 It 
seemed to emphasize the "liberation" nature of the election in an effort to motivate 
African voters. As the campaign got underway, they would introduce "A Better Life for 
All ," seeking to persuade voters -- particularly those who were either undecided or weak 
78This chapter and those that follow draw heavily on analysis that Jeremy Seekings and I have used in a 
series of papers: "An Uphill Battle;" "Mandela's Lost Province: The African National Congress and the 
Western Cape Electorate in the 1994 South African Elections," Journal of Southern African Studies, vol. 22 
no. 4, Dec. 1996, pp. 517-540; and "Losing the Unwinnable Cape: The ANC's Campaign Strategy in 1994," 
unpublished paper, November 1995. 
79The initial strategy should not be confused conceptually with what I might call the ANC's "total" strategy, 
which includes the party's approach both before and during the campaign. I will evaluate this total strategy 
and relevant factors in Chapter Six. 
sowillie Hofmeyr, interview, June 24, 1994. 
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supporters of other parties -- that the ANC's plans would benefit al l South Africans, not 
just Africans. 81 Strategists agreed upon this dual approach, at no point taking for granted 
their chances of achieving a decisive win.82 In addition, the tone of the campaign would 
be constructive. As then provincial secretary Lemmo Kalako noted, "Overall , the ANC's 
national strategy was positive -- a better life for all, not harping on the past or criticizing 
the NP, just concentrating on what we could bring the people. •'83 
Internal provincial dynamics: debate over strategy 
The ANC's leaders in the Western Cape agreed on the importance of employing 
provincially both strands of the national strategy. However, deep disagreement arose 
over how or where to strike a balance between them in terms of the distribution of 
campaign resources. Provincial leaders divided generally into two camps: "Africanists," 
who sought to prioritize a "liberation"-oriented campaign among African voters, and 
advocates of a "coloured focus" who favored targeting undecided coloured voters.84 The 
province's demographic profile heightened the contrast between these two approaches. 
Africanists came from mainly African communities that comprised the bulk of the AN C's 
81 It is unclear why both slogans were not used from the outset, although this seems to indicate a shift in 
emphasis toward the inclusive, second theme, which may have been perceived as less threatening to voters 
outside of the ANC's core constituency. 
82 According to Ketso Gordhan, ANC national election campaign coordinator, about 70 percent of the 
ANC's elections expenditures nationally were directed at consolidating support, and about 30 percent on 
winning new supporters; telephone interview, March 24, 1995. 
83Lerumo Kalako, interview, November 1, 1994. In addition, I use the words "positive" and "negative" 
when describing the general tone of campaigns. By positive, I mean emphasizing what a given party has to 
offer, or reasons why voters should choose that party. This can include, for example, a party's campaign 
platform, manifesto or other plans for action once in office. Conversely, I define negative as stressing 
unfavorable aspects of an opposing party, or reasons why voters should not support that party. For 
instance, this may involve attacks on the integrity of the opposing party's candidates, its past perlormance 
in office, or its proposed policies. 
84for a discussion of the historical development of these approaches within the Charterist or ANC-
supporting movement, see Jeremy Seekings, "The United Democratic Front and the Struggle for 
Democracy," unpublished paper, University of Cape Town, forthcoming. 
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membership and leadership in the province, whereas some coloured focus advocates were 
from predominantly coloured or white areas with less support within the party. 
Africanists within the Western Cape ANC argued that the party should initially 
concentrate on consolidating support among African voters in townships and squatter 
settlements. Only after it had shored up its core constituency of African voters, they 
argued, could the ANC move effectively and from a position of strength into coloured 
areas. This approach was based on four beliefs: 
• the ANC's historical mission was the emancipation of the African majority, 
which had been more oppressed than any other racial group 
• African voters comprised substantially more than 18 percent of the electorate; 
the ANC thus not only had an obligation to ensure that its support base voted, 
but would also benefit from it, since there were many more African ANC 
voters than generally thought 
• the ANC had to counter not only the challenge of the PAC, but also the NP's 
attempts to secure African support in the province's huge shack settlements 
through the NP's alliance with prominent shack-lords85 
• a "multiracial"86 strategy played into the hands of the NP by accentuating 
supposed racial differences, and it undermined the "nonracial" character 
of the ANC.87 
85The NP included on its election list the shack-lords Johnson Ngxobongwana and Mali Hoza, whom the 
ANC derided as "notorious." 
86See below for a discussion of this term. 
87This paragraph is based on interviews with Tony Yengeni, February 13, 1995; Zou Kota, February 15, 
1995; Dugmore, December; and Kalako. 
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With respect to the second of these beliefs, Africanists took issue with how the 
population figures had been derived. The ANC mainly relied on statistics from the 
Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), which had estimated African 
populations based on aerial photographs.88 This method, Africanists argued, was 
fundamentally flawed because it only provided a crude approximation of how many 
people lived in African townships and squatter settlements. Most likely, the population 
density had been grossly underestimated. One could not determine the exact size of a 
particular household from the air, and the margin for error was undoubtedly far greater 
than DBSA analysts might admit. As one prominent African, Zou Kota, commented, 
"Whatever population office there is has no idea how many people are living in the back of my 
house. People were coming to this region almost daily .... A number of NGOs came up with 
stati stics but some were using different methods. At the end of the day, none could give a good 
number. The last census attempt door-to-door was in 1984 or 1985. n89 
Africanists did not disregard altogether the importance of winning coloureds' votes. On 
the contrary, although they favored placing primary emphasis on shoring up the votes of 
Africans, they argued that coloured support was also necessary. As former provincial 
secretary general Tony Yengeni put it, "we had to win over a substantial number of 
coloured voters to the ANC. ... For any party to win in this province, it must win a 
substantial number of coloureds in order to have an impact. "90 
Coloured focus advocates countered that the ANC could only win through securing a 
considerable number of votes outside of its core constituency. They pointed to public 
88Garth Strachan, interview, August 17, 1994. 
89Kota interview. 
90y engeni interview. 
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and internal ANC research that consistently showed that ANC support was very strong 
among African voters, but weak among coloured voters. They acknowledged that the 
support of African voters should not be taken for granted, but argued that three low-cost 
efforts would be most appropriate for African areas: 1) voter education, 2) mobilization 
to get voters to the polls and 3) publicizing aspects of the AN C's plans for jobs, houses 
and education. The ANC should concentrate most resources, they contended, on winning 
support from the large number of undecided, mostly coloured, voters. Campaign 
administrator, Garth Strachan remarked: 
"We needed to project the ANC as an organization in which coloureds could find expression for 
their aspirations. We needed to project a coloured leadership. And we needed to project the 
changing culture of the ANC in the Western Cape, down to things like [using) Afrikaans in 
freedom songs. 1191 
The ANC should seek to reassure coloureds on the key issues of jobs, housing, education 
and violence, and persuade them that the ANC would look out for their interests. It had 
to address coloureds' particular fears and concems.92 
Coloured focus advocates also took issue with the claim of some Africanists that if the 
ANC did not concentrate sufficiently on African areas, it stood to lose votes to the 
PAC. They maintained that the PAC actually had only marginal backing and little 
potential for winning new support. The ANC only needed to get out the vote among 
Africans rather than keep them from shifting to the PAC. As campaign organizer Max 
Ozinsky commented, 
91 Strachan, August interview. 
92This account is based on interviews with Max Ozinsky, February 8, 1995; Garth Strachan, August 
interview and September 13, 1994; and Dugmore, December interview. 
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"In African areas, the choice of the ANC was way ahead of the PAC. The PAC was concentrated 
only in Guguletu and wasn't really a factor. There were a few moments when this issue was raised 
but the PAC was never viewed as a threat. Remember that the PAC had been exposed by the 
ANC nationally. It was in the difficult position of its members expecting to boycott the election 
and of many people perceiving it as a terrorist organization. The choice on the ground was what 
the two parties had to offer -- the PAC usually said we agree with everything the ANC wants, and 
sometimes would just add a few things to the AN C's plan. n93 
The multiplicity of issues involved in this debate rendered it difficult to clarify or 
resolve. It ranged across questions of strategy, of tactics, of principles, and of power 
within and over the Western Cape ANC. This meant, as senior campaign organizer 
Cameron Dugmore noted, "the debates were quite subtle and not necessarily neatly 
boxed into the two camps. "94 In general, Africanists seemed to understand the debate as 
a zero-sum contest over resources between African and coloured areas,95 whereas 
coloured focus advocates often described it as a question of tactics. As Dugmore put it, 
the question was: 
"how to talk about coloured people as 'coloured people;' the differences were in terms of what our 
emphasis should be . .. .In some ways, the two approaches hit on similar issues but offered 
different choices on how to win undecided voters to the ANC -- no one didn't understand the need 
to target coloureds. We were debating on tactics."96 
The debate within the ANC over its strategy in the elections was far from novel. In some 
respects, it represented just the latest chapter in a long-running debate. For decades, the 
93Max Ozinsky, interview, June 14, 1995; emphasis added. 
94Dugmore, December interview. 
95Yengeni interview. 
96Dugmore, December interview. 
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Charterist movement adopted an eclectic approach to organization and strategy, hovering 
between "nonracial" and "multiracial" positions. The ANC and its allies were committed 
to a nonracial political settlement, in which South Africans would be enfranchised 
equally without regard to race. Since African people had been particularly oppressed and 
also constituted a majority of the population, nonracialism entailed the leadership and 
primary role of the "African masses." At the same time, however, the Charterist 
movement consistently sought to extend its support base through an appeal to coloured, 
Indian and white South Africans. It also repeatedly employed a multiracial approach to 
accommodate the perceived varied needs and interests of the different constituencies. 
The Congress Alliance in the 1950s was explicitly multiracial, and the UDF in the 1980s 
accommodated de facto multiracialism.97 
w Debates in the Western Cape over multiracialism and nonracialism centered on the so-
called "coloured question." Should Charterists organize among coloured people along 
nonracial lines, or within separate structures specifically for coloured people? The 
unbanning of the ANC in 1990 seemed to have resolved this question, with the 
nonracial ANC incorporating most Charterist organizations and activists. However, as 
I noted in Chapter Two, many coloured people in the pre-campaign period continued to 
regard the ANC as an organization for African people. This perception was probably 
furthered by the fact that the ANC's membership was overwhelmingly African, even in 
the Western Cape. Also, some coloured voters perceived party activists to be distant 
from the concerns of their communities. Dugmore outlined the difficulty this situation 
posed for the ANC: 
"African branches usually had membership of about 1000 [each] , but coloured areas had no more 
than 150-200 members. Credible and rooted branches needed to be put into place by 1993. The 
97Seekings, "The UDF and the Struggle for Democracy." 
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problem was that leadership in some coloured communities sometimes represented an activist 
clique more than civic or community-based people that had been used in the UDf. 11 98 
In addition to general lack of support for the ANC among coloured voters, a number of 
prominent coloured ANC activists felt marginalized within the party. This led to some 
discussion in the early 1990s of reviving the UDF or some other organization tailored 
more explicitly to the needs and fears of coloured people in the province. Although the 
ANC decided against separate organization on the grounds that it would violate its 
nonracial character, the debate over strategy continued.99 
"Resolving" the debate: key steps 
Three critical developments may have influenced the eventual outcome of the debate over 
strategy. First, the national leadership subtly manipulated provincial discussions of 
strategic options, making it difficult for Africanists to further their approach. Second, 
direct intervention by the national office and a change in provincial leadership enabled 
coloured focus advocates to gain control of top positions in the campaign structure. 
Finally, the inclusion of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSA TU) in the 
campaign's governing political committee added pressure for concentrating efforts on 
winning coloured votes. 
98Cameron Dugmore, interview, June 14, 1994. 
99rhis and the previous paragraph are based on discussions with Strachan, August interview ; and Paul 
Davids, interview, June 28, 1994. See also Max Ozinsky and Ebrahim Rasool, "Developing a Strategic 
Perspective for the Coloured Areas in the Western Cape," African Communist, second quarter, 1993; Mike 
Coetzee, "Coloured Workers: Joining COSATU, Voting NP?" South African Labour Bulletin, vol. 17, no. 
2, March/April 1993. As late as 1993 there were rumors that the Coloured People's Congress or the UDF 
would be revived. 
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Manipulation of strategy discussions 
The national leadership sought to shape deliberations of strategic choices. It went to 
considerable lengths to persuade the Western Cape ANC to adopt a strategy in line with 
national priorities. In particular, it wanted the provincial party to run a positive campaign 
devoted largely toward winning undecided coloured voters. 
From mid-1992, if not earlier, the head office suspected that the ANC faced likely 
defeat in the Western Cape,100 a view later reinforced by the party's own polling 
research. The national leadership concluded that the party must make a special effort to 
win support among coloured voters. Mandela himself had repeatedly urged the ANC to 
pay heed to the particular concerns of coloured voters. In late 1991, he controversially 
intervened in the Western Cape ANC in support of Allan Boesak's candidacy for the 
post of provincial ANC chairperson. 101 In late 1993, the ANC's national elections 
organizers sought to intervene more subtly, structuring the process of strategic 
decision-making on their terms. They used the ANC's own opinion poll and focus 
group research both to inform and frame election strategy meetings, focusing 
organizers' minds on the composition and concerns of the AN C's target voters. 
National organizers gave provincial activists an opportunity to discuss possible 
strategies only after a presentation of the research results.102 
The national leadership was sufficiently concerned about the Western Cape that they flew 
the ANC's American advisers Stan Greenberg and Frank Greer to Cape Town in October 
1993. Ostensibly, they hoped the Americans would add their professional authority to 
discussions of the AN C's polling data for the province. Greenberg, a pollster, and Greer, 
IOOstrachan, September interview. 
IOiougmore, December interview. 
102This and the next paragraph are based on Seekings' observations of ANC workshops in late 1993. 
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a media strategist, had played central roles in Bill Clinton's successful 1992 presidential 
campaign in the U.S. Greenberg and the ANC's South African pollsters argued that the 
ANC had to direct its efforts toward increasing support among coloured voters. Although 
some provincial Africanists remained wary of the polling "experts," the strategic debate 
was recast. Henceforth, to challenge the strategic focus on coloured voters meant 
challenging the "evidence" presented by the ANC's own advisors and endorsed by the 
national leadership. 
Provincial ANC leaders had initially intended, in terms of tone, to run a negative 
"liberation-oriented" campaign. The efforts of the national leadership, and especially the 
use of its American advisors, seemed to change the minds of many provincial strategists. 
As Strachan noted, 
"Before [Greenberg] came, the ANC would have run a negative campaign focused on history 
and apartheid. Greenberg and Greer were instrumental in talcing the ANC through a process 
which led to the conclusion that the negative approach wouldn't work. Focus groups all over 
the country showed that people wanted peace, wanted to forget the past, wanted to be reassured 
of a better life .. .. 11103 
Restructuring the provincial campaign 
The national leadership intervened less subtly at the end of 1993, at about the same time a 
new provincial secretary general took office, in order to revamp the campaign's initial 
structure. At the outset of the debate around election strategy in 1993, Africanists 
maintained an apparently strong position in the Western Cape ANC. They included Tony 
Yengeni, the provincial general secretary, and Zou Kot.a, the initial election campaign 
I03strachan, September interview. 
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coordinator. They also enjoyed strong support from ANC branches, most of which were 
located in predominantly African areas. However, advocates of a coloured focus --
mostly white and coloured former UDF activists -- managed with the help of the national 
leadership to take control of the campaign structure and steer ANC strategy along their 
preferred lines. 
The Africanists were marginalized in two ways. First, they lost positions of influence at 
the top of the campaign machinery. In November 1993, Yengeni was defeated in 
elections for the post of provincial secretary general by Lemmo Kalako, who was 
African but not as closely associated with the Africanist approach. The national 
leadership took this opportunity to move overall responsibility for the elections from 
Y engeni and Kota to the ANC's coloured provincial treasurer, Ebrahim Rasool, and 
administrative control to Garth Strachan, a white former exile. As one campaign official 
described the change, 
"[The new campaign structure was] basically mandated by the head office -- by Popo Molefe, 
Ketso Gordhan, etc. The previous structure, run by Zou and Tony, was seen to be a real cock-up. 
It had fail ed to build any real strategy for winning coloureds' votes . The new structure ... was 
designed in order to make inroads into coloured communities -- those areas were seen as crucial to 
winning the province or doing as well as possible. 11104 
Second, the introduction of specialized substructures further sidelined the Africanists. 
Under Rasool and Strachan, the campaign formed three separate area committees -- one 
each for African, coloured and white communities. Yengeni and Kota were put in 
control of the African Areas Committee which coordinated the campaign in African 
104westem Cape ANC leader who spoke on condition of anonymity, date of interview withheld to protect 
this person's identity. 
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townships and shack settlements, but retained little influence elsewhere. Neither 
participated in the "Command Centre" created during the second phase of the campaign 
to provide overall coordination. Opinions differ as to why they did not take part --
Strachan maintained that they had been invited to do so, but Y engeni claimed that he 
was not "included. 11105 In either case, their new roles seemed to provide them with far 
less influence over campaign decisions than their former positions. Figure 18 illustrates 
the overall campaign structure. 106 
The creation of three distinct area committees prompted a negative reaction from many 
ANC leaders and activists, particularly Africanists. As they had opposed a coloured 
focus strategy earlier, partly because they believed it would undermine the ANC's 
nonracial character, they now spoke out on similar grounds against separate "racial" 
committees. As Kalako put it: 
"There was criticism of the campaign structures and apparently demarcating areas based on race --
coloured, African and white -- rather than across color lines. There was strong criticism, 
especially from townships, of this approach. It was argued that this strategy plays into the hands 
of the racists themselves." I07 
However, despite this opposition to the committees, provincial campaign leaders did not 
di smantle them. The first half of the campaign got underway with the committees being 
put into place, and leading Africanists like Y engeni and Kota marginalized. 
iosstrachan, telephone interview, March 24, 1995; Yengeni interview. 
106-fhis paragraph is based on interviews with Yengeni ; Kota; and Strachan, March 7, 1995. See also 
Richard Calland, The Winds of Chnnge? The ANC's Campaign in the Western Cape: An Assessment of the 
Principal Strategic Issues and Some Projections for the Future, unpublished M.A. dissertation: Department 
of Political Studies, UCT, November 1994. 
I07KaJako interview. 
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Figure 18: Campaign Structure 
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COSATU 
A further development that aided the adoption of a coloured focus involved COSATU, 
the nation's largest labor federation. As part of the tripartite alliance standing for the 
elections under the ANC's banner, COSATU was particularly sensitive to the "coloured 
question" since many of its members in the province were coloured.1os Moreover, 
although COSATU's leadership, officials and shop stewards overwhelmingly backed the 
ANC, a majority of rank-and-file members held more conservative, often pro-NP 
views. 109 When the ANC's national leadership intervened directly in late 1993 to 
restructure the provincial campaign, it made the campaign formally accountable not to 
the ANC alone but to the ANC-led alliance, including COSATU. This enabled the ANC 
to draw on the expertise and resources of the union, especially among the coloured 
working-class. In addition, it strengthened the position of coloured focus advocates 
relative to that of Africanists. 
Outcome? 
The debate over strategy never reached a definite conclusion, even though coloured focus 
advocates took control of positions in which they could significantly shape the 
distribution of resources. Opposition to a coloured focus remained and seemed to 
continue playing a role in campaign decision-making, albeit a diminished one. As one 
campaign organizer noted, "The debate was never fully resolved. It was always an issue 
throughout the campaign." 110 
I08The third partner in the alliance was the South African Communist Party (SACP). 
J09coetzee, "Coloured Workers", p. 47. 
11onugmore, December interview 
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In summary, the Western Cape ANC appeared to choose its initial strategy through a 
complex, often subtle tug-of-war between coloured focus proponents and Africanists --
an internal struggle that followed on the decades-old Charterist debate over nonracialism 
versus multiracialism. Several key developments seemed to influence the outcome of 
thi s intra-ANC debate. The national leadership laid the groundwork by shaping 
provincial discussions of strategy options, making it difficult for Africanists to promote 
their approach. Perhaps most important, with a change of provincial secretary general 
and the aid of sympathetic national leaders like Mandela, coloured focus advocates 
successfully secured key positions of power in the Western Cape campaign structure. 
With additional support from COSATU, they were able to set the campaign on an initial 
course designed principally to win the support of undecided coloured voters. 
~/,.£,. 
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Madam and Eve facilitate last-minute multiparty negotiations. 
CHAPTER FOUR: Campaign Implementation 
With top positions of its campaign structure dominated by advocates of a coloured focus, 
the Western Cape ANC began formally implementing campaign activities in December 
1993. In this chapter, I explore the campaign's general phases from its start to late April 
1994. I begin by examining the extent to which the Western Cape seemed to be a priority 
for both the NP and ANC, and outlining the broad strategy that the NP used in the 
province. I then detail the main characteristics of each phase of the AN C's campaign. I 
conclude by describing differences between the phases, and explaining why certain 
strategic and tactical changes seem to have been made. 
Western Cape prioritized 
The composition of the Western Cape electorate posed strategic challenges to both the 
NP and ANC. As I noted in Chapter One, only about 18 percent Uust under 440,000) of 
the estimated 2.4 million voters in the province were African, and only 25 percent (about 
600,000 voters) were white. About 56 percent (or about 1.3 million voters) were 
coloured. 111 Both the NP and ANC, therefore, had to extend their historical support bases 
if they wanted to win the election. To do so, each perceived the need to fashion a new 
image while minimizing any loss of existing support. The NP sought to appeal to 
coloured voters -- whom it had previously discriminated against -- without losing the 
support of white voters to the DP or far right-wing parties. The ANC similarly sought to 
111 See also Chapter One. Indian voters accounted for just 1 percent of the electorate. The precise size and 
composition of the electorate remain unclear, since there were neither accurate census nor voter registration 
data. The total figure here is the estimate provided by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), cited 
in Reynolds, "The Results," p. 187. The estimated racial breakdown of the electorate is that used in the 
Research Initiatives survey (see Chapter Two), although they were for the expected boundaries of the 
Western Cape in late 1992 when only eight provinces were demarcated. Nonetheless, these figures are 
almost exactly the same as those provided by Reynolds on the basis of data from the IEC and others 
sources (see Reynolds, "The Results," p.201), and in other surveys. In only one other province, the 
Northern Cape, did African voters comprise less than two-thirds of the electorate. 
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win the support of coloured voters, but without losing the support of African voters to the 
Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC). I 12 
Both the ANC's and NP's national campaigns prioritized the Western Cape, perhaps 
spurred on by uncertainty of the provincial election result and the desire to demonstrate 
their nonracial credentials. For its part, the ANC dedicated a disproportionate share of 
national spending toward the province. It spent about 20 percent on Western Cape 
activities, but for voters who comprised only around 10 percent of the country's 
electorate. 113 Also, Mandela reportedly made more visits to the province than any other 
during the campaign period. 114 Dugmore summed up the importance of the Western 
Cape election to the party: 
"This place was the only one where a real campaign was fought. It was about personal ities. 
images and policies. This was not the same anywhere else. Things were very different even in 
Natal , where the campaign was more like bamstonning. But here it was a real contest. We 
organized here and fought a bit of a battle. And the national office was very much aware that this 
was where the action was happening .... 11115 
One might not have expected the ANC to place a priority on the Western Cape, given its 
likelihood of receiving a majority of votes nationally. Some have argued that the ANC 
did not intend at the national level to win more than two-thirds of the vote, which would 
have given it the power in Parliament to amend the constitution at will. Aiming for and 
confident of a majority of somewhere between 51 and 65 percent, the ANC might have 
I 12As I noted in Chapter Three, opinions differ among ANC provincial campaign officials as to whether 
they ever regarded the PAC as a serious threat. 
113Ketso Gordhan, telephone interview, February 15, 1995. 
I 1-lDugmore, June interview. 
11 5Dugmore, December interview. 
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chosen, for example, not to spend resources at all rather than devote them toward a losing 
battle in the Western Cape. 
Several plausible reasons, however, would help to explain why the national leadership 
prioritized the province. First, perhaps sufficient uncertainty existed in the minds of 
national strategists as to what the provincial outcome would be. They may have believed 
that the ANC could capture at least a small yet valuable share of undecided coloureds' 
votes. Second, they may have considered it important to be seen making an effort to win 
coloureds' votes. They might have believed that this would yield dividends for the party 
in future local and provincial elections, by showing coloureds that their votes were 
important. Third, national leaders may have considered a campaign for coloured voters 
as a means to demonstrate the ANC's nonracial , or at least not exclusively African, 
character. Fourth, as others have argued, the ANC actually may have sought to win as 
many votes as possible across the country, and saw the Western Cape as a key area in 
which to garner new support. 
With respect to all of these possibilities, however, it is unclear whether the national 
leadership initially intended to prioritize the province. This may have occurred 
during the campaign as the result of other causes -- for example, a combination of 
effective lobbying by provincial leaders and sympathetic personalities at the head 
office such as Mandela.116 
Fm the NP, the Western Cape seemed to offer one of its best chances for a provincial 
victory, though it also anticipated a strong performance in the Northern Cape. The party 
devoted particular resources toward the Western Cape, especially during the final month 
of the campaign. De Kl erk himself made several high-profile appearances across the 
1 l6Dugmore, December interview. 
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provmce. He even completed his campaign roadshow with a rally at the Good Hope 
Centre in Cape Town, which was attended mainly by coloured voters.111 
The NP's campaign 
The NP, generally discounting the potential threat of other traditionally white parties to 
diminish its share of the white electorate, established a provincial strategy aimed mainly 
at attracting coloured voters' support. Key to this approach was the fact that, until the 
final weeks of the campaign, right-wing parties had opted to boycott the elections. By 
the time they entered the race, they seemed to pose little danger of stealing the NP's 
support among whites. Even the most favorable polls showed the far-right receiving only 
minimal, and declining backing. Figure 19 shows white support for far-right parties in 
four polls conducted from 1992 to early 1994. Figure 20 illustrates support for far-right 
parties as a proportion of the entire electorate in the Cape Province or Western Cape --
these data stem from seven surveys held from early 1992 to early 1994. 118 
The NP devised a principally negative, anti-ANC campaign centered on issues of primary 
concern to coloured voters, such as housing, education, violence and the economy. One 
popular slogan challenged voters to "Stop the Comrades, Vote NP," playing on 
perceptions of the ANC as a party of communists and thugs. A newspaper advertisement 
run early in the campaign proclaimed: 
117Giliomee, "The National Party's Campaign," p. 64. 
118These figures should be read with caution. They are not intended to show possible patterns of decline in 
far-right support over time, both among whites and the general electorate. I use them only to in_dicate that 
far-right support in the Western Cape -- or Cape Province before late 1993 -- seemed to be low. 
'. 
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120Far-right parties in the HSRC polls included the CP, Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (A \VB), and 
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referred to as :Ylarkinor. 
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''The ANC is bad news for the country. The NP builds schools ; the ANC disrupts schooling. The 
NP builds houses; the ANC breaks houses down. The NP stands for peace and reconciliation; the 
ANC intimidates people. The NP builds hospital s; the ANC's supporters toyi-toyi in hospital 
corridors while people die inside. "121 
The NP's appeals may have also addressed the concerns of white voters, but the bulk of 
its Western Cape efforts focused on winning coloureds' support. Many have described 
its activities as a "swart gevaar" campaign -- one that played on coloured and white 
fears of the "black threat." Two particular incidents occurred during the NP's campaign 
that help to illustrate its general attacks on the "black" ANC. First, a group of African 
squatters took up residence in a new development of houses that the old government 
had built for coloureds. The NP responded with newspaper advertisements that 
warned: "The ANC is not yet part of the government and already its supporters are 
taking houses which bel ong to legitimate owners." "Your house is not safe," cautioned 
the NP, "under the ANC."122 
Second. the NP produ·. c. d an illustrated pamphlet that seemed partly aimed at coloured 
youth in tow nships on the Cape Flats. It featured a discussion between a young man 
and hi s parents about whether they should vote NP. Their dialogue included the 
suggestion that under an ANC government one could expect to hear the slogan of, "Kill 
a coloured, kill a farmer. "123 The pamphlet -- commonly referred to as the NP's "comic 
book" -- also showed a coloured woman stopped from going to church by a group of 
African youths. She bemoans thi s harassment, noting that under the past NP 
government she could count on freedom of worship. 12~ "The Ii berators have become 
l 2 l Die Burger. February 2 I, I 99-i, p. 8, as cited in Giliomee, "The National Pany's Campaign," p. 59. 
122Giliomee, "The National Party's C.ampaign," p. 62. 
l23Meredith. South Africa's New Era, p. 177. 
mGiliomee, ''The National Pany's Campaign," pp. 64-65. 
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the killers," another character in the comic book argues, "they shout freedom and sow 
death." The IEC ruled that the NP had to recall all 80,000 copies of the comic book due 
to the inflammatory rhetoric it contained.125 
The NP also strived to sell itself as the "new NP," which had shed its apartheid past and 
was responsible for ushering in the "new South Africa." It portrayed the election to 
voters as a choice between it -- especially its leader, F.W. de Klerk -- and a violence-
causing. communist-ridden ANC dedicated to Africanization. As Kriel alleged about the 
ANC in a debate with Boesak. "They have done nothing, except blame everybody else, to 
stem the killing." 126 
The ANC's Campaign 
The ANC. although its approach mainly prioritized winning coloured votes, effectively 
ran tv.:o campaigns in the Western Cape.127 The continuous, often subtle tension over 
strategy and emphasis seemed to be resolved, in practice, by running these two 
campaigns separately. The most prominent and first of these was aimed at coloured 
voters. and waged through the press, 128 high-profile rallies, and later through door-to-
door canvassing. It ultimately accounted for an estimated 65 percent of the provincial 
party's campaign expenditures,129 and generally followed what coloured focus advocates 
had proposed in pre-campaign debates over strategy. As Strachan characterized it: 
125Meredith, South Africa 's New Era, p. 177. 
126Giliomee, "The National Pany's Campaign," p. 63. 
127 A third campaign was aimed at white voters, but this was never a priority according to provincial 
officials. 
l28Radio ad,·ertising was not allowed until the last few weeks of the campaign; television advertising was 
banned altogether. 
129Gordhan, February interview; Dugmore, December interview; and Strachan, interview, March 29, 1995. 
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"the coloured community strateg) was totally different. It was based on saying there is a home for 
you in the ANC. We have a long hi story of struggle on behalf of coloureds. We tried to reassure 
them that an African government -- at the end of the day , that 's what the ANC is -- wouldn't carry 
out political di scrimination toward coloureds with respect to jobs, affirmative action, schools, and 
the very important question of violence. Coloureds saw violence as directed at them. 11 130 
The second campaign was aimed at African residents of the province's townships, shack 
settlements and fann s. It was conducted primarily though mobilization and organization 
at the local level , with little use of the press or of rallies. In comparison with the main 
campaign toward coloured voters, these efforts received far fewer funds from the 
provincial party and occurred on a much more limited scale. As Kalako put it, "There 
was virtually nothing done in African areas -- we were carrying African areas with ease. 
There were very few meetings, rallies and door-to-door canvassing. The great part of our 
resources went to coloured areas. "131 These two campaigns had separate coordinating 
structures: the Command Centre -- which took over from an initial Elections Co-
ordinating Committee during phase two -- and the de facto independent African Areas 
Committee. respectively .1 32 
In contrast to the NP's largely negative , aggressive appeals, the ANC used a positive tone 
from the outset. Its campaign for coloured people's votes in the Western Cape unfolded 
in three broad phases. First, the ANC concentrated on presenting its "Plan," based around 
proposal s in its draft Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). In early 
March, it shifted to a more aggressive approach, contrasting the ANC with the NP and 
even attacking the NP directly. It also began to publicize endorsements of the ANC by 
130strachan, August interview. 
13tKalako interview. 
I32J have been unable to gather much information on the ANC's campaign in African areas , panJy due to 
my methodological focus on the party's activities in coloured communities, but also due to the apparent use 
of fewer materials than the campaign for coloured voters. 
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prominent community leaders. In the last weeks of the campaign, in April, the ANC 
stepped up the intensity of its attacks on the NP, while advertising further endorsements 
and offering optimistic messages about the future. 
Phase One: "Our Plan" 
The Western Cape ANC linked its first phase to the national-level approach, which had 
been developed in a set of strategy meetings in mid-to-late 1993. Taking to heart the 
advice of Greenberg and Greer, the national headquarters had decided to implement a 
largely positive campaign that addressed the party's ability to tackle real "issues." 
Greenberg noted that. "You have an electorate that's serious. South Africans are not just 
voting to affirm hi story, they're voting for a direction and a set of policies." Greer added: 
"South Africans so clearly want the elections to be about their lives. I believe the NP will seek to 
di wn a11cntion to other subjects -- like how many communists [are] on the list. And our 
challenge. the ANC's challenge, is to keep the election on the issues." 133 
The nvo American consultants proposed a campaign that included some methods used 
on the Clinton campaign. For example, in December 1993, the ANC campaign got 
underway with a succession of "people's forums" -- community events reminiscent of the 
"town meetings" Clinton had popularized. These stage-managed affairs were intended 
to give voters an opportunity to voice their concerns to the party , or at least to 
demonstrate that the ANC was offering voters this chance. One advertisement urged 
voters to attend, saying: 
13·'Mark Gevisser, "Clinton's Men on the ANC Campaign Trail," Weekly Mail and Guardian. February 25 
to March 3, 199-l, p. 10. 
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"Join us at a People's Forum in the Western C..ape. Give us your views on jobs, affirmative action, 
crime, security, language and culture. Tell us where you stand. Because, above all, the ANC 
stands for you." 
Most forums in the Western Cape sought to involve coloured voters in particular. 
For instance, in one given week, just one out of a dozen forums took place in an 
African neighborhood.13-1 
From mid-January to late February 1994, following a considerable lull in activity over the 
December holidays, the ANC stepped up its efforts. It introduced a series of newspaper 
adverti sements. entitled "Our Plan," to publicize its stands on pressing issues. Most ads 
contained considerable amounts of text, extensively outlining the RDP's main 
components. Greenberg noted, "Even if you don't read or can't read the details, you get 
the message: the ANC has a plan; it's serious. "135 The ads' headlines highlighted key 
facets of the RDP: 
"WHY T EN YEARS FREE Q UALITY EDUCATION MAKES SENSE" 
"2. Pl TTTI NG A STOP TO CRIME AND V IOLENCE" 
"3. MAKING EDUCATION FREE AND EQUAL TO ALL" 
"4. B UH.DING HOUSES AND IMPROVING SERVICES" 
"5. IMPROVING THE LIVES OF WO.MEN" 
"2,5 MILLION JOBS AND FREE EDUCATION" l36 
13-lArgus, December 2, 1993. 
135Gevisser. "Clinton's Men." 
l36Examples of each of these ads can be found in the following: Argus, February 2~, p. 21 ; South, February 
18-22, p. 7; Weekly Mail and Guardian, February 25 to March 3, pp. 12-13; Sunday Times, February 27, 
pp. 8-9: Sunday Times , March 6, p. 9; Sunday Times, March 13, pp. 10-11 . 
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Speakers at ANC rallies and public meetings focused attention on these central aspects 
of the RDP. At a rally on February 13 in the mainly coloured Cape Town suburb of 
Retreat, Mandela spearheaded thi s trend. He promised that the party would construct a 
million houses over the next five years and create 2.5 million jobs in ten years. Other 
speakers followed Mandela's lead, such as candidate and unionist Salie Manie who 
echoed these points at smaller rallies and events during this phase.137 Some, like 
candidate Tony Ruiters, consistently made reference to the "five pillars" of the plan, 
almost as if reciting a mantra.138 
Speakers al so sought to address specific concerns of coloured voters, though the 
campaign primarily emphasized the broad features of the RDP during this stage. At the 
Retreat rall y. for instance , Mandela attempted to di spel rumors that the party would seize 
coloureds' homes and reallocate them to Africans. He added that the ANC would also not 
fa \ or the hiring Africans over coloureds through affirmative action. Rather, affirmative 
action would benefit all who had been oppressed under apartheid. 139 These remarks may 
have been a defensive reaction to provocative NP allegations, or based on survey research 
that showed these concerns to be widespread among coloureds, or both. 
The provincial party made efforts through newspaper ads to show how "Our Plan" would 
affect the Western Cape. Ostensibly, as an attempt to show that the ANC did not only 
reflect the interests of Africans, it publicized its list of candidates -- the largest group of 
whom were coloured, by 20 out of 42. By contrast, the list included only 18 Africans. 
Given that the vast majority of provincial party members were African, the number of 
coloured candidates was disproportionately high. 140 The party's final candidate list on 
l37See. for example, Manie's remarks at the CRIC Centre in Athlone, Cape Town on March 9. 
138Tony Ruiters. remarks at Cape Town Central ANC Branch public meeting, April 10. 
139Nel son Mandela, speech at Allenby Spons Field, Retreat, Cape Town, February 13. 
l-IOsee Appendix G: Advenised List of Candidates for Provincial Assembly. 
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election day had an even larger gap between the numbers of coloured and African 
candidates, by 21 to 15.1~1 
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In many ads, the ANC pledged to develop housing1~2 and employment1~3 in the province. 
and promised a sufficient budget for education. 1~ It also attempted to respond to the 
unlawful takeover of houses by African squatters. As one advertisement proclaimed: 
"On Friday the 18th of February, an attempt was made to occupy houses in Delft. (fo make 
matters worse. some people have been on the waiting list for these homes for more than 10 years.) 
Why didn't the police do anything to protect the interests of the rightful owners? And why did the 
Nati onal Pany government fail to fulfill its obligation to the community? Only the ANC 
interYened. f- or. as Nelson Mandela said at a rally in Retreat recently. 'I want to give you my 
ass urance and that of the ANC that your homes will be safe under an ANC government.' In fact. 
safeguarding your personal property is one of the most important points in the ANC's plan for the 
Western Cape. A plan which stands for Coloured people, African people, Indians and Whites. 
AnJ a better life for all." 1 ~.'\ 
In terms of its other activities, the party created only a small number of leaflets for the 
Western Cape in phase one, and its posters mainly served to publicize events and 
meetings . 1~ The reasons for this generally low level of activity are unclear, but may 
reflect a desire by provincial leaders to avoid "peaking" too early, or the organizational 
inability of the campaign to conduct more efforts sooner, or perhaps both. 
1-H See Appendix H: Final List of Candidates for Provincial Assembly. 
l~2Weekend Argus, March 5-6, I~, p. 11. 
1~3Southeaster, March 25-29, 1994, p. 5. 
1 ~Southeaster. March 25-29, I~, p. 8. 
l~5Weekend Argus, February 26/27, I~. p. 18. 
1 ~In January and February combined, the Western Cape ANC only produced 19,700 posters and 77,000 
pamphlets. See Appendix D for details. 
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Near the end of February, at about the same time the ANC's national-level, "Our Plan" 
advertising blitz got fully underway, many of the party's Western Cape campaign leaders 
began to question the utility of this strategy. It seemed that the NP campaign's negative 
tone had altered the nature of the contest. Many local branch activists, with support from 
some provincial leaders, urged campaign headquarters to retaliate in kind. As Strachan 
described the situation: "There was great pressure in the Western Cape for a component 
of our campaign to be strongly negative. "1~7 
There was a need to fight fire with fire, some claimed. "It was important to respond to 
these !NP] anacks." argued Kota. "At the end of the day, we would have been sending 
the wrong signal to say just ignore the past." Rudi Dicks, a coloured organizer at the 
ANC's branch in the predominantly coloured area of Grassy Park, expressed his 
fru stration thi s way: 
"We had 10 deal with fears -- people always threw those things in our faces. There were some of 
the most rude and racist comments. Coloureds are the most racisr people you can get. This racism 
came nor from the Boere1-18 but my own people. People would say the ANC is only for Africans, 
it will take away my jobs and houses, and our kids will be raped . ... we had to adapt our whole 
approach !to counter these claims)." 1 ~9 
Simultaneously, survey research indicated that the party's efforts were not attracting as 
many votes as leaders had hoped. According to Strachan, "The problem for us here was 
that nationally the ANC was way ahead, but in the Western Cape we were way behind . 
.. .the NP was running a dirty campaign, so there was a sense that we had to do 
1 ~7Strachan, March 7 interview. 
I-IS Afrikaners. 
1 ~9Rudi Dicks. interview, June 17, 1994. 
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something." 150 Partly in desperation, campaign leaders opted to adopt a more negative 
style, targeting the NP. Some of them later argued that they had not believed this new 
tack would boost ANC support by much -- internal focus group studiesl51 had suggested 
that undecideds wanted to look forward instead of backward at past injustices. Rather, 
they expected that attacking the NP would motivate grassroots activists. As Strachan 
noted, "The negative campaign appealed not because it would work but because it would 
galvanize activists. . .. there was also a measure of sensing we had nothing to lose -- we 
had tried a positive campaign and it hadn 't seemed to work." 152 
Phase Two: A.C.E. 
The Western Cape campaign shifted its strategy in early March to one referred to as 
"Anack. Contrast and Endorsement (ACE). "153 ACE consisted of mounting anti-NP 
anacks. highligh ting contrasts between the RDP and the NP's proposals,15-1 and 
publi cizing endorsements of the ANC by prominent community leaders. Although the 
"contrast" element followed a strategy move at the national level, provincial leaders 
emphasized the "attack" component, directing aggressive assaults on the NP. According 
to one provincial official, the national leadership reacted "badly" to the province's 
adoption of a negative approach. 155 However, having already granted the Western Cape 
campaign a degree of autonomy, national leaders might have been reluctant to intervene 
on thi s issue. 
150s1rachan, March 7 interview. 
l51Melanie Vemoerd, interview, June 27, 199-t; Strachan, September interview. 
l52s1rachan, September interview. 
153This label was used by Strachan at an ANC sub-regional organizers' briefing in Guguletu, March 3, 
199-l 
15-IThe ANC also claimed that the NP had "no plan." 
J55senior proYincial ANC campaign official, who made this comment on condition of anonymity. 
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Significantly, the provincial campaign altered its decision-making structure during this 
phase. 156 Initially , the "Elections Co-ordinating Committee" -- which consisted of the 
heads of each task group -- had served as the central forum for operational decisions. 
However, day-to-day operations did not always require the involvement of the heads of 
such task groups as finance , security or fundraising. For this rea·son and possibly others, 
the campaign leadership decided to reformulate operations coordination into a 
"Command Centre" of essential task group heads, augmented by two canvassing 
coordinators and other ANC leaders. The Command Centre met about three to four times 
a week. usually around 10:00 at night. 157 One effect of this restructuring was to 
consolidate the control of coloured focus advocates on the overall direction of the 
campaign. Given the non-participation of Africanists like Yengeni and Kota in the 
Command Centre, as I noted in Chapter Three, this move also further isolated those 
fav oring an Africanist approach. 
The new Command Centre quickly set about responding in kind to the NP's negative 
attacks. Provincial campaign appeals during this phase clearly illustrate an increase in 
aggressive. anti-NP rhetoric. One offensive targeted Hemus Kriel, the NP's candidate for 
provincial premier. Kriel seemed to represent a weak spot for the NP, who downplayed 
hi s candidacy in favor of highlighting de Klerk. Reportedly, Kriel never once shared a 
public platform with de Klerk during the entire campaign period.158 One public opinion 
poll conducted from March 12 to 16 suggests that the electorate perceived both Kriel and 
Boesak unfavorably. Figure 21 illustrates voters' responses to the question , "Do you 
think that x will make a good prime minister?" Although Boesak pulled nearly twice as 
many positive responses, both candidates garnered about the same net approval rating, 
with Boesak at -38 and Kriel at -36. 
156See Chapter Three for a diagram of the campaign structure. 
I570zinsky , February interview. 
158Manes. Giliomee and James, "The Election in the Western Cape," p. 22. 
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Figure 21: Support for W estem Cape Partv Leaders 
Source: South African Broadcasting Corporation!Markinor159 
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The ANC instigated widespread, persistent attacks on Kriel. Often at least one speaker 
at public meetings and rallies would target him . '60 Pamphlets served as another means 
of targeting Kriel. One featured his photograph under the headline, "A Vote for the NP 
Is a Vote for Fear," and suggested that he had approved of torturing prisoners. It also 
sought to highlight the RDP in contrast to the NP's alleged lack of a plan, stating on the 
reverse side: "The NP has no plan." It outlined the RDP's points for addressing 
homelessness, joblessness, crime, violence and education (see Figure 22 below). 
Altogether, the ANC printed three quarters of a million various pamphlets in March, 
including this one -- a total that represented ten times the volume produced in January 
and February combined.161 
159Nfattes, "Appendix: Public Support," p. 248. This poll, hereafter referred to as SABC, was conducted by 
Markinor from ~'larch 12-16, 1994; n=400 (198 coloured, 102 African, 100 white), reweighted to reflect a 
population of 54% coloured, 17% African and 28% white; most white and coloured respondents were 
interviewed over the phone, but personal interviews were done with those without phones in correct 
proportion; all African interviews were done in person. 
160f"or example, Kader Asma! at a meeting at the Ghousia Manzi! Centre, Rylands, March 5. 
161Jnfonnation from Allie's Press. See Appendix D for full details and also Figure 26 below. 
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Figure 22: ANC Leaflet: "A Vote for the NP Is a Vote for Fear" 
"It 's amazing how quickly people talk 
after 3 days in solitary confinement. " 
Hem11s Knel, .Vli11ister <f Law and Order and NP az11didiite for Premier 
<fthe Western Gipe, a.s q11ored in the S1111day Times, 5 Marcil 1994. 
The NP has no plan 
The NP has no plan for the future 
and, if they win this region, will be 
unable to attract investment in the 
ITTstern Cape. 
All the NP can offer us is the 
shame of the past. 
There's no difference between the 
leaders of the 'new' National Party 
and the old one. Except for a few 
leaders who have little or no support 
in the communities they claim to 
serve. Among their supporters are the 
corrupt and violent '1vitdoek' leaders. 
Vote ANC for a better life for all. 
if you vote for the NP, you vote for a man 
who supports Section 29, a law that has no 
place in a dvilized sodety. 
The NP wants you to use your vote as a vote 
against the ANC. They are asking you to vote 
I with your fears, instead ef your dreams. I 
They would like you to be scared of democracy, 
scared of th e very system of government all the 
world 's most successful countries are based on. 
I 
I 
By doing this, the NP hopes to deny South 
Africa a government that represents all the people -
in favour of a government that represe~ts only a few 
ef them . 
The NP have had their chance 
In the 46 years that the National Party has ntled 
South Africa, the N P has torn our country apart, 
divided our people, destroyed our economy and made 
most people second class citizens in the country of I 
their birth. 
Although the N P admits they've made a 'mistake', 
they take no responsibility for the lives 
they've destroyed under apartheid -
or the billions of rands they've 
wasted on their useless policies. 
Vote ANC and send a clear 
message to the NR: We reject 
oppression. 
Let's work together for jobs, peace and freedom. 
l»urd l•r AXC lli·.mm C.i/I(', P 0 &•.\· 1.i L!.I . Srr L~•T/' RJ. -wHI 
Chapter Four Page 89 
Another leaflet printed and distributed during this period also targeted Kriel, alleging that 
he knew about "Third Force" activities. 162 It lists on one side "the facts" about Third 
Force activities and includes photographs of three major players involved: Basie Smit, 
Themba Khoza and Krappies Engelbrecht. A box in the lower half with the heading 
"Kriel's Terror in the Boland" describes an incident in the Western Cape town of Saron. 
According to the ANC, Kriel ordered an illegal search of a transitional local 
"management" committee office. "KRIEL MUST GO!" in boldface runs the length of the 
leaflet's bottom margin. On the reverse side, under the words "STOP Tms! ! " a photo of 
Kriel lies superimposed on a shot of Inkatha soldiers carrying weapons. The text below it 
claims that Kriel, as Minister of Law and Order, either "knew this was happening and 
didn't care - or he didn't know and wasn't doing his job." It ends: "ONLY AN ANC 
GOVERNMENT CAN STOP THE VIOLENCE!" (See Figure 23 below.) 
The shift to a negative campaign occurred in tandem with an increase in door-to-door 
canvassing, particularly in coloured communities. One advantage to canvassing over 
other avenues of communication had to do with its direct, personal impact. It allowed the 
party to contact voters who might not be reached as effectively through rallies, for 
example, which were largely speeches to the converted. As provincial canvassing 
coordinator Johnny Issel noted: 
"[it became] apparent that in order to change their minds we need to get in direct contact with 
voters to inform them about the ANC. .. .It also became apparent that through mass activities we 
weren't reaching those whose support we needed. For example, mass rallies weren't effective 
instruments to challenge prejudices and inform people about us." 163 
162The term "third force" is used to describe elements in the apartheid government that illegally supplied 
arms and military training to Inkatha members. 
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Figure 23: ANC Leaflet: "Kriel Must Go" 
•-·.···-:::~::·:-;c••.· • 
THE ~RD FORCE 
Deputy Commisioner of Police, 
Lieutenant-General Basie Smit 
Trained and armed Inkatha members. Helped 
plan train violence. Ordered the manufacture 
of home-made guns. 
IFP Transvaal leader,Themba Khoza: 
In charge of a gun-running network between 
the SAP and Inkatha members. Also supplied 
guns to hostel-dwellers and train killers. 
Head of Counter Intelligence, General 
Krappies Engelbrecht: 
Organised the training of IFP members in the 
use of hand weapons and grenades. 
Responsible for hit-squads and the planning 
violence in trains and hostels. 
Kl'iel's Terror in the Boland 
Soron Is a small town in the Boland which has suffered under 
apartheid. In January a democratic election was held to elect a 
new management committee. 
Housing Minister Markel refused to accept the result of this 
democratic election . After negot iations the new and old 
committees agreed to work together. Still the NP would not 
accept this. 
On Friday, the police stormed the management committee 
building. They had no search warrants. They gave no warning 
and fired guns at unarmed people. One person died in the attack. 
The police orders came from the very top. Hernus Kriel is the 
Minister of Law and Order. We say Kriel must stop harrasing his 
opponents. 
ICRIEL MUST GO!. 
P~lrJANCW..,.C.,.221~1t .. w....m..p,....,.'1"Amlllf Prtl.-J'JI 11•2 
163Johnny Issel , interview, June 13, 199-t 
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Initial attempts to implement canvassing operations in phase one had run into difficulties . 
at the branch level, where recruitment of canvassers had stalled as a result of funding 
delays and limited training. 16-1 
In March, the campaign leaders opted to create a centrally coordinated "task team," which 
included 120 canvassers and a minimum of 11 vehicles. The main impetus for 
establishing the team, according to senior campaign official Willie Hofmeyr, was to 
compensate for lack of activity in target areas: "The feeling was that we weren't 
delivering enough canvassing at the local level. It was important to put together a big 
group [of canvassers] to have a significant impact in certain areas and an inspirational 
spin-off on other members." 165 Not unlike UDF "blitzes" conducted in the 1980s, the 
task team delivered pamphlets door to door and, occasionally with ANC candidates, 
spoke with voters in person. 
The team carried out its activities almost exclusively in predominantly coloured 
communities, such as Delft, Grassy Park, Kraaifontein , Lentegeur, Macassar, 
Mannenberg. Mitchell's Plain and Retreat. Canvassing coordinators targeted these areas 
because they were believed to include large numbers of undecided voters but insufficient 
local ANC structures to reach them. 166 Campaign leaders perceived important 
distinctions between these areas in terms of support for the ANC, though it is unclear 
how they based decisions on these distinctions. As Dugmore described these differences: 
"The most difficult to reach were the more traditional, working-class coloureds in 
Lentegeur, Mannenberg and Grassy Park. It was more difficult to organize there than in 
164()zinsky, February interview. 
165Hofmeyr interview. 
166Jnterviews with ANC organizers who spoke on condition of anonymity, dates withheld to protect 
identities; and with Issel, February 7, 1995. 
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Blue Downs or Delft. We focused on both areas, though perhaps we should have 
concentrated on one or the other." 167 
Endorsements emerged as a regular feature of rallies and, increasingly, newspaper 
advertisements during this phase. Typically, these included statements of support for 
the ANC by popular local or provincial figures, and were intended to demonstrate the 
party's backing among respected individuals. In coloured areas, another important goal 
of endorsements was to show coloured voters that the ANC represented a home for 
them and their community leaders. Endorsers at rallies would share the stage with 
party speakers and candidates, and often would be invited to stand and be recognized 
by the audience.168 
Phase Three: Endgame 
An ANC conference formally launching the RDP took place on March 26, marking the 
beginning of this phase nationally. Ironically, although the RDP remained a prominent 
feature in the party's appeals, other themes -- particularly aggressive ones -- took on a 
significant share of emphasis. The party stepped up its anti-NP rhetoric, and also 
employed further community leader endorsements and optimistic appeals about the future 
under an ANC government. In addition, this phase witnessed a tremendous surge in 
leaflet production and distribution. 
The provincial ANC ran a final series of newspaper advertisements that held the "new" 
NP responsible for apartheid injustices. COSATU independently sponsored several 
167Dugmore, June interview. 
168for example: ANC rally at Stellenbosch Town Hall , Stellenbosch, April 12; and ANC rally at Hewatt 
College, Athlone, March 27. 
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especially pointed ads, in defiance of national campaign leaders' wishes 169 and despite 
having maintained a low public profile during the first two phases of the campaign. One 
such ad appeared on April 17, picturing a woman languishing over the coffin of a boy 
whom the South African Police had allegedly murdered in 1985. The headline 
exclaimed, "This is the Reality of 46 Years of National Party Rule. Don't Let Them Stain 
Your Hands with the Blood of Our Children." (See Figure 24 below.) Immediately after 
this ad appeared, much to the ire of those who had designed the ad, the woman featured 
pointed out to the press that she was actually an NP supporter.170 
Another COSATU ad depicted rows of white crosses laid out like a cemetery against a 
black background. The names of prominent anti-apartheid activists who had been killed 
appeared underneath each cross, as well as the dates they had died. "Now on April 27 
where are you going to put your cross?" asked the ad. "Stop the National Party. Vote 
ANC."171 (See Figure 25 below.) 
The party accelerated its canvassing drives during this phase and supplemented them with 
a massive increase in leaflet production. During the month of April alone, the provincial 
ANC commissioned the printing of 3 million pamphlets, about four times as many as in 
March. It also produced 84,000 posters. Figures 26 and 27 illustrate the production of 
leaflets and posters during the course of the entire campaign, and show clearly how these 
volumes peaked toward the end. 172 These suggest that the negative campaign fought 
through leaflets included not just part of all leaflets produced, but rather the 
overwhelming proportion. 
169Strachan, September interview. 
l70cape Times, April 15, p. 4; Argus, April 20, p. 4. 
171 Argus, April 22; Weekeml Argus and Cape Times, April 23 ; Sumlay Times , Metro section, April 24. 
I72s ee also Appendix D. 
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Figure 24: ANC Advertisement: "Don't Let Them Stain Your Hands ... " 
ADVERTISEMENT 
THIS IS THE REALITY OF 46 YEARS 
OF NATIONAL PARTY RULE 
t l ~:_S)j);';;·~,: ~. ' .',': ·: )'_ :. 
_;~:~~-!)::;,;<~1::~f,~·;~,~ ; ;;~·· 
Michael Miranda (II), Shaun Magmoed (16) and Jonathan Klaasnr (18) IW"t ' ._. 
killed by the South African Police in Thornton Road, Athlone in October 1985. 
DON'T LET THEM STAIN YOUR HANDS 
WITH THE BLOOD OF. OUR CHILDREN. 
Now it is time for us to use our vote to make sure the National Party will ne ver again be allowed to do to our children what they 
ha ve done to us and those who have gone before us. 
Chapter Four 
Figure 25: ANC Advertisement: "Where Are You Going to Put Your Cross?" 
. ~ .. : . 
ADVERTISEMENT 
NOW, ON APRIL 27 
WHERE ARE YOU GOING 
TO PUT YOUR CROSS? 
Stop the National Party. 
VoteANC 
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Figure "6: ANC Leaflet Production Per Week 
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Fiiure '27: ANC Poster Production Per Week 
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The majority of leaflets attacked the NP in a similar vein to newspaper advertisements. 
One warns, "Beware of Kriel's 'new' NP!" featuring a hand-drawn caricature of Kriel, 
handling the reigns of three ferocious, salivating dogs. Each dog wears a collar with the 
name of a "notorious" figure -- two of these were African shack-lords and NP candidates 
whom the ANC claimed to be responsible for violence in Cape Town's squatter 
communities. Shacks burn on the horizon and R 50 bills fall out of Kriel's pocket. "Will 
you be safe in their hands?" continues the ad, playing off an NP campaign slogan by 
tying the NP instead of the ANC to violence and destruction. The party produced over 
three-quarters of a million copies of this pamphlet (see Figure 28 below). 
In addition to increased canvassing, the ANC and COSATU organized a number of 
"court forums" during this phase. 173 Court forums generally involved visits by a group of 
candidates and volunteers to the courtyards of apartment blocks. As ANC national list 
candidate Melanie Verwoerd described a typical court forum: 
"We would go into working class areas in the Cape flats to high-rise flats centered around a 
courtyard. Our cars would go through the courtyard with a sound system on the back of a bakkie 
[truck], and we would start playing music. Then we would have our political message. This was 
dangerous because there were hostile areas. The security risks were high. There were often a lot 
of gangsters around and some [of our] people were hit with rocks. We later moved to using more 
open areas like playgrounds or out on a veld. 174 A lot of us did two to three court forums a night 
starting at Spm and then would go to a public meeting around 8pm. 11175 
I73ougmore, June interview. 
I74Afrikaans for "field." 
I75ver.voerd interview. 
Chapter Four 
Figure 28: ANC Leaflet: "Beware Kriel's 'New' NP" 
These two are warlord leaders of the 'witdoeke' vigilantes. 
The witdoeke destroyed thousands of homes in KTC and 
Crossroads in attacks that left 30 000 Capetonians 
homeless. 
There have been many court cases to stop their attacks, 
intimidation and people's courts. 
They work with Prince Gcobinga, a military agent, being 
investigated for gun-running to the Western Cape. 
Kriel's Minister of Tourism. Shan Jumana 
Chopped up and killed his 15 year old girlfriend 
and was convicted for murder. 
Who can forget Abe 
Williams? 
• He destroyed 
Coloured Education . 
• He caused bitter 
conflict withteachers. 
• He tricked Saldanha 
tenants into paying 
high rents for krotte. 
al'9 .. Pf'M•:931-21'2 
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The anti-NP offensive reached new heights at rallies. Speakers at one rally in Cape 
Town's city hall condemned the NP for its "racist," "swart gevaar" campaign, standing 
under a banner of "Save the Cape from NP Racism!"l 76 
The ANC's endorsement efforts also increased, including figures such as the well-known 
educationist Franklin Sonn, who was appointed after the elections as ambassador to the 
United States. The campaign leadership chose to step up its use of endorsements, it 
seemed, out of concern that the party had not successfully convinced coloured voters it 
would not champion Africans' interests over theirs. As the Cape Town Southern Suburbs 
coordinator, Paul Davids, put it: 
"The problem was that, on one hand, it was hard to explain how affirmative action didn't mean a 
replacement of coloureds' jobs by Africans. The ANC was seen as a black organization with a 
black leadership. We had the problem of saying we were an organization for everylxxly -- that's 
why people like Franklin Sonn, Allan Boesak and Dullah Omar became key near the end." 177 
One endorsement by Sonn features a somber, bespectacled portrait. His face and upper 
torso take up most of the space, and a lengthy quotation fills the upper right comer: 
"I call on all God-fearing, decent, principled people to join me in saving the Western Cape from 
disaster. ... The National Party has a strategy for this region. It's called racism. It is a deliberate 
strategy aimed at creating fear and racial conflict. It is a strategy that could destroy all our hopes 
of living together in peace in the Western Cape."178 
l76cornrnents by Boesak, Franklin Sonn, Jan van Eck, and Charles Villa-Vincenzo at Cape Town City 
Hall , April 8. For another example, see Boesak's remarks at a rally at the Baxter Theatre, University of 
Cape Town, April 19. 
177Davids interview. 
178Weekend Argus, March 26-27, pp. 17 and 19; Southeaster, April 8-12, p. 5; Weekend Argus, April 2-3 , 
p. 13; Weekend Argus, April 23-24, p. 21. 
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Along the bottom border of the ad, just below the ANC logo, are the words that have 
been the hallmark of nearly all ANC advertisements, leaflets and other printed 
materials: "A better life for all. Working together for jobs, peace and freedom." (See 
Figure 29 below.) 
Taking the lead from the national campaign, the provincial ANC also publicized its 
positive vision of the future in an attempt to reassure uncertain voters. Mandela and 
Boesak featured in a set of advertisements that included their "personal" appeals to the 
electorate, urging voters to choose freedom and "A Better Life for All. "179 "Dear 
friends ," states Boesak in the text of one ad, "Our hour has almost come. On Wednesday 
27 April we will reach the goal which the ANC has struggled to achieve for over eighty 
year ' ." One page of this two-page spread shows Boesak from the waist up, beckoning 
the reader with his hands outstretched, mouth slightly open as if speaking (see Figure 30 
below). His lengthy statement fills the entire opposing page, and concludes: 
"I know many of our people are afraid and uncertain. Any period of transition brings 
anxiety. But, together with our trust in God, we must take up this challenge to shape a future 
we can all share. We have worked hard to bring about the opportunity for fundamental 
change. Now we must direct that change. I call on all who love our region to vote for the 
ANC on the 27th of ApriI. 11 180 
Summary 
Throughout these three phases, the Western Cape ANC essentially ran two campaigns, as 
noted above: a marginal one aimed at consolidating African support and another, more 
179Cape Times, April 27, p. 8; Sunday Times , April 17, p. 11; Weekend Argus, April 23-24, p. 23. 
ISOsumtay Times , Metro section, April 24, pp. 6-7. 
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Figure 29: ANC Advertisement: Sonn endorsement 
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! 
significant one designed to win undecided coloureds' votes. The latter campaign 
received the overwhelming share of attention and resources, and represented the 
party's primary thrust by a ratio of approximately two to one. The party's provincial 
focus on Africans and undecideds respectively was, therefore, about the opposite of 
what it was nationally.181 
The AN C's initial and largely positive appeals, many of which were targeted generally 
toward undecided coloured voters, shifted about midway through the campaign. By the 
end of the first phase, campaign leaders had begun to question the effectiveness of a 
purely positive strategy. In the face of growing NP attacks and local activists' 
exhortations to fight fire with fire, the ANC adopted a more aggressive tack in phase two. 
The party moved to a combined positive-negative approach, which highlighted reasons 
why coloured voters in particular should support the ANC. It attempted to persuade the 
coloureds not only to vote fo r the ANC, but to vote against the NP. Rather than only 
offering voters details of the RDP and how it would apply to the Western Cape, the party 
ultimately sought to hold the NP responsible for apartheid injustices and coloureds' 
socioeconomic plight. 
As the campaign continued, the ANC's anti-NP assaults, and production and delivery of 
materials increased tremendously. 182 With growing emphasis, the party attempted to 
convince voters that supporting the NP constituted a vote for racism. Backing the ANC, 
on the other hand, would ensure a "Better Life for All." The party delivered its 
concluding appeals in an upbeat, visionary manner, encouraging voters to look forward to 
better times ahead und~r an ANC government. 
l81Gordhan interview; and Strachan, March 7 interview. 
182This ~atic rise in production and activity occurred despite the national headquarters' denial of the 
provincial campaign's request for a increase in allocated funds for the third phase. The campaign's 
leadership had wanted to launch an even more remarkable, final assault against the NP -- this may have 
included a greater boost in materials production, canvassing and event scheduling than what actually took 
place; interview with Western Cape ANC leader who spoke on condition of anonymity, date of interview 
withheld to protect this person's identity. 
We've made the change 
Some voters questioned the extent to which the NP had really changed. 
CHAPTER FIVE: Content Analysis 
I have attempted in the previous chapter to characterize the three general phases and key 
activities of the ANC's Western Cape campaign. I sought to substantiate my descriptions 
of the campaign's evolution with largely qualitative information -- for example, by 
highlighting examples of various ANC newspaper advertisements, leaflets and other 
election materials, and by citing interviews with various ANC officials.183 In this 
chapter, I seek to augment my depiction of the party's efforts with quantitative data. I 
examine the content and delivery of certain ANC campaign appeals -- not only what 
messages were conveyed, but how and where. 
In particular, I focus on three sets of data: themes in speeches, event locations. and 
language used in posters and leaflets. With respect to the first of these, I identify 
"dominant" themes, "strong" themes, and possible patterns in the use of these themes 
over time. Second, I review the locations for which the party's rallies and public 
meetings were scheduled, and from this information attempt to draw conclusions about 
how the party targeted racial groups. Finally, I tum to leaflet and poster production, 
and examine the party's use of the three main languages in the province: English, 
Afrikaans and Xhosa. 
Themes in speeches 
During the campaign period, I observed a total of 63 speeches given by ANC candidates, 
officials and endorsers. In Appendix I, I briefly describe the methodology used to record 
these observations. Appendix F details the methodology I employ in this chapter to 
1830 ne main exception to my reliance on qualitati ve information in Chapter Four was the citation of ANC 
poster and leaflet production data. 
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analyze the content of these observations. Before outlining my findings, I believe it is 
important to note two important qualifications. 
Qualifications 
First, as 1 indicate in Appendix I, the speeches which I observed do not represent by 
any means a comprehensive set of all campaign speeches. One could venture to say 
that they are perhaps a representative sample, but this is difficult to determine. It is 
unclear, after all, exactly how many events were held or speeches given and, therefore, 
what proportion mine constitute of that total. In any case, the events I observed seem 
to comprise only a small number of total scheduled events. Thus, any conclusions 
about the ANC's campaign speeches in general drawn from my data must be 
considered as tentative. 
Second, very few speeches occurred in the initial weeks of the campaign and, largely as a 
result of thi s, I observed only a handful of speeches during that period. Since I am now 
analyzing speech themes by week, those that were used in early weeks may appear in the 
tables below to have greater significance than they may deserve. For example, I 
witnessed two speeches during the week ending February 19, and the dominant theme for 
both was the RDP. Thus, even though the RDP constituted the dominant theme for all 
speeches observed during that week, it is important to keep in mind that only two 
speeches were studied. 
Findings 
As I note in Appendix F, I have categorized themes in two main ways: "dominant" and 
"strong/weak/absent." My principal findings concern 1) what the main "dominant" and 
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"strong" themes were, and 2) how they varied in incidence over time. With respect to 
dominant themes, I have identified the top five of these as follows: 
• education 
• fears of the ANC and Africans 
• the NP 
• racism 
• the RDP 
As Appendix F indicates, these five dominant themes occurred far more frequently than 
any others. Tables 9 and 10 show how these themes recurred in speeches during the 
course of the campaign. The use of three of these dominant themes -- the RDP, the NP 
and racism -- seems to parallel shifts in the campaign's phases. Near the beginning of the 
campaign, the RDP featured as the most common dominant theme. It is used throughout, 
but drops as April approaches. The NP emerges as a dominant theme in early March, at 
about the same time the ANC launched its second phase, and increases in frequency 
through to the end. Racism arises in April, as the ANC sought to further intensify its 
anti-NP attacks. Figure 31 illustrates how these three dominant themes appeared to be 
the most dominant. 
Table 9: Weekly Incidence of Five Top "Dominant" Themes 
Theme 19-Feb 26-Feb 5-Mar 12-Mar 19-Mar 26-Mar 2-Apr 9-Aor 16-Apr 24-Apr Total 
education 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 1 1 6 
fears 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 1 0 6 
NP 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 2 5 9 20 
racism 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 3 6 14 
RDP 2 0 4 1 1 1 1 0 3 6 19 
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Table 10: Incidence of Five Top "Dominant" Themes. as a Proportion of Total 
"Dominant" Themes per Week184 
Theme 19-Feb 26-Fe_b 5-i\t@ 12-l'v[ar 19-Mar 26-M~1 2-Am 9-.'\nr 
education 0% 0% Olk 25% -13 % Oo.t 0% 0% 
fears 0% 0% 29'1 0% 0% 25<1 50% 0% 
Nl' 0% 0% l4q 0% 14% 25<1 25% 50oz ,o 
racism 0% 0% 0'1 0% 0% Oo.t 50% 75% 
RDP 100% 0% 57q 25% 14% 25o.t 25% 0% 






















One limitation of examining only dominant themes, as I have defined them, is that they 
did not necessarily have to be the overwhelmingly dominant theme in a particular speech. 
They only had to be either the most dominant, on balance, or one of the two most 
dominant. In many cases, those themes I classified as dominant had only slightly greater 
emphasis than other strong themes. Thus, looking at leading strong themes can 
complement the conclusions I have reached about dominant ones. 
1841'-iote that some speeches had more than one dominant theme and, thus, row totals add up to more than 
100 percent. See Appendix F methodology. 
Chapter Five Page 109 





• peace, violence or crime 
• houses 
It is immediately apparent that nearly al l of the top strong themes were also the main 
dominant themes. There are only three exceptions. First, fears of the ANC seems to be a 
less frequent strong theme than these six. Despite the fact it was one of the leading 
dominant themes, it does not appear among these principal strong ones. In other words, it 
received a great deal of emphasis in speeches, but only for a relatively short period of 
time. These six themes, on the other hand, occurred with frequency throughout the 
campaign. Second, both peace and houses now seem to have greater significance than if 
I had only examined dominant themes, among which they did not feature at all. 
Several noteworthy patterns emerge when looking at the incidence of these strong themes 
over the course of the campaign, as Tables 11 and 12 outline. The NP emerges in early 
March, as it did as a dominant theme, peaks in early April, and remains prominent until 
the end. Racism features in late February, appears occasionally in March, and then 
maintains a sizable presence throughout April. The RDP is very strong during the whole 
campaign, with its highest peaks in the very beginning (though there were few speeches 
at that time, as noted above) and mid-March. Education and houses seem most 
significant in February and March, dropping in April, ostensibly because there tended to 
be greater emphasis placed on RDP details early on. In Figure 32, we can see that the 
Chapter Five Page 110 
three leading strong themes -- the NP, racism and the RDP -- are the same three that led 
among dominant themes. 
Table 11 : Weekly Incidence of Six Top "Strong" Themes 
Theme 19-Fet 26-Fet 5-Ma 12-M::ii 19-M::11 26-M::11 2-A DJ 9-ADI 16-A rn 
education 1 c 2 2 4 1 1 c 1 
NP c c 4 G 2 2 3 3 ( 
racism 1 c 1 c 2 ( 2 4 ( 
RDP 2 c 3 3 3 2 2 c 3 
peace 1 c 3 1 c 1 3 (] 2 
houses 2 c 3 1 c 1 (] (] 2 
Table 12: Incidence of Six Top "Strong" Themes. as a Proportion of Total 
Speeches per Week 
Theme 19-Feb 26-Feb 5-Mai 12-Mar 19-Mar 26-Mai 2-Apr 9-Apr 
education 50% 0% 290t 50% 57% 25 0t 25% 0% 
NP 09( 0% 570t 0% 29% 500t 759( 75% 
racism 50% 0% 140t 0% 29% 00t 50% 100% 
RDP 100% 0% 430t 75% 43% 500t 50% 0% 
peace 50% 0% -B 0t 25% 0% 250t 75% 0% 
houses 100% 0% 430t 25% 0% 250t 0% 0% 









8% 11 % 
50% 61 % 
50% 44% 
25% 56% 
17% 11 % 
17% 17% 
Scheduled event locations lend themselves to more definite conclusions than the speech 
theme data, mainly because I have a comprehensive list of them. Appendix C details 
these events, including intended speakers. However, as I note in the methodology of that 
appendix, even these findings have important limits. For example, the provincial party 
did not necessarily schedule all of these events. It is unclear how many may have been 
organized by local branches, perhaps in conjunction with the provincial office. Thus, 
using only scheduling information, one cannot with certainty say that provincial leaders 
sought to hold a particular number or proportion of events in predominantly coloured 
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education NP racism RDP peace houses 
Strong theme 
areas. What is clear is how many events were scheduled and where they were intended to 
take place. Also, whether or not scheduling was most influenced by provincial campaign 
headquarters, it is interesting that at least some branches may have independently reached 
similar conclusions as to what areas should be prioritized. 
Two key patterns emerge from these data. First, the vast majority of events were 
scheduled for the last phase of the campaign, as Figure 33 illustrates. This number 
peaked in Ap1il , especially in the final week. A slight dip in scheduling occurred in late 
March and early April -- interestingly, thi s resembles a dip that took place in poster and 
leaflet production (see Figures 26 and 27 in Chapter Four). The reasons for this lapse are 
unclear, but may be linked to the shift from phase two to three, the formal launch of the 
RDP on March 26, or both. 
Second, the overwhelming bulk of events were scheduled to take place in coloured areas 
throughout the campaign. This emphasis increases dramatically over time, as Figure 34 
and Table 13 demonstrate. By the end of April , the proportion of events to be held in 
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coloured areas far outshadows those elsewhere. African areas received the next 
largest number of total scheduled events, as Figure 35 shows, and white areas come 
in far behind. 
Figure 33: Total Scheduled Events: Late Februarv to Late April 
Number of Events 
100 
90 
' " ' 
Week Ending 
Table 13: Scheduled Events by Location. Late Februarv to Late April 
Week Coloured/ 
En dim! Coloured African African White all 
26-Feb 7 '") 4 4 ,.., 
5-Mar 14 ,.., 5 3 0 
12-Mar 14 5 12 '") 4 
19-Mar 18 5 10 0 4 
26-Mar 9 0 3 1 4 
"-A pr 32 8 9 3 6 
9-Apr 28 8 4 '") '") 
16-Apr 41 3 6 ,.., 9 
"'3/4-Apr 65 8 8 5 9 
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Language in posters and leaflets 
This set of data proved the most straightforward to analyze. After compiling a 
comprehensive list of poster and leaflet production in the province, and comparing this to 
the ANC's record of posters and leaflets received from the national office (see Appendix 
D), patterns of language use became clear. I draw three primary conclusions: 
1) English overwhelmingly marked the language of choice in both 
leaflets and posters 
2) the prevalence of English varies little from provincial-level production to 
national-level delivery, although the province used slightly more Afrikaans 
than the national office 
3) the gap between use of English and other languages --Afrikaans came in a 
distant second -- increased sharply over time. 
Despite the fact that Afrikaans is the home language for the greatest proportion of the 
Western Cape electorate (see Chapter One), the ANC chose at both provincial and 
national levels to produce and distribute most posters and leaflets in English. It is 
unclear why this occurred. ANC leaders may have perceived the need to avoid using 
Afrikaans, wary of its negative stigma among many ANC supporters. After all, it 
represents for many of them the language of apartheid and of their oppression, and many 
resent having been forced to learn it in school. Alternatively, leaders may have decided 
that English posters and leaflets would be the most transferable, since English was the 
most commonly understood language among the three main racial groups in the 
province. Perhaps they figured that at least some voters in Afrikaans-speaking or 
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Xhosa-speaking areas would be able to translate for others without too much difficulty. 
Leaflets were often distributed door-to-door by canvassers who ostensibly understood at 
least their basic content. 
Figure 36 illustrates the production of posters in the Western Cape, posters received from 
the national office, and the sum of each, by week and according to language used. Figure 
37 shows this information for leaflets. In both of these figures, production and receipt of 
materials skyrockets in the final phase of the campaign. Also, the gap between English 
and other languages used widens greatly. 
Figure 38 depicts what proportion of total posters and leaflets were done in each 
language. The lowest percentage of leaflets made in English was 79 percent (produced 
provincially), and 80 percent for posters (received from national office). 
Findings 
This content analysis of ANC speech themes, event locations, and language in posters 
and leaflets reveals several compelling patterns. The emphasis of ANC speeches seemed 
to shift by late February or early March -- from RDP-related themes to a set of themes 
including the RDP, but also the NP and racism. The party also seemed to schedule the 
greatest proportion of its events in predominantly coloured areas. Finally, it almost 
exclusively used English in the production of posters and leaflets for the Western Cape, 
despite the fact that Afrikaans is the most widely spoken language. I have sought to offer 
plausible explanations for all of these patterns. 
Perhaps most important, these quantitative data tend generally to support the description 
of the campaign that I provided in Chapter Four. The ANC changed course midway into 
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the campaign and also began to target coloured voters primarily. However, to my 
surprise, the fact that the party conveyed a huge proportion of its appeals in English was 
not apparent from the interviews, observations and other qualitative information I 
gathered. My methodological focus on materials and events that were likely to be in 
English may have minimized my insight into how much -- or, indeed, how little -- the 
party had campaigned in other languages. 
In light of the Western Cape's history, demographics, electoral system and voter attitudes, 
what do this chapter's quantitative data and the qualitative information of Chapters Three 
and Four suggest about those factors that may have shaped ANC strategy the most? 
address these issues and more in Chapter Six. 
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Figure 36: Posters Produced or Received Weeklv. by Language 
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Figure 38: Total Posters and Leaflets Produced and Received. 
Proportionallv bv Language 








































The NP' s Hernus Kriel demonstrates a heavy-handed 
approach to the ANC's Allan Boesak. 
PART III: 
Post-Campaign Assessment 
CHAPTER SIX: Conclusions 
The ANC's loss in the Western Cape came as a shock to more than a few party 
members and even some leaders, as the results slowly trickled in after the Apri l 26-28 
elections. To many, the party of liberation had lost to the party of oppression. The 
most progressively-minded region had voted into power the architects of apartheid. 
The coloured population somehow had been tricked into supporting the party that had 
once stolen the vote away from them, kicked them out of their homes and called them 
inferior. Disappointed by the ANC's performance, many directed blame toward the 
campaign. They asked what went wrong, and why? But does the fact that the party 
did not win a majori ty, or even a plurality, of the vote necessarily mean that 
something went wrong? The answer would seem to depend on how one views the 
ANC's pre-election prospects and whether, due to serious mistakes, it fell short of 
them by election day. 
In thi s chapter, I re-examine the party's strategy. I begin by revisiting my central 
research questions and suggesting the extent to which contextual factors may have 
infl uenced the campaign. I then explore the election results and outline relevant 
voting patterns. Finally, I also describe how many ANC officials reacted to and 
interpreted the outcome. 
Influence of contextual factors 
In the Introduction, I li sted six main research questions in order to guide my study of 
the ANC's campaign. I proposed several contextual factors that might have affected 
the party's strategy: the history, demographics, electoral system, knowledge of voter 
attitudes, internal political dynamics at the provincial level, national priorities and the 
issue of race. Many of these factors are closely interlinked, making it difficult to 
di stinguish the impact of one from another. In Chapters One and Two, I suggested 
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how the first four factors might have been expected to influence the campaign. Given 
the evidence of the party's actual efforts presented in Part II, I now seek to offer a 
plausible explanation for how all of the factors may have shaped the A NC's approach. 
History and race 
In Chapter One, I suggested that key developments in the hi story of the Western Cape 
might have the foll owing effects on the ANC's campaign: 
• at least some focus on coloureds, the province's single largest racial group 
• intraparty divisions over whether to prioritize African voters, the party's 
core constituency 
difficulty garnering coloured support, given the disbanding of the UDF 
It seems that at least the first two of these effects manifested themselves in A NC 
strategy. Both tied in directly to the issue of race. First, the growth of the coloured 
population into the region's majority, especially given coloureds' particular oppression 
and relati ve advantages under apartheid, did appear to play a critical role in party 
strategy. The election contest found the two major parties, whose support bases 
consisted primarily of Africans or whites, focusing their appeals toward coloured 
voters. As Yengeni noted, no party could hope to win the province without winning a 
large share of coloureds' support. Both national and provincial ANC leaders 
recognized that appealing to coloured people would be important. 
Second, long-standing debates wi thin the party over race -- whether framed in terms 
of nonracialism versus multiracialism, or the "coloured question" -- seemed to ari se as 
a central issue if not the central issue for strategists. As this matter had sparked 
internal divisions in the days of the UDF, it also proved problematic for the ANC in 
the run-up to the 1994 elections. Should the party appeal to coloured people as 
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"coloureds?" Would this be tantamount to abandoning principles of nonracialism? 
Dugmore and others claim that disputes around this question concerned tactics and 
semantics , and that no one was arguing that the ANC ought not to seek coloureds' 
support. However, the issue of what proportion of emphasis to place on coloured 
versus African voters was a strategic consideration, not tactical. It's resolution stood 
to have, and indeed appeared to have, far-reaching implications for how the party 
would design its appeals and devote its resources. 
As for the third possible effect regarding the disbanding of the UDF, the data I have 
gathered do not seem to indicate one way or the other whether that development may 
have alienated coloured voters. If anything, Seekings' analysis suggests that the UDF 
is something of a red herring in explaining why coloureds did not vote ANC. Despite 
percepti ons of widely-supported UDF-organized mass action in the 1980s, little 
evidence exists that the UDF actually enjoyed broad backing among coloured people. 
Thus, the movement's collapse in the late 1980s, and the decision of the ANC not to 
revive it in the run-up to the 1994 elections, may have had but a marginal impact on 
coloured support for the ANc. 1ss 
Demographics 
The demographic divisions of the electorate were tightly connected to historical and 
racial issues. In Chapter One, I identified two possible effects that demographics 
might have on the campaign: 
l85Jeremy Seelcings, seminar comments, September 1995. 
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• different appeals for different racial groups 
• some appeals directed toward coloured voters given the lack of a demographic 
basis for an overwhelming "affinity" with whites, though this might depend 
on whether public opinion data suggest they would consider voting ANC 
Evidence seems to bear out the first of these effects. Each of the three main racial 
groups had such a different socioeconomic status that parties faced difficulty 
appealing to them all at once. It was suspected that the same messages and themes 
might not resonate among such diverse segments of the electorate. The national ANC 
seemed initially to favor a liberation-oriented approach using its theme "Now is the 
Time!" As noted in Chapter Four, however, this soon shifted to the more broadly-
focused "A Better Life for All." This would seem to indicate a change in emphasis 
from Africans to voters in general. The provincial ANC appeared to go a step further 
midway through the campaign, by organizing three distinct racial area committees 
and also directing many appeals specifically toward coloured voters. As for the 
second possible effect, I explore it below in relation to knowledge of voter attitudes. 
Electoral system 
The four potential incentives of the PR system and double ballot outlined in 
Chapter One all seemed to have some effect on the ANC's campaign. These 
included the following: 
• urban focus 
• pooling of resources 
• emphasis on presidential candidate 
• priority on voter education in general and with respect to double ballot 
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First, the ANC appeared to perceive focusing on urban areas as advantageous, as I 
had assumed in my methodology. The list of scheduled events in Appendix C seems 
to illustrate that the vast bulk of the party's events were intended to be held in the 
greater Cape Town area. 
Second, the similar advantage for a party to pool its resources and channel them 
toward target areas appeared to be important to provincial leaders. As Southern 
Suburbs organizer Paul Davids suggests in Chapter Four, however, many ANC 
branches did not full y understand or accept the goal of winning votes provincially 
before locally. 
Third, national ANC strategists may have believed the contest to have a "presidential" 
nature, by which many voters would vote for a party's leader more than the party 
itself. As l noted in Chapter Four, the ANC prioritized the Western Cape nationally, 
and thi s correlated with a disproportionately large number of Mandela appearances 
relative to the size of the provincial electorate.186 
Finally, voter education seemed to have significance to strategists, in light of the fact 
that nearly all ANC supporters had never voted and that the potentially confusing 
double ballot would be used. They designed a specific arm of the campaign structure 
to address this need (see organizational diagram in Chapter Three), and many 
speakers went out of their way to explain the double ballot, particularly during the last 
weeks of the campaign. 
186See Chapter Four. 
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Pub/ ic opinion and intraparty dynamics 
The confluence of three factors -- knowledge of voter attitudes, internal political 
dynamics at the provincial level, and national priorities -- seemed to play an 
especially critical role in shaping Western Cape strategy. In Chapter Two, I outlined 
two possible effects that knowledge of voter attitudes might have: 
• prioritization of the Western Cape nationally, given closeness of the race 
• primary focus on undecided coloured voters, since the vast majority of 
Africans already showed strong support for the ANC 
My evidence strongly suggests that these effects took place. With respect to national 
priorities, the ANC dedicated a disproportionate share of both Mandela appearances 
and finances to the Western Cape, as noted in Chapter Four. Interviews indicate that 
these decisions stemmed partly from the perception, based on polling results, that the 
party faced a tight contest. Also, public opinion data seemed to provide a basis for 
national intervention in favor of a coloured focus strategy. Polling advisors 
Greenberg and Greer had argued that the ANC faced little threat from the PAC, had a 
strong hold on African votes, and stood to make gains in coloured communities. 
Ostensibly taking this interpretation to heart, national leaders manipulated provincial 
strategy di scussions around presentations of survey research, and restructured the 
provincial campaign management to place coloured focus advocates in top positions. 
These factors appear to have influenced the campaign in at least two other interrelated 
ways as well. First, public opinion data played a central role in intraparty dynamics at 
the provincial level. Coloured focus advocates relied heavily on these findings to 
bolster their arguments, whereas Africanists disputed their accuracy. Second, it 
seemed that the provincial campaign could not make strategic decisions without 
taking into consideration how the national office might react, and what the possible 
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repercussions of such reactions might be. For example, national leaders' preference 
for a positive tone may have compelled the provincial ANC not to introduce negative 
appeals until halfway through the campaign. In addition, near the beginning of the 
third phase, national leaders opposed a further negative shift and denied the province's 
requested increase in allotted funds. 187 Provincial official s indicate that this decision 
was influenced by secret ANC survey research conducted during the campaign. 
Findings had suggested that the party was winning less coloured support than hoped, 
and stood to make only marginal gains during the final four weeks. 188 
Strategic choices and why 
Each of the above factors appears to have influenced the ANC's Western Cape 
strategy as di scussed. However, I have not yet explicitly listed what the main 
strategic decisions were both before and during the campaign. Based on the evidence 
I presented in Parts I and II, I outline below what six of these choices and their 
immediate causes seem to have been: 
I) Structural change. In late 1993, the national office overhauled the 
organizational structure of the provincial campaign and placed coloured 
focus advocates in positions of control. It had perceived the old leadership 
to be inadequate and using the wrong approach. 
2) Initially positive. The provincial campaign chose to use positive appeals 
initially. This seemed to result partly from the fact that the national office 
had chosen a positive tone for the national campaign, and preferred the 
Western Cape's approach to be consistent with this. 
l87see end of Chapter Four. 
I88Westem Cape ANC leader who spoke on condition of anonymity, date of interview withheld to 
protect this person's identity. 
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3) Coloured focus. Coloured voters were made the province's primary target 
group. As noted in Chapters Three and Four, this did not appear to be a 
formal decision, but rather the de facto sum of choices concerning 
resource allocation. It would seem that these choices were shaped by the 
views of coloured focus advocates who dominated management positions. 
4) Negative shift. Halfway through the campaign, the provincial 
headquarters shifted to a more negative tone and increased the use of 
appeaJs tailored to coloured voters in particular. This choice seems to 
have resulted from growing grassroots pressure to counter the NP's 
aggressive approach and desperation that the NP was winning the battle 
for undecided coloureds. 
5) Increased volume. During the course of the campaign, the party steadily 
rai sed the volume of its appeaJs both in terms of event scheduling and 
materials production. This peaked aJmost exponentially during the finaJ phase. 
It is unclear why this occurred. It may, for example, represent a culmination of 
decisions which were not necessarily intentionaJ. It may mark increased 
organizational and production capacity, or it may reflect the conscious 
objective of a strong finish. Perhaps it is a combination of all of these. 
6) Additional funding denied. Near the beginning of the third phase, the 
nationaJ headquarters denied the provincial campaign's request for an 
increase in aJlotted funds . As noted above, nationaJ leaders seem to have 
concluded from secret opinion data that the party's support would only rise 
marginally by election day, at best. An increase in funding now would 
make little difference in the outcome. 
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The results 
In order to detennine what impact the AN C's strategy might have had on the party's 
performance at the ballot box, it is important to examine the election results. By the 
time the IEC announced the final ballot returns in early May 1994, the NP had 
secured an unmistakable triumph in the Western Cape. It received 53.3 percent of the 
vote, whereas the ANC garnered only about two-thirds as much, at 33 percent. The 
two-party race anticipated by pre-campaign polls proved to be the case, with smaller 
parties acquiring a total of less than 14 percent altogether.189 
In August 1993, nearly one-third of the electorate had appeared to be undecided, as I 
noted in Chapter Two. The Western Cape had the highest proportion of undecided 
voters in the country, compared to only 18 percent nationally. By election day, 
however, most undecided voters appeared to have made up their minds, at least to 
vote rather than to abstain. Only 13 percent of Western Cape voters stayed away 
from the ballot box -- a proportion roughly equal to the national average. 
Table 14 compares the fi ndings of the August 1993 Research Initiatives survey to the 
April 1994 election results. The election results by themselves, noted in the middle 
column, do not indicate how many voters abstained. The "adjusted" column, on the 
other hand, represents voters' choices as percentages of the total electorate -- it 
includes eligible voters who chose not to vote as "undecided/not vote." Thus, the 
"adjusted" column offers a useful comparison to the August 1993 poll results. 
l89 As voters had two votes, and there was some vote-splitting, the distribution of Western Cape votes 
for the national Constituent Assembly was somewhat different. For example, the DP fared better on 
the provincial than the national ballot. 
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Table 14: Party Support in August 1993 Compared to April 1994 
Source: Research Initiatives; IEC.190 
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August 1993 April 1994 April 1994 election, 
noll (%) election(%} adiusted (%) 
ANC 26 33 
NP 30 53.3 
DP 5 6.6 
far right-wing 4 2.1 
other 3 5 
undecided/not vote 32 
TOTAL 100 100 
From August 1993 to April 1994, not only did the number of apparent undecideds 
plummet, but there seemed to be a dramatic jump in NP support by 16 percentage 
points or over 50 percent.191 By contrast, the ANC only received an increase of 3 
points or about 12 percent. Other parties fared worse than the ANC. Although the 
DP's support rose by 32 percent, it gained only 1.6 points. Far right-wing parties 
actually lost over half of their support, leaving them with only 2.1 percent of the vote. 
By all indications, undecided voters had flocked en masse to the NP.192 Figure 39 
l 
illustrates the percentage increase or decrease of each party's support compared to its 
August 1993 level. Figure 40 shows the net gain or loss of support as a percentage of 
votes cast/respondents. 
1Wrable 14 should be read with caution, as opinion polls and a~tual elections measure different things 
-- in this case, the former attempts to gauge voting intention whereas the latter illustrates voter choice. 
The proportion of "undecided/would not vote" voters in the actual election is based on the IEC's 
estimate of turnout, which was itself calculated by comparing the actual number of voters with the 
expected number, based on population estimates. This figure is only an approximation. The IEC 
estimate and the election results are from Reynolds, "The Results," pp. 187 and 204. Note also that the 
category of "far right wing" consisted of the Conservative Party, A WB, A VU and AVF in the 1993 
poll, but included only the Freedom Front in the actual election. For details of these parties' activities 
during the campaign period, see Johan van Rooyen, "The White Right," Andrew Reynolds, ed., 
Election '94 South Africa: the Campaigns, Results aml Future Prospects, Cape Town: David Philip, 
1994. 
191 Note that the precise magnitude of this shift hinges upon estimates of how many eligible voters 
opted not to vote in April 1994. 
192A second, much less important factor was the conversion of some voters who had previously opted 
for one or other of the minor parties -- particularly the IFP, which attracted the support of some white 
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Figure 39: Change in Partv Support as a Percentage of Partv Support 
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As noted in Chapter T\\iO , most undecided voters happened to be coloured. By 
ostensibly winning support from most undecideds, the NP also received the lion's 
share of the coloured vote. Figure 4 1 shows the proportion of votes received by the 
ANC and NP according to race. It is estimated that just under 60 percent of all 
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coloured voters cast their votes for the NP, compared to 20 percent for the ANC and 
15 to 20 percent who did not vote at all. At least two out of three of the NP's votes 
came from coloured voters. Figure 42 compares the proportion of the coloured 
electorate that voted NP to that which voted ANC. Figure 41 is based solely on votes 
cast, whereas Figure 42 takes estimated abstentions into account. 
Figure 41: ANC and NP Western Cape Election Results bv Race 
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Despite the ANC's overall defeat, the results had perhaps two encouraging signs for 
the party. First, African voters chose the ANC overwhelmingly, which suggests that 
the party may have effectively mobilized its widespread support in African areas. In 
the very least, the ANC did not lose many, if any, African votes on election day either 
to other parties like the PAC or to abstentions. Second, the ANC also sustained its 
pre-election backing among coloured voters -- according to one estimate, over 40 
percent of those voters who chose the ANC were coloured.193 Figure 43 denotes what 
percentage of the NP's and ANC's support came from coloured voters. 
Figure 43 : ANC and NP Western Cape Coloured Support Bases 
(Percentage of Each Party's Votes That Came from Coloured People) 
193Robert ~vfatles, comments made to a postgraduate seminar on the ANC's 1994 Wes tern Cape 
election campaign, Department of Political Studies, University of Cape Town, September 21 , 1995 . . 
This estimate was based on the results of a post-election survey commissioned by the Institute for 
Democracy in South Africa. 
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ANC Reactions to and Interpretations of the Results 
Reuer ions 
Before examining ANC leaders' explanations of the results. it is interesting to note 
how officials at various levels in the party reacted to the outcome. Initial responses to 
the A~C's performance were mixed. Leaders' assessments tended to correlate with 
their re spective decisi on-making level within the party. I have gathered data on the 
view s of those at the following three levels: candidates and local activists, provincial 
strategists. and national coordinators. 
\Ian;- candidates and local activists had confidently predicted an ANC win during the 
campaign. even pri\·ately. As Davids admits, "We believed we would win. We didn't 
belie\ e \\ e would lose until it really happened. "19-+ Like Boesak at that sunny 
afternoon rail: in \ ·1itchell's Plain just before the election,195 some believed that an 
A>:C \·ictor: was an hi storical inevitability -- the imminent culmination of the 
liberati on struggle . Despite the warni ng flags of survey research and other evidence. 
man;. refused to accept the possibility of defeat. They believed that, even in the worst 
case. the outcome would re sult in a tie with the NP or a hung parliament. 196 Some 
claim that the campaign leadership downplayed or obscured the ANC's likely loss. 
As \1elanie Verwoerd noted: 
"People running the campaign knew [before the elections that we were losing] but they h.id it 
from us . ... We had to phone in results to them and were surprised at their reaction -- it was so 
19.fDavids intervie\\ . 
I 95see Introduction. 
1961 spoke to a range of candidates and activists, such as the following: Verwoerd; Davids; Naledi 
Pandor. interYiew. Jul) 5. J<)9..l ; Dicks ; Yvonne Witbooi, interview. June 13, 199-+; and one organizer 
''ho spoke on condition of anonymity, date withheld to protect th.is person's identity. 
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ma11er-of-fac1. Thal \\as because they knew. I thought it would be at least a close ball.le , with 
us gelling ahout 50 percent or having a hung parliarnent. "197 
Leading Africani sts in the provincial ANC admit being taken by surprise. As 
Yengeni put it, "We believed the reports from activists that we were doing well. Only 
after the elections did we discover that we had not done so well. "198 Other Africanist 
leaders question the accuracy and validity of the results, particularly in rural farming 
areas and in certain African townships. Kota pointed out: 
"I ha\ e concern abou1 \\ he1her [the election] was free and fair in rural and farming areas 
''here the A"IC didn'1 ha Ye 1he resources 10 monilor 1he NP. It got many \'Oles in rural areas 
\\here farmers 1\ ere !\IP members. Thi s is a big question .... There may be some discrepancies 
in the· ".1itchell's Plain di stric1. where [Khayelitsha] \\aS, because ii \\as raining. hallo1s 
1\ eren't deliYered on time. 1here \\ere delays and problems securing [ rnting] stations. Some 
hoxe ~ 1\ ere takL'll by police where we couldn 't moni1or them. So. !here are many questions. 
I'm not say in~ 1\ e could've 1\on the Wes1em Cape. but we could've done belier if we could've 
kept track of e\ery single ballot. "199 
Some col oured focus advocates, on the other hand. insist that although they had hoped 
the party would do bener, internal polls persuaded them to expect a loss. The issue 
for them was not if. but by how much, the NP would defeat the ANC.200 
Party official s at the national level seemed the least surprised. Before the campaign 




200fhis paragraph is based on discussions with ANC' leaders both at the time of the election and later. 
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fl oated the idea of actuall) writing off the 1994 provincial election and running a 
campaign with the 1999 election in mind.201 
Explanations n. ~ l 
Like reactions to the electi on outcome. explanations of the results al so varied. In 
post-election interviews, ANC leaders tended to put a positi ve spin on what had 
pro\'ed fo r many to be an intensely shocking and di sappointing tall y. They argue that 
the A'.\C fa ced a tough contest from the outset, and that although it performed worse 
than they had hoped. it actuall y did bener than they had expected. They claim that 
internal A :\C sur\'ey research showed the party to· be well behind the NP before the 
campaign peri od. and that these data demonstrate just how far the ANC closed that 
gap during the campai gn. According to Strachan: 
"\\e kne\\ 11 e 11 ere in trouble and that we were going to lose. [A NC polling ad1 isor Stan] 
(ireenberg spent two weeks here and 11 as adamant that there wa~ no 11 ay 11 e could win. I 
~ixikc· 11 ith hi m afternards and he said he was surprised we got as much suppon as 11·e did. 
We achie1 cd 3 meas ure of success -- 33 and a lhird of the vote .. .. The best-case scenario 
suggested hy our jX)Jl s was 28 percent. "202 
Organi::.ational problems 
Leaders offer a spectrum of reasons fo r why the ANC did not capture a larger sli ce of 
the electoral pie, and these generally fit into three categories. The first group of 
explanations -- by far the largest and most complicated -- involves organizational 
201 T hi ~ option 11 as mentioned by Strachan. September interview; the 1999 option might have had the 
ad1·antage of allowing activists to put all their effons into winning the more easily available vote ~. 
especial ly in Afri can areas. since these counted at the national level ; resources would not be wasted in 
an expectedly arduous attempt 10 make inroads into coloured communities. 
202s1rachan. August inten·iew. 
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problems. For example, some hint that the persistent Africanist-coloured focus debate 
hindered the development of an effective, unified approach. Some claim that certain 
top political leaders , such as Boesak, were unwilling to leave day-to-day operations 
under the control of campaign managers. and that this interference limited their 
administrative autonomy and effectiveness. 203 
Other leauers argue that the party spent too much energy and resources on mass 
activities such as large rallie s rather than personal contact with voters. They claim 
that a greater emphasis should have been placed on canvassing, which was perceived 
to haYe the greatest impact on undecided voters. 2~ Still others pinpoint Boesak's 
lar~el ::- negative image among many coloured voters, and maintain privately that 
another. less controversial premier candidate ought to have been chosen. Pandor 
touched on Boesak's reputati on, yet expressed reservations that his candidacy could 
be blamed for the party's loss: "Another question is how Allan Boesak was perceived 
b::- the public. There seems to be a negative perception of him but public support was 
high on the c:ampaign trail. So. I don't know who holds the negative view but I'm 
aware it ma\ be a factor. "205 
One foreign consultant to the campaign offers a scathing, in-depth criticism of the 
organizational structure of campaign headquarters, arguing that it was insufficiently 
understood both by those outside and inside, needlessly cumbersome, and lacking in 
strong. centralized leadership.206 Many organizers at the ANC's Community House 
headquarters in Cape Town's suburb of Salt River seemed to have, at best, a 
rudimentary knowledge of decision-making structures, and many branch heads 
appeared simply baffled, often operating on the basis of known contacts rather than 
20Js1rnchan. September imerYiew. 
2~Kalako interYiew; lssel, June interview; Ozinsky, June interview. 
205Pandor interYiew. 
206See Cal land. The Winds of Change.? 
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formal procedures. 207 The relationship between the three area committees and 
campaign management remained vague throughout the campaign. with the white and 
coloured committees essentially ceasing to function by phase three. In addition, the 
Command Centre , despite its ostensibly centralized decision-making function, often 
operated on the basi s of consensus and thereby wasted valuable time and energy. 
Polit ical environment 
The second group of reasons concerns the political environment of the province . For 
in stance. some argue that the ANC lacked an ally in the Western Cape media, 
parti cularly among new spapers, which were generally perceived to be either pro-DP 
or pro-:\ P Many simply concede that the NP had run a highly organized, though 
racist and inflammatory, campaign.208 Dugmore elaborated on the media factor: 
"\\:e aho must use the media be11er [in the next elections] . In the Western Cape from 1993 to 
1994 \\ e \\ ere basical ly cut off from communication that could ha\·e made a real difference. 
We\\ ere faced with a hostile SABC, despite the more objective composition of its board. The 
perceptions of the ANC ''e wanted to a'oid were shown in Die Burger. the Cape Tim es, and 
the Arf?us. As much as we tried to show nurselves with nonracial leadership and messages. 
we couldn't get the message across!" 209 
Racism 
A third category has to do with voter prejudices based on race . Leaders refer to the 
allegedly widespread racism of coloured voters toward Africans. They claim that 
such attitudes made it difficult for the ANC to convince coloureds that it was not an 
207 Jt took me until early 1995 to piece together a diagram of the general campaign structure. 
208Pandor interview. 
209Dugmore. June interTiew. 
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exclusively "Afri can" party, and that coloureds ought to di sregard the NP's doomsday 
predictions of African "domination" under an ANC government. 210 As Issel put it: 
"Coloureds chose to opt for white safety. It was easy [for the NP] to say that dl' Klerk was 
different [from leaders of the "old" NP] .... We had a ral ly with Mandela in El sie's Ri ver in 
September I 993 and I li\ed there to organize it. I saw that people didn't suppon the ANC and 
didn 't sho'' up at the ral ly. They were scared of A NC people. They saw us as \iolent, unable 
to C\)ntai n the ,·iolence and responsible fo r it. "211 
;-..tan) analysts outside the party echo the explanations gi ven by ANC strategi sts for its 
performance. Some el aborate on factors such as B· ie sak's negati ve reputation among 
man: coloured voters,21 2 the NP's "top-notch organization" and an effectively run 
.. 11rnr1 ~ernar21.' campai gn. 2 1 ~ and the ANC's inabili ty to "get away from old 
percepti on::. of the unity of the oppressed " and use sophisticated strategies to target 
specific areas.215 
Summar} 
The initial design and continued evolution of the ANC' s campaign strategy seems to 
haw been influenced by a range of contextual factors: the Western Cape 's history. 
demogra phics, electoral system, the party's knowledge of voter attitudes. internal 
politi cal dynamics at the provincial level , national priorities and the issue of race. 
These factors correlate with several principal strategic deci sions, including early 
changes in campaign structure, an initially positi ve tone, a focus on coloured voters. a 
21osee comments by Dicks and others in Chapter Four. 
21 1Issel. June inter\iew. 
212V uyo Barnma. "Cape ANC searches for winning leader," Argus, September 9, 199-t 
21.'Afrikaans for "black threat. " 
21 ~ " How West was won .... organisation and huge coloured vote," Argus, May 3, 1994. 
21 .'iBob Mattes. as cited in Richard Calland, "ANC Must Heed Lessons of W. Cape Poll Loss," Argus, 
September 9. 199-l 
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negative shift in tone halfway through the campaign, a steadily increasing volume of 
appeals and a denial of additional funding from the national headquarters. 
"'·'hen the elections eventually took place, results show that the NP far outperformed 
the A\iC at the ballot box. Perhaps most important, voting patterns suggest that the 
J\P' s victory stemmed from winning over a greater share of undecided coloured 
' oters than the A'.\JC. Many provincial ANC leaders. disappointed though perhaps 
not shocked by the outcome, attribute the party's loss to organizational problems, the 
political en\'ironment and racism. In the Postscript which follows. I speculate on 
whether an alternative strategy might have been more appropriate for the ANC in 
199-J.. and what implications its campaign and the election results may have for future 
strategies in the \Vestern Cape. 
-
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"You've got to hand it to them . .. They know how to pick a winner." 
An observer com ments on successful NP campaign strategies in the Western Cape, 
including ··Rooi Gevaar" (red/communist threat ) and "'Swart Gevaar"' (black threat). 
· I 
POSTSCRIPT: Alternative Strategy and Implications 
An Alternative Strategy 
One must be very careful when assessing an event in retrospect, with the benefit of hindsight 
and the luxury of roposing alternatives which cannot be tested. What I seek to accomplish 
in thi s section is to offer what might be called "informed speculation." I fully recognize that 
definitive conclusions about "what might have been, if only ... " are very problematic. I 
analyze strengths and weaknesses of the AN C's strategy, and suggest the possible impact that 
an alternative strategy might have had on the election outcome. In particular, I attempt to 
answer three questions: 
Did the ANC "lose" the province or was it "unwinnable?" 
• How appropriate was the ANC's strategy, given the nature of Western Cape 
society and the electoral system? 
• Why did many undecided coloured voters choose the NP? 
All of the explanations of the AN C's performance noted above tend to overlook what I 
believe is a central question: whether the party lost the election through a faulty campaign, or 
whether from the beginning it did not stand a reasonable chance of winning. The ANC's 
three main interpretations of the outcome -- organizational difficulties, the political 
environment, and racism -- all hinge upon what I view as essentially tangential, albeit 
important, issues. It is unclear to me how a more effective campaign organization, an ally in 
the provincial media, and less prejudice among coloured voters toward Africans would have 
significantly improved the ANC's electoral performance. The party's very strategy seems to 
Postscript Page 144 
me to be the main problem it had in 1994, as I shall explain. I would answer yes to both 
sides of the question above: the ANC probably could have done slightly better by running a 
different campaign, and it stood very little chance of victory in the Western Cape. 
Strengths and weaknesses of the ANC's strategy 
The AN C's provincial election campaign had both strengths and weaknesses in terms of the 
attitudes and beliefs of the electorate. It seems to have been entirely appropriate with regard 
to African voters, among whom the ANC enjoyed overwhelming support from the outset of 
the campaign. One challenge facing the ANC was therefore ensuring a high turnout among 
Africans , which the ANC sought to do through its grass-roots organization in townships and 
shack settlements. The party appears to have succeeded in this, both in the Western Cape 
and elsewhere in the country. 
Among coloured voters, however -- and especially among the large number of undecided 
coloured voters -- the ANC's strategy had its limits. The ANC maintained significant 
support among coloured voters, but made few inroads into the initially undecided bloc of 
them. To the ANC's credit, its big budget, media-oriented strategy rightly targeted 
undecided coloureds. Its focus on issues was also appropriate, since these voters seemed 
essentially to be "issue-voters" with weak or no allegiances to any of the competing 
parties. There were problems, though, with both the form of the AN C's campaigning and 
its precise content. 
Undecided coloured voters clearly felt distanced, perhaps even alienated from the ANC, as I 
discussed in Chapter Two. Few saw it as a party for people like them. The ANC sought to 
transform its image by promoting coloured leaders at the provincial and national levels, and 
through the People's Forums and rallies in coloured residential areas. However, the 
Postscript Page l-l5 
weaknesses of the ANC's branch-level organization in many coloured areas meant that the 
ANC always remained something "out there." The NP, by contrast, could utilize locally-
based electioneering structures which coloured NP activists brought to it from their days in 
the old, pre-1994 Tricameral Parliament, before they joined the NP. 
Perhaps more important, the content of the AN C's campaigning seems to have been self-
limiting. The ANC rightly diagnosed that most undecided voters harbored deeply-rooted 
concerns about the ANC, linking it to changes that were seen as directly or indirectly 
prejudicial to them -- i.e., to issues such as violence, and discrimination against the 
coloured working class with regard to housing and jobs. The main thrust of the ANC's 
election campaign comprised attempts to address such concerns directly. During the 
crucial first months of 1994, the ANC concentrated on its "plan," emphasizing that it had 
detailed policy positions on the issues worrying the voters. This was a strategy designed 
at the national level with potential swing voters in mind: convince them that the ANC 
could run a responsible government, it was reasoned, and they'll vote for the ANC. 
However, although the strategy was conceived with the right voters in mind, the message 
appears not to have been tailored e ectively. 
The content of the "Our Plan" campaign was perhaps too academic and too broadly 
nonracial, notwithstanding efforts to reassure and appeal to coloured voters in particular, in 
advertisements and at rallies. The constraints on ANC support in the Western Cape did not 
appear to be simply due to fears of ANC incompetence. Rather, they seemed to stem from 
the perceived association of the ANC with violence and its perceived neglect of the 
particular interests of coloured people, especially working-class coloured voters. "Our Plan" 
detailed the AN C's proposals for building houses and providing jobs, for example. However, 
coloured voters might have asked "So what? How would it help us if an ANC government 
gave these to African and not coloured families?" The strategy may have edged support 
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upwards very slightly, but arguably failed to challenge deep-rooted perceptions about the 
ANC. To do the latter would require, I suspect, much longer than the four months of the 
election campaign. 
Like the ANC, the NP ran an issue-focused campaign in the Western Cape. Unlike the ANC, 
however, the NP's campaign was aggressively negative from the outset. NP advertising 
pointed to issues such as violence, housing and employment, with the message that an ANC 
government would be bad for undecided, coloured voters on these very issues. The ANC 
and NP concurred on the agenda for the election in the Western Cape, but it was the NP 
which apparently succeeded in setting the terms by which the core issues were understood by 
voters. The election was thus defined primarily in terms of the ANC's weaknesses. 
A possible alternative 
The ANC's principal mistake, with hindsight, may have been not taking the fight to the NP 
from the outset, contesting the very issue framework in which the provincial election was 
fought. The ANC might have adopted a two-pronged strategy, combining an emphasis on 
the AN C's positive attributes with a hard-hitting attack on the NP. The second prong could 
have combined criticism of the performance of the "new" NP since 1990, including its failure 
to address issues such as crime, housing, and unemployment, together with a more pointed 
questioning of whether the "new" NP was really so "new " after all. The ANC could have 
appropriated and inverted the NP's own slogan, proclaiming "NP destroys, ANC builds." 
Advertising could have pointed to NP-built houses falling down, NP-commanded police 
failing to control crime, and other aspects of the NP's performance in office. 
Undecided voters may not have been persuaded that the ANC's history was unblemished, but 
they might have been dissuaded from voting for the NP. The NP itself recognized that many 
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of its supporters were somewhat ambivalent about voting at all, leading party organizers to 
worry about how to motivate them.216 Some voters may even have been persuaded to vote 
for a flawed ANC rather than a flawed NP. In other words, the ANC might have cast the 
election in terms of the NP's weaknesses rather than its own. The Western Cape ANC 
belatedly recognized this, adopting a more aggressive tact halfway through the campaign 
period. However, this shift seems to have come too late, and the ANC may have only 
succeeded in limiting the scale of its defeat. 
The ANC's national and provincial leadership had initially seemed to lean toward a negative 
campaign, focusing on the NP's responsibility for apartheid. They appeared to decide against 
this after consultations with Greenberg and other advisors, who drew on secret polling 
evidence to suggest that a campaign focused on apartheid would alienate many voters, 
especially the undecided voters whom the ANC sought to recruit. As Greenberg put it, "an 
unrelentingly negative campaign might backfire and put the ANC out of sync with the mood 
of the country. "21 7 The proposed, overwhelmingly positive campaign may have proven a 
wise strategy in other provinces, but among undecided coloured voters in the Western Cape 
it seems to have been less appropriate.218 I would argue that a negative campaign focused 
not on the NP and apartheid but on the "new" NP's performance since 1990 would have been 
more "in sync" with the targeted Western Cape voters. 
Perhaps the principal obstacle to the ANC running a negative, issue-focused campaign in the 
Western Cape, even as part of a two-pronged strategy, was that this would have been "out of 
sync" with the ANC's campaign nationally. As some provincial officials recognized at the 
time, the AN C's choice of strategy in the Western Cape ostensibly reflected not just its 
216See Giliomee, "The National Party's Campaign," p.54. 
21 7Quoted in Gevisser, "Clinton's Men." 
2 I 8The case for a negative campaign in argued strongly by Call and, The Winds of Change? I note that 
Calland does not distinguish between different types of negative campaigns, in particular between a 
campaign focused on 1994 issues and one on the historical topic of apartheid. 
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appraisal of the electorate but also the organizational dynamics of the ANC, i.e., the 
relationships between provincial and national leaders and among provincial leaders 
themselves. First, the ANC's national campaign leadership seems to have had considerable 
influence, especially in late 1993 and the beginning of 1994. It had been advised to avoid a 
negative campaign nationally, and appears to have believed that the ANC was not equipped 
to run a dramatically different campaign in the Western Cape than elsewhere. 
Second, the provincial ANC leaders were in an arguably poor position to challenge or 
defy the national leadership. The advocates of a coloured focus had drawn heavily on the 
support of the ANC's head office during the process of choosing which voters to 
prioritize in the Western Cape. They may have been very reluctant to tum around and 
tell the national leadership that they were going to run a very different provincial 
campaign. These provincial leaders seem to have been organizationally vulnerable, given 
the predominance of African branches in the province, and were perhaps unlikely to defy 
key mentors or supporters. Moreover, none of the national or provincial ANC leaders 
had experience in running election campaigns, and may have understandably tended 
toward caution rather than boldness. 
Possible effects of alternative strategy 
If the provincial ANC had been able to overcome differences with the national office and 
actually implement the kind of alternative strategy I outline above, I believe that this 
approach might have had two main effects: 1) a significant proportion of the initially 
undecided voters may have remained undecided in April 1994, abstained from voting, and 
thus lowered the turnout in the election, and 2) a small proportion of them might have 
decided to vote for the ANC. The best possible scenario, given surveys of undecided voters' 
feelings about the parties and issues involved (see Chapter Two), might have been one in 
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which the NP emerged as the largest party in a hung provincial legislature. The NP might 
have won only about 48 percent of the vote compared to about 38 percent for the ANC. 
Even in this best-case scenario, therefore, the ANC probably would not have won the 
election in the Western Cape -- it only could have avoided losing it so badly. 
The election results also could have been far worse, of course. The ANC's strategy was 
successful in two important respects, as noted above. First, it ensured a high turnout among 
African voters, who made up over half of the AN C's support base. Second, it attracted a 
substantial minority of coloured voters to the ANC, so that almost half of the AN C's votes 
came from them. Had the ANC failed to campaign for coloured votes, then its defeat would 
almost certainly have been even more crushing. 
Implications of 1995 local elections? 
Is the Western Cape unwinnable for the ANC? ANC leaders have been greatly encouraged 
by the ANC's performance in the local government elections held on November 1, 1995 
outside of metropolitan Cape Town. The ANC actually won more votes overall than the NP 
in predominantly coloured wards. However, the ANC should not overrate its performance. 
It enjoyed relatively stronger support in the small towns that were contested in November 
than in either greater Cape Town or the farming districts where there were no elections. The 
AN C's share of the vote in the small towns certainly seemed to rise between April 1994 and 
November 1995, but not by a huge amount. The greatest change was the collapse of the NP's 
vote. Most of the NP's 1994 voters did not vote at all. Many of those that did, voted for 
locally-based civic groupings rather than either the ANC or the NP directly. 
The lesson of the 1995 local elections may be that a locally-oriented campaign with local 
candidates (i.e., local coloured candidates in coloured areas) works to the ANC's advantage. 
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Orienting the campaign towards the specific concerns of coloured voters may have meant 
that the ANC no longer seemed to be an alien, African party "out there." This kind of 
campaign may have pacified the fears of some potential NP 
voters. In the short run many such voters seem to have simply stayed away from the polls, 
perhaps viewing the major parties with indifference.219 
In both the 1994 and 1995 elections, ANC and NP campaigns seem to have influenced the 
turnout and the parties' shares of the vote in the Western Cape. This may have been 
primarily because a high proportion of the electorate did not have strong attachments to any 
of the major parties. Whether these voters voted and who they voted for appeared to depend 
largely on how they understood the elections, and that may have been deeply shaped by the 
emphasis, form and content of the major parties' campaigns. In 1994 the NP arguably 
succeeded in defining the election to its advantage. In the small towns of the Western Cape, 
in late 1995, the ANC seems to have been more successful. 
Implications 
What implications do the ANC' s chosen strategy and the election results have for future 
ANC campaigns in the Western Cape? Perhaps of greatest relevance will be the conclusions 
that provincial ANC leaders draw from the campaign. I offer four possible scenarios and 
then identify evidence that suggests which of them may be most likely: 
Scenario A 
Leaders infer from the election results that the ANC lost because it failed to place sufficient 
emphasis on its African support base. They assume that coloureds were not as undecided as 
2 l 9Seekings, "What Swing? A Closer Look at the 1995 Local Government Election Results in the Non-
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pollsters led them to believe, and that the ANC lost in 1994 because it failed to recognize the 
extent to which coloureds' perceived "affinity" with whites would shape their votes. The 
ANC wasted too much time and resources on winning coloureds' support. The most 
effective approach for the 1999 provincial elections will be to place top priority on 
consolidating the party's core constituency of African voters. Despite these leaders' support 
for the ANC's nonracial philosophy, they would have the party "go racial" in the Western 
Cape -- not necessarily because going racial works in an objective sense, but rather because 
they believe it will work. 
Scenario B 
Leaders reach the opposite conclusion as in Scenario A -- coloureds are not permanently 
aligned toward the NP, and whatever "affinity" they may have with whites does not 
overshadow other factors. In fact, surveys suggest that levels of party identification remain 
low even after the election, despite some hardening of allegiances. Leaders interpret these 
findings to mean that many coloureds can be won over to the ANC if it adopts a more 
appropriate campaign strategy, one which targets coloured voters from the very start. 
Perhaps most important, coloureds make up nearly half of the party's 1994 vote totals. Given 
the consistently high support for the ANC among Africans, coloureds thus represent the most 
crucial constituency in the province. 
Scenario C 
Leaders are split in their interpretations of the results and conclusions about race as a 
motivating factor. Some decide, as in Scenario A, that the party needs an "Africans first" 
approach. Others conclude, as in Scenario B, that a coloured focus will be critical in 1999. 
Metropolitan Western Cape," unpublished paper, November 1995. 
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This difference in opinion exacerbates existing rifts between Africanists and coloured focus 
advocates. Battles over resources hinder leaders' ability to compromise with each other, and 
the party approaches the next elections without a unified, cohesive strategy. Divisions . 
harden and prospects for improving the party's share of the provincial vote appear dim. This 
conflict lays the groundwork for future intraparty tensions and heightens the possibility of 
the ANC eventually "going racial" in the Western Cape. 
Scenario D 
The same situation unfolds as in Scenario C, except that leaders conclude that their 
differences of opinion may threaten the ANC's chances of electoral success in 1999. 
They agree to compromise on strategy, and ultimately develop an approach that 
directs efforts toward both African and coloured voters. The commitment of factions 
to work together for common goals lowers the chances of the party going racial, at 
least in the short term. 
Evidence for scenarios 
Several post-election events provide limited evidence relevant to these scenarios, though 
none of it appears conclusive. As noted above, tensions seem to exist between provincial 
ANC factions along the lines that divided campaign strategy options for 1994. Two 
occurrences seem to support this: a walkout by coloured leaders in the ANC Youth League, 
and the almost exclusively African composition of the REC and criticism of it by coloured 
focus advocates. On the other hand, some ANC leaders seem encouraged by the party's 
performance in rural coloured wards in the November 1995 local elections. 220 They appear 
22ocomments made by Cameron Dugmore and Max Ozinsky at a joint University of Cape Town, 
University of the Western Cape, and Stellenbosch University seminar on the local elections, hosted by the 
UCT Department of Political Studies at the UCT Centre for African Studies, November 1995. 
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to believe that the ANC may have a reasonable chance at winning some coloured votes 
away from the NP and/or capturing a larger share of the vote in 1999. They do not seem to 
have written off either the importance of maintaining the party's perhaps tenuous hold on 
existing coloured su port, or the possibility of increasing that support. 
1 would suggest, tentatively, that this evidence supports Scenarios C and Dover A and B. 
Neither Africanists nor coloured focus advocates appear to have taken over the direction 
of the provincial party to the exclusion of the other side, though Africanists seem to 
dominate current decision-making structures. Tensions exist but so too do areas for 
compromise and cooperation. 
Conclusion 
A different strategy may have given the ANC a better electoral performance. One that 
targeted undecided coloured voters from the campaign's outset, offering reasons to vote 
for the ANC and against the NP, might have proved the most appropriate approach. The 
1995 local election results suggest that at least some coloured voters who previously 
backed the NP were willing to vote ANC, and the party's campaign may have played a 
role in thi s conversion. 
1 doubt that the ANC could have won a majority or plurality of the Western Cape vote in 
1994, particularly given the limited four-month campaign period and deep-seeded 
attitudes among coloured voters which seemingly predisposed them against the ANC. As 
one provincial strategist paraphrased Greenberg, "In the Western Cape we would have 
needed a miracle to win. And miracles are few and far between. "221 Nevertheless, had 
22 1 Strachan, September interview. 
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the ANC adopted the kind of alternative strategy outlined above, I believe it might have 
done marginally better. 
The implications that the ANC's 1994 campaign strategy and election results have for 
future campaigns in the Western Cape may hinge largely on party leaders' assessments of 
that strategy and those results. I suspect that Africanists and coloured focus advocates 
will remain the provincial party ' s two predominant factions, at least in the short term, and 
it is unclear whether this will result in a more cooperative or more divisive intraparty 
dynamic as the 1999 elections approach. In any case, the ANC's ability to formulate and 
communicate compelling messages to coloured voters appears critical to either 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A: List of Interviews 
NAME CAMPAIGN ROLE DATE 
Zou Kota provincial ANC pre-campaign February 15, 1995 
Elections Coordinator; coordinator of 
African areas committee; national 
candidate 
Ketso Gordhan national ANC campaign coordinator February 15, 1995; 
March 24, 1995 
Tony Yengeni immediate past provincial ANC February 13, 1995 
secretary general; coordinator of 
African areas committee; national 
candidate 
Lemmo Kalako provincial ANC secretary general; November 1, 1994 
national candidate 
Garth Strachan provincial ANC Campaign September 13, 1994; 
Administrator August 17, 1994; 
March 7, 1995; 
March 24, 1995; 
March 29, 1995 
Kader Asma! national candidate July 5, 1994 
Naledi Pandor national candidate July 5, 1994 
Paul Davids ANC Cape Town Southern Suburbs June 28, 1994 
Sub-regional Organizer 
Melanie Verwoerd national candidate June 27, 1994 
Rudi Dicks ANC Grassy Park Branch Organizer June 17, 1994 
Willie Hofmeyr provincial ANC coordinator of Special June 17, 1994 
Events; coordinator of white areas 
committee; national candidate 
Cameron Dugmore provincial ANC head of Voter June 14, 1994; 
Education , Organi sation, Training and December 12, 1994 
Transport (YOTT); provincial 
candidate 
Max Ozinsky provincial ANC YOTT canvassing co- June 14, 1994; 
coordinator February 8, 1995 
Johnny lssel provincial ANC YOTT canvassing co- June 13, 1994; 
coordinator; provincial candidate February 7, 1995 
Yvonne Witbooi ANC Grabouw Branch organizer June 13, 1994 
Note: From June 1994, persistent attempts were made to interview the following ANC 
officials who played important roles in designing, influencing and/or implementing 
the campaign -- Allan Boesak, Trevor Manuel, Bulelani Ngcuka and Franklin Sann. 
These individuals unfortunately were consistently unavailable for comment. 
APPENDIX B: List of Campaign Events Observed 
DATE TIME SPEAKER/EVENT LOCATION NOTEBOOK 
31-Jan aft. MPD Field Reports Leslie Bldg. , UCT 
I 0-Feh aft. news of police raid ANC ANC Retreat Branch 
13-Feb 15:30 Mandela Retreat Sports Field 
16-Feb 12:00 ANC voter ed workshop Zolani Twshp., Ashton 1.5 
17-Feh 12:30 Manie, Golding, Hofmeyr Cape Town Civic 1.5 
23-Feh e\·e. Sub-Regional Organizers Meeti ng Ottery· 1.5 
25-Feh 12:00 Mbek.i Jameson Hal l, UCT 2 
27-Feh LU O Mbeki , Manuel, Rasool Athlone Civic 2 
28-Feh 20:00 van Eck, Pandor, Manuel Claremont Civic 2 
5-Mar 1-tOO Asmal, Ngcuka, Naidoo Rylands 3 
6-Mar 12:30 Delft canvassing blitz (not) Delft 3 
6-Mar 1-tOO Manuel, M. Verwoerd Macassar Civic 3 
6-Mar 20: 00 Sachs, Naidoo, M. Verwoerd Sea Point Civic 3 
8-Mar 13:00 Sisulu -- CT women's march Parliamem, Cape Town -+ 
8-Mar 19:00 Sisulu -- women's league rally Good Hope Ctr. -+ 
9-Mar I-+: I 0 Ozinsky imerview Community House, Salt Ri ver -+ 
9-Mar aJt. Manie, Noel Daniels, Benjamin CRIC, Athlone -+ 
10-Mar 10:00 Strachen .. lssel: organizers' mtg. Guguletu -+ 
I I-Mar 12:30 Holomi sa NSLT, ucr -+ 
15-Mar 19:30 Pandor, Benjamin Mowbray Town Hal l 5 
16-Mar 08:00 multi part y debate: Gabru Garlandale H.S., Athlone 5 
16-Mar 20:00 Nissen, Omar, Essop All Saints Hall , Woodstock 5 
17-Mar 13:00 Naidoo Great Hall , UWC 6 
17-Mar 19:00 canvassing blitz Grassy Park ANC 5 
20-Mar 17: 25 Mandela Kleinvlei 6 
22-Mar LUO Boesak Central Methodi st, CT 6 
22-Mar 16:00 Manuel, Manie, Davies CT Civic 6 
26-Mar 15:00 Manuel, van Eck, Boesak, Ramaphosa Eastridge, Mitchells Plain 7 
27-Mar 11 :30 Ramaphosa Baxter Theatre, Rondelx1sch 7 
27-Mar 15:00 Ramaphosa, Sonn Hewatt Coll. , Athlone 7 
28-Mar 1-.J.: 15 MPD press confe rence The Town House Hotel, CT 7 
2-Apr 15:30 Mandela Good Hope Ctr. 8 
5-Apr 12:00 Asma!, Boesak Woodstock Holiday Inn 8 
7-Apr 20:20 multipart y debate: Bloch Marks Synagogue Ctr. . Sea Pt. 8 
8-Apr 13:00 Boesak, Sonn, van Eck, Villa-Vincenzo CT City Hall 8 
9-Apr 17:00 Slovo UCT Med School 8 
10-Apr J...J. :50 Naidoo (not) Goodwood Showgrounds 8 
IO-Apr 20:20 Ruiters, van Eck, Pandor Cf Central ANC 8 
I I-Apr 20:00 Hofmeyr -- Black Sash debate Rondebosch Cong. Church 9 
12-Apr 13:00 Nkonki , Yengeni Jameson Plaza, lJCT 9 
12-Apr 19:30 W. Vem oerd, Sonn, Manuel, Niehaus Stellenbosch Town Hall 9 
13-Apr 19:30 Carolus, Sonn Sinton Alexander Sch., Athl. 9 
1-.J.-Apr 20: 15 Bradenkamp residence -- TV debate Grassy Park IO 
17-Apr 15:30 Mandela, Boesak Athlone Stadium 10 
18-Apr 09:30 Manuel Dock Rd. Theatre, CT Waterfront 10 
19-Apr 20:00 Boesak, Carolus Baxter Theatre, Rondebosch 11 
20-Apr 20:20 Manuel, Pandor, Davies Van Niekerk Hall , Table View 11 
21 -Apr 12:50 Boesak-Bester debate Great Hall , UWC 11 
22-Apr 12:55 Boesak, Bloch NSLT, UCT 11 
23-Apr 15:...J.5 Ramaphosa, Boesak, Manie Mondale Sch. , Mitchells Plain 12 
2-+-Apr 13: 30 Mbek.i. Boesak Hout Bay Harbour Festival 12 
APPENDIX C: List of Campaign Events Scheduled 
date location event tnie SQS;akers area 
Tuesday, Cape Town Central meeting Bridgette Mbandla all 
February 22 A ranch 
Thursday, Nondzwakazi Church ANC Section I Guguletu Tony Yengeni , Bulelani African 
Februar, 2..+ Hall , NY l , Guguletu Branch Ngcuka (A) 
Elsies Ri ver Civic sports meeting Cheryl Roberts, Jannie coloured 
Centre, Halt Rd. Momberg, Ngconde (C) 
Balfour, Derri ck 
Whiteboy, Cameron 
Dugmore 
Electri c City/Bl ue people's forum Johnny de J ,ange, Imam c 
D0\\"11S Solomons 
Bi shop La\" iS Civic publ ic meeting Hilda Ndude, Jan van Eck c 
Centre 
Fri day. Aredasdorp I ,andho u Farmers' Union seminar: van van Eck white (W) 
February 2:'i Ko-Opcrasie Eck speaking on ANC 
agricultural policy 
Jameson Hall , lJ(l. rall y Mbeki all 
NICRO offices, meeting with white Mbeki w 
Hoboken Bldg., pensioners and poor 
Krufk.all Ave .. 
Bell ville 
I&J Factory, candidate visit Mheki c 
Woodstock 
lJWC Festirnl, l JWC hrief appearance Mhcki CIA 
stadium 
Kenil worth fundraising function Mbeki , Trevor Manuel w 
Racecourse 
Cape Evangelical discussion on the future Chri s Nissen c 
Bi ble Institute, ..+2..+ under new government 
Kli pfontein Rd., 
Surrey Estate 
Saturday, Mitchell 's Plain Town walkabout and short address Mbeki c 
Febrwu-y 26 Centre 
Mbekweni , Paarl canvassaing blitz Mbeki A 
Guguletu visit to mentally Mbeki A 
handicapped children 
NICRO offi ce, meeting with social workers Mbeki c 
Mitchell 's Plain and community 
organizations 
Luckhoff High School people's forum Mhcki , Ni ssen, Ebrahim CIA 
Hall , ldas Valley, Rasool 
Stellenbosch 
Club Ubuntu, social function with llnity Mbeki A 
Guguletu Zone community leaders 
Town Hall , local government Mbeki , Rasool, Manie w 
Stellenbosch di scussions with 
Stellenbosch municipality 
Sunday, St. Gi les, Klipfontein visit to di sabled people Mbeki w 
February 27 Rd. , Rondcbosch 
Guguletu Section 2 meet ing with African Mheki A 
Civic oensioners 
lTWC S 1 Lecture Northern Suburbs Mbeki c 
Theatre communi ty leaders' meeting 
Primrose Park, people's forum Manuel c 
Madrassa, Surrey 
Estate 
Rai lton Community public meeting t.b.a. c 
Hall , Sw·ell endam 
Trek Garage, ANC Sol Plaatjies Branch Omar A 
Khavelitsha oeoole's forum 
ANC: Office, Fairways public meeting Melanie Verwoerd, Essa c 
Moosa 
Regent Road, Sea opening for exhibition of Albie Sachs, Omar w 
Point black art Brads ha 
Mandalay Primary people's forum Asma!. Phumzile Ngcuka, c 
School Tony Ruiters , Lerumo 
Kalako, Rhoda Joemat, 
Enver Daniels, Tasneem 
Essoo 
Monday, Claremont Ci vie rall y Manuel, Pandor, van Eck w 
February 28 Centre 
Tuesday, Langa people's forum t.b.a. A 
March I 
Thursday, open field opposi tt e COSA TU workers' rally Yengcni , Manie, Dullah c 
March 3 Maitland abbatnir Omar and Nomtsikeleli 
Mgavia 
Bellville South Civic COSATU workers' rall y Asma!, Danny Olifant , c 
Centre Leonard Rarnatlak.ane 
Site 5 School, ANC Two Oceans Branch Yengeni , A. Young A 
Kommetiie launch 
Ida's Valley Stellenbosch oublic meeting t.b.a. CIA 
Strand TO\rn Hall ANC Helderberg Zone Imam Solomons, Melanie CIA 
public meeting V erwoerd, Pandor 
Klaver Community ANC Klaver public meeting Noel Williams c 
Hal l 
Friday, Athlone Civic Centre education forum Cheryl Carolus, Pandor, c 
March ...i Mav is Mak.eleni 
Nonzwak.azi Church International Women's Day n/a A 
Hall , Guguletu prayer 
Saturday, open field opposite COSA TU workers' rally Jay Naidoo, Baleka c 
March 5 Sil ver Stream Hotel , Kgotisile, Boesak, Manie, 
Atlantis Oliohant, M. Yerwoerd 
Ghousia Manzi! rally Naidoo [ed: and Asma!] c 
Centre, Athlone 
Roman Catholic Hall , ANC Dooringbaai public Omar, Mak.eleni , Sue van c 
Dooringbaai meeting der Merwe 
St. Helena Bay ANC St. Helena Bay mass t.h.a. c 
meeting 
Victoria West Victoria West people's t. b.a. c 
forum 
Sunday, Holomi sa Village, ANC Bantu Holomisa Lizo Nkonki , Bulelani A 
March 6 Khayelit sha Branch Rall y Ngcuka, Enver Daniels 
Rosemead Primary Delft mani fes to canvassing Boesak [ed: did not show, c 
School, Delft blitz blitz went ahead without 
him] 
Oscar Mpetha High candidate visi t to preschool Kgotisile A 
School, Nyanga 
Bernard Fuller Hal l, ANC heal th policy forum Naidoo, Carolus, Omar all 
UCT Medical School with pri vate sector doctors 
and representati ves 
Macassar Civic Hall public meeting Naidoo, Trevor Manuel, c 
Jan van Eck, Kota, 
Pandor, M. Verwoerd 
The Music Cafe, Observatory/Mowbray Jean Benjan1in, Lynne all 
Observatory International Women's Day Brown, Beattie Hofmeyr 
celebration 
Sea Point Civic Centre domestic workers' forum Naidoo, Kgotisi le A 
Minor Hal l, Sea Point Sea Point ANC ral ly Naidoo, Kgotisil c. M. w 
Civic Centre Verwoerd, Albie Sachs 
Monday. Jameson Hall , UCT lJCT ANC Student Forum t. b.a. al l 
March 7 rall y 
Parli ament women's march to Boesak fed: he did not all 
Parliament by al l ANC showJ 
All iance fe male candidates 
Westridge Civic COSA TU women's ral ly Naidoo, Boesak, Carolus c 
Centre, Mitchell's 
Plain 
Wednesday. uwc UWC Education Policy Unit Omar CIA 
March 9 seminar 
Lentcgeur Civic Hal l, ANC Mitchell 's Plain Suh- Ebrahim Rasool c 
Mitchell 's Plain Region mass meeting 
Thursday , Cloetesville ANC Stell enbosch public t.b.a. CIA 
March 10 meeting 
Bishop Lavis Civic ANC Bishop Lavis public Manuel, Rashieda c 
Centre meeting Abdullah, Gertrude Fester 
Moreesberg ANC Moreesberg public t. b.a. c 
Community Hall meeting 
Fri day, Lusaka Community people's forums Winnie Mandela, A 
March 11 Hall and KTC Hal l, Holorni sa 
Gug ul ctu (?) 
Black City/Boys people's forum W. Mandela A 
Town/Bunt ubakhe, 
Black City 
uwc public meeting Holorni sa CIA 
Vi llage 2 grounds, people's forum Holorni sa CIA 
Browns Farm 
Holomisa Village, people's forum W. Mandela A 
Khavelitsha 
Hanover Park candidate bli tz Asmal, Ngcuka, Manie, c 
shopping centre M. Verwoerd 
Mbekweni puhlic meeting W. Mandela A 
Communitv Hall 
Hermanus Community public meeting Holomi sa CIA 
Hall 
Saturday, SAC.TWlJ Hall , Salt COSA TU Regional Boesak c 
March 12 River Conference 
Club llbuntu , breakfast W. Mandela, Holomisa A 
Gugulet u 
Athlone candidate shopping centre W. Mandela c 
walkabout 
Bloekombos rall y W. Mandela c 
Site 5, soccer ground, people's forum and Holomisa A 
Noordhoek walkabout 
Mitchell 's Plain candidate walkabout Holomisa c 
3B Alfred Ct., St. ANC City Branch office Sachs w 
Johns Rd. , Sea Point launch 
Langa Stadium rally W. Mandela A 
Mfuleni Community rall y Holomisa A 
Hall 
Goedvemacht Church ANC Picketburg public M. Verwoerd, Willian1s c 
Hall , Picketburg meeting 
Electri c City Primary Electric Ci ty, Blue Downs Boesak c 
School , Blue Downs mass rall v 
Maitland Cemetery wreath laying ceremony for W. Mandela, Holomisa c 
Ashley Kriel and Anthony 
Fran sch 
Section 7, Guguletu wreath laying ceremony at W. Mandela, Holomi sa A 
graves of "fallen comrades" 
Sunday. Nolungilc Primary people's forum W. Mandela, Holomisa A 
March 13 School, Site C, 
Khavelitsha 
primary school, people's forum W. Mandela, Holomisa A 
N gxobongwana 
NY 116 Stadi um, townshi p church gathering n/a A 
Guguletu 
Cross roads Hall, people's forum W. Mandela, Holomi sa A 
Crossroads 
Wolseley Civi_c Centre ANC Wolseley public Boesak, M. Verwoerd c 
meeting 
Kensington/Fatreton ANC Kensington people's Manuel, van Eck, Fester, c 
Community Hall forum van der Merwe 
Ottery Civic Centre ANC Southern Suburbs n/a c 
people's forum 
Mfuleni ANC Mf uleni public t.b.a. A 
meeting 
Monday, Bonteheuwel Civic debate on women's issues t.b.a. c 
March 1-f Centre, Mitchell 's 
Plain 
Athlone Technical Athlone Tech forum on t.b.a. c 
College affirmative action 
Melkhoutf ontein Melkhoutfontein public t.b.a. CIA 
Community Hall meeting 
Tuesday, Paarl Community Hall ANC Paarl Election Launch Manuel CIA 
March 15 
Mowbray Town Hall ANC Mowbray/Observatory Benjamin, Pandor, all 
information meeting Shepard Mdladlana led: 
last soeaker did not show] 
Wednesday, Garlandale High multi -party debate on Daniels c 
March 16 School, Athlone education 
opposi te Rainbow COSA TU workers' forum n/a c 
Industrial area 
Landsdowne Civic people's forum Solomons c 
Centre 
Thursday, Genadendal Public candidate visit Naidoo c 
March 17 Works Proiect 
Caledon Square Police Albie Sachs freedom run to Sachs, Ngconde Balfour, all 
Station to Clifton .+th commemorate release from Cheryl Roberts, Duncan 
Beach, Cape Town prison 30 years ago Crowie, Brickwa Stanley, 
Leon Beech 
Recife (block of court forum Naidoo c 
flats ?), Hanover Park 
Phillipi public meeting Steve Tshwete, Nofulele CIA 
Creche, Joe Modise 
Sco11sdene Club sports forum Tshwete, C. Roberts , c 
House, Kraaifontein Crowie 
Malmesbury Civic COSATU workers' forum Manuel c 
Centre, Westbank 
Strand Town Hall rally Boesak CIA 
Strandfontein Civic public meeting Omar, Virginia Engels, c 
Centre Nomantaya Haganga 
Cloctesville , rally Boesak CIA 
Stellenbosch 
Friday, Scottsdene Secondary teachers' forum Fester c 
March 18 School , Kraaifontein 
I ,anga High Schcxll public meeting Tshwete A 
Club llbuntu, Mnandi Clothes launch Boesak A 
Guguletu 
Langa Community meeting Boesak A 
Hall, Washington St. 
Eyona Centre, NY 1, candidate mans infomrntion Boesak A 
Guguletu tables 
SAMWU Hall, sports forum Tshwete c 
Beverly St. , Athlone 
Saturday, UWC Lecture Theatre Social Audit Academics Manuel all 
March 19 DL2 Conference 
Nyanga bus terminus, launch of ANC Big Better Boesak, Mbandla A 
NY3 Life [street rubbish ] Clean-
Uo camoaign 
Westfleur Council COSA TU workers' rally Yengeni c 
Offices, Mandela 
Square, Atlantis 
Ocean View sports ANC Ocean View Branch van Eck, Manie, M. c 
fie ld launch rally and soccer Verwoerd 
match (local team vs. 
regional candidates) 
Cape Town Civic National Ministers' Boesak al l 
Centre Fellowship Forum 
Wal lacedene sports public meeting Yengeni , Amos Lengisi c 
stadium, Kraa ifontein 
Sunday, Green Point Stadium , Lion's Club children's sports Nelson Mandela all 
March 20 Cape Town day 
Perrivale Primary ral ly Mandela c 
School, Grassy Park 
Greens Football Field, Man nenherg Peace Event Mandela c 
Mannenberg 
Kleinvlei sport s Peace Rally Mandela c 
stadium 
Monday, l~nga Comprehensive Langa Sharpeville Mbandla A 
March 2 1 School, Zone 27 Commemorati ve Rall y 
Khayelitsha soccer meeting Lulu Johnson (president A 
stadium ANCYL) 
Diazvi ll e Civ ic Centre, Sharpev ille Day Ral ly ? c 
Saldanha 
Tuesda) , Cent ral Methodist publ ic meeting Boesak al l 
March 22 Church, Green Market 
Square Caoe Town 
Wednesday, Cape Town Civic forum on ANC economic Boesak, Manuel, Ruiters, al l 
March 23 Centre pol icy Davies, P. Ngcuka, Manie 
Durbanville Town public meeting: "The Future Doug [Johnny?] de Lange c 
Hall for Farmers and 
Farmworkers under the 
ANC" 
SACS Hi gh Schcx1l, teachers' and parents' Boesak w 
New lands meeting 
Schotschekhx)f Civic Cape Town Central Branch Manie, Omar, P. Ngc uka c 
Centre (Bo-Kaap), meeting 
Cape Town 
Friday, Hanover Park bus canvassing bli tz Cyril Ramaphosa c 
March 25 terminus 
Berg Ri ver Hall , ral ly Ramaphosa c 
Well ington 
Saturday, Good wood opens RDP conference Raniaphosa al l 
March 26 Show grounds 
Crossroads rall y Ran1aohosa A 
Eastridge, Mitchell's ral ly Ramaphosa c 
Plai n 
Sunday, Baxter Theatre, lJCT Sunday tea with white Ran1aphosa w 
March 27 community 
Eikendal Sports ral ly Ran1aphosa c 
Ground, Kraaifontein 
Hewatt College, ral ly Ramaphosa, Carolus, c 
Athlone Sonn 
l IWC Great Hall Mavibuve Centre opening Ramaohosa all 
Monday, Nonzwakazi Church, memorial service frir Chris Nissen, Kalako A 
March 28 Guguletu prisoners 
Sanlam head office, Sanlam workers' ral ly van Eck c 
V oortrekker Rd. 
Ceres Town Hal l Ceres teachers' forum Abdull ah CIA 
Bell ville candidate visit to numerous Boesak c 
sites 
Bellville South Senior Bellville peoples' forum Engel c 
Secondary 
Matilda and Mabe l Mannenberg peoples' forum t.b.a. c 
Court s, Mannenberg 
Christchurch Hal l, publi c meeting Manuel w 
Constantia 
Maitland Town Hall Kensington peoples' forum Essop, Joh1my de Lange c 
on affirmative action 
T uesday. NW coast candidate tour Boesak c 
March 29 
Gugul etu students' rall y Kalako A 
Comprehensive 
School, Guguletu 
South Peninsul ar Hi gh panel debate on education nla c 
School 
1.-anga High School, Langa students' ral ly Yengeni , Nkonki A 
Langa 
Masiyile Secondary Khayc litsha students' rally n/a A 
School, Khayelitsha 
l JCT plaza lJCT students' meeting Ngcuka al l 
Atlanti c Underwater Underwater Club meeting n/a ? 
Cl ub, Bay Rd. on the future of sea 
resources 
Knysna Knysna public meeting Janie Momberg CIA 
Wednesday. 2A Robert Leslie religion forum Barney Pityana, Fahricl all 
March 30 Bldg. , lJCT Essa.ck 
J,anga Langa traders' meeting Omar, Kalako A 
? touri sm in the '90s Carolus, Asmal ? 
Macassar Civic Hall public meeting Rasool c 
Laingville Civic publ ic meeting Kalako, Engel, Hananga c 
Cent re, St. Helena Bay 
Bell \'i lle Civic Centre, public debate ? c 
Bell ville 
Community Hall , farmworkers rally Liz Abrahams c 
Vredendal 
Grassy Park people's forum ? c 
Rj vcrsdale Town Hall oublic meeting Bloch c 
CPA Hal l, Chapel St. , information meeting Essop, Gasan Solomons c 
Woodstock 
Thursday, Woodstock Holiday press conference Boesak, Sonn all 
March 3 1 Inn 
67 Capricorn Way. coffee with community Boesak c 
Ocean View leaders 
Porter Boys Reform candidate vis it Boesak w 
School, Tokai 
Kalk Bay Harbor meeting and lunch wi th Boesak c 
local fishermen 
Cafta squatter candidate walkabout Boesak c 
settlement, Steenberg 
Lavender Hill candidate wal kabout Boesak c 
Jaffers Motors, Grassy tea with business and Boesak c 
Park community leaders 
Ottery Cemetery, funeral for ANC member Roesak CIA 
Phillioi Pat Harri son 
St. Georges Cathedral, Easter service Roesak all 
Caoc Town 
Redby Methodist public meeting Bocsak, Pandor, Fester, c 
Church Hall R. Ngcuka 
G.H. Starke Centre, 2 multi-party debate Reg September c 
Greenturf Rd., 
Hanover Park 
llWC march to Bellville police Yengeni CIA 
station, demand fo r free 
political acti\·ity in Natal 
UCT, New Science meeting on free political ? all 
Lecture Theatre activitv 
Westridge Civic end of term rap powerjam c 
Centre, Mitchell's (rap concert) 
Plain 
Town Hall , mass meeting Kalako, M. Vemoerd, CIA 
Franschock Johnny Arendse, 
Nomatvala Hangana 




Valhalla Park Ci vic people's forum: social Bloch, MacGregor, Lynn c 
Centre securitv and education Brown 
Saturday, Mbekweni Stadium, SADTU member funeral September, Ben A 
Apri l 2 Paarl service Tengimfene 
Vanguard Hall , ANC funeral service Virginia Engels c 
Genadendal 
South West Coast rally Mandia Gxan\'a c 
ANC office, Kecrom candidate walkabout and Boesak CIA 
St. , Robertson short address 
Klipheuwel rall v Kalako c 
Cororhrick rall y ? c 
MacGregor Rugby meeting and address to farm Boesak c 
Field, MacGregor workers 
Nquebele Primary candidate visit Boesak A 
Schcx)l, Nquebele 
Township 
Good Hope Centre, Muslim commemoration of Mandela c 
Cane Town arrival of Sheikh Yusuf 
Barnard Hall , Ashton candidate visit and Boesak CIA 
canvassing 
Zolani Civic Centre, candidate visit Boesak A 
Zolani (near 
Robenson) 
Worcester Stadium, rally and music festival Asmal, Daniels, Gass<mt CIA 
Worcester Solomons, Hanganya, van 
Eck Sonto 
Bonnivale Civic rall y Boesak c 
Centre, Bonnivale 
Sunday, Robenson Rugby public meeting ? CIA 
April 3 Stadium, Robertson 
Bonnivale Community church serv ice Boesak c 
Hall, Bonnivale 
Montague oeace ra ll v Boesak c 
Monday, Turfhall Park, Athlone Athlone festival ? c 
Apri l..+ 
Mal mes bury farm workers people's forum Christmas Tinto, Amos c 
Lengesi 
Eis len Park Civic candidate motorcade Boesak c 
Centre, van Huysten 
Ave., Eislen 
Worcester candidate visit to various Boesak CIA 
church bazaars 
Shoprite Centre, Blue Downs ANC Easter Sonn c 
Eerste Ri\'er fest ival 
Laingsburg School rall y Boesak c 
Hall , Laingsburg 
Tuesday, Holiday Inn, launch of "Sekunjalo" Boesak, Pretorius, Asma! , all 
Aori l 5 Woodstock cassette for taxi members Solomons 
Scottsdene Senior public meeting W. Yerwoerd c 
Secondary School, 
Petunia St. , Scottsdene 
uwc . teachers' forum Benjamin CIA 
Goeie Hoop Primary people's forum Russel MacGregor c 
School, Bellville 
Wednesday, Bonteheuwel Civic Muslim forum Manie c 
Aoril 6 Centre 
Stell enbosch High, public meeting W. Yerwoerd, Rob Davi s CIA 
Jamestown, 
Stellenbosch 
Touws River public meeting ? c 
Community Hall 
Athlone Scout Centre, people's forum ? c 
Hazendal , Athlone 
Nonh 
Thursday, Lentegeur candidate motorcade Boesak c 
April 7 
Lentegeur radio station candidate visit Boesak c 
GuguJetu Civic Hall Chris Hani Week rallv ? A 
Windmill Res .. forum W. Yenvoerd c 
Bredasdoro 
Lutheran Centre, Felix people's forum Vincent Di ba, Jean c 
St. , Bell ville Benjamin 
Happy Valley infom1al mini ral ly Boesak CIA 
settl ement, Phillipi 
Leaf College Hal l, panel di scussion Asmal, Pandor w 
Rondebosch 
comer of Jacaranda mi ni public meeting Boesak c 
and Hibiscus Roads, 
Lentegeur 
Marks Synagogue, Sea multi-party debate on Graham Bloch w 
Poi nt elections 
Friday, Lighthouse Christian mult i- party panel discussion Sonn, Ngcuka, Asmal ? 
Aoril 8 Centre 
Piesang Valley Civic ral ly Manuel, Momberg, CIA 
Centre, Plettenberg Nissen, Nomatyala 
Bav Hanganga 
Graaf water Primary rall y Boesak c 
School 
Saturday , Grabouw peoples' forum Leonard Ramatl akane CIA 
Aori l 9 
Grootbrakrivier sports rall y Manuel, Momberg c 
fie ld 
Boland sub-regional sports forum Cheryl Roberts ? 
office 
Wallacedean Sport s ra ll y Slovo (' 
Stadium, Kraaifontein 
Chris Hani Fields, Hani memorial rally Manuel, Momberg A 
Kwangaba, Mossel 
Bay 
llluntu Centre early childhood education Nobom Sonto, Rose A 
forum Somo, Omar 
Vanguard Hall, farm workers' forum Chri stmas Tinto c 
Genadendal 
St. Mary's Hall , roadshow Danny Oliphant, Sorhub c 
Calvinia Oosthi zen 
Wallecedean Sports Hani mass rall y Yengeni c 
Field, Kraaifontein 
Mandalay Primary peoples' forum Manie c 
School 
ManncnbcrglGug uletu march from police station to Slovo, ANCYL CIA 
shoooing centre 
Civic Hal l, Vredendal ral ly Boesak c 
Oudendal Sports peoples' forum Russel MacGregor, c 
Grounds, Pri nce Gertrude Fester 
Albert 
Marconi Beam rally wi th joint squatter Slovo A 
informal settl ement areas damaged by fire 
Heidelberg Civic public meeting W. Verwoerd c 
Centre 
UCT Medical Faculty heal th care in the '90s panel Slovo al l 
Lecture Theatre 
Onverwaagt peoples' forum Kalako, Joey Cupido c 
Restaurant , Wellin!!lon 
Sunday, NGK, Vredenburg church service Boesak c 
April 10 
Louterwater, Langkoof Hani Dav rallv ? c 
open fi eld by ANC Hani memorial service Slovo A 
office, Koornhof St. , 
New Crossroads 
Good wood SACTWll Conference Naidoo all 
Show grounds, 
Good wood 
Guguletu Stadiu m NY Hani memorial rally Sl ovo A 
-+9 
Vanguard Community forum Ycngeni , Ngcuka, c 
Centre Abdullah, Freddie 
Bosman 
Ceres Town Hall Hani memorial meeting Essa Moosa, Liz CIA 
Abrahams, Terrv Lester 
Al bow Brass Hall , Cape Town Central meeting Pandor, van Eck, Ruiters all 
Gardens, Cape Town 
Monday, Antoniesbos rall y Boesak c 
April 11 
lJmfe leni Old Age public meetin iz Boesak A 
Centre 
Bell ville South SAMWU Workers' Rally Mani e c 
Stadium 
Blue Downs: candidate walkabout Boesak c 
Stranford, Brentwood 
Park , Rosedale and 
Kleinvlei 
Blue Downs candidate motorcade Boesak c 
ISM Events Centre Sapics Industrial Forum Manuel all 
(Cape Town?) 
Lo urensford Hal l, rall y Amos Lengesi c 
Lourens ford 
Tuscanny Glen public meeting Boesak c 
Primary School, Blue 
Downs 
Pniel Congregational peoples' forum Sonn, M. Verwoerd, c 
Church. Pniel Davies 
Deyseldorp Civic Ctr. , public meeting Manuel, Momberg c 
Devseldom 
Congregational Black Sash debate Hofmeyr w 
Church, Rondebosch 
Tuesday , Vanguard Hal l, teachers' forum ? c 
April 12 Genadendal 
Mandalay Shopping Eskom victory repon Manie c 
Complex 
Voorburg Senior peoples' forum M. Verwoerd c 
Secondary School, 
Delft 
Freedom Hal l, Mfeleni oeooles' forum ? A 
Town Hall , mass meeting Niehaus, Sonn, Manuel , CIA 
Stellenbosch W. Verwoerd 
Rietbrom public meeting Manuel, Momberg c 
Civic Centre, Ocean peoples' forum ? c 
View 
Civic Centre, Grassy endorsement ral ly Omar and over 25 c 
Park community leaders 
Main Town Hall , public meeting ? c 
Woodstock 
Plaaslike Geen, public meeting ? c 
Mal mes bury 
Wednesday, Methodist Church, press conference by 60 Boesak all 
Apri l 13 Buitenkant St., Cape Christian leaders concerning 
Town forthcoming elections 
Bredasdorp candidate roadshow begins Boesak c 
Leslie Bldg., Lecture UCT meeting on "The Land Sonn, lndie Mfeketu, all 
Theatre 2A, UCT Question" Bloch 
Gansbaai candidate visit Boesak c 
Stanford candidate visit Boesak c 
K ylanie Crossroads Bindu Bakhe public meeting ? A 
Gordans Rd. Two Oceans court forum Enver Daniels c 
Playground, Kalk Bay 
Rugby Stadium, rally Boesak c 
Haws ton 
Belh·ille South Civic public meeting Carolus, W. Verwoerd, c 
Centre Manie 
Industrial Pscyhology election symposium Asma! al l 
Bldg., Univ . or 
Stellenbosch 
Square Hill Civic forum Sonn c 
Centre, Retreat 
Alex Sinton School, people's forum Sonn, Carolus c 
Athlone 
Bethany Full Gospel public meeting Daniels w 
Church, Lansdowne 
Rd., Claremont 
Lansdowne Civic people's forum Carolus, Sonn c 
Centre, Church St. 
St. Bartholomew's women's rights debate Fester c 
Hall , Walmer Estate 
Caledon oublic meeting Boesak c 
Thursday, Koeberg Power Eskom Koeberg workers' Daniels c 
Apri l l...J. Station rall y 
UCT Plaza SASCO Open Air Forum Sonn all 
and Walkabout 
Leslie Bldg., Rm. 3A, UCT cultural debate: "The Omar Badsha all 
UCT Role of Art in the New SA" 
B.J. Vorster Bldg., public meeting ? all 
Univ. of Stellenbosch 
Rylands High School, Thornhill teachers' forum Daniels, Randall van der c 
Rylands , Mitchell 's Heever 
Plain 
Gerald Wright Hal l, people's forum van clcr Heever CIA 
Grabouw 
Rtx:klancls Civic public meeting ? c 
Centre, Mitchell 's 
Plain 
Redhill squatter camp, people's forum ? A 
Simon's Town 
Wi ndmill Restaurant, Overberg spons forum ' ) c 
Bredasdom 
Civic Centre, Civic mass rally ? c 
Wav, Matroosfontein 
Friday, Bell ville South CTPA, meeting Boesak c 
April 15 Kasselsvlei Rel. 
Coloured Affai rs meeting Boesak c 
Regional Office, 107 
Yoonrekker Rel., 
Omnia Bldg., Bell vi lle 
Luthe ran Centre, Feli x senior citizens' tea party Reggie and Hettie c 
Street, Belh ille September 
Matroosfontein Old meeting Boesak c 
Age Home 
Uit sig Ci \ ic Hal l meeting Boesak c 
Bishop Lavis Police meeti ng wi th police officers Boesak c 
Office 
Monday, lm izamo Yeth u, Hout coun foru m ? A 
April 18 Rav 
Bantu Hall , people's forum Hilda Nducle A 
Washington St. , Langa 
St. Margaret's Hal l Cederberg fam1 workers ? c 
(location?) meeting 
Groot Constantia meeting Abrahams, Daniels c 
Estate, Constantia 
fveri te Hostels Everite workers' forum ? c 
(location?) 
Grootdrakenstein Racksbern Farm meeting R. Ngcuka de Lange c 
Pacalsdorp Town Hal l, public meeting ? c 
George 
Darling Town Hall nublic meeting Sonn c 
Ponuguese Club, Ponugucse community Manuel w 
Milnenon public meeting 
Sarepta Civ ic Centre, Election Hype rally Tshwete, Manuel c 
Reitv lei Rd., 
Kui lsriver 
Tuesday, Cafta Old People's candidate visit Boesak c 
April 19 Home 
House of meeting Boesak c 
Representati ves office, 
Wvnbern 
Wvnberg taxi rank candidate walkabout Boesak CIA 
Park wood candidate motorcade Boesak c 
Heathfield meeting Boesak c 
Baxter Hall , UC.I rall y Boesak, Carolus c 
Westridge Hi gh panel debate Yusuf Gabru, Daniels c 
School, Mitchell 's 
Plain 
New Orl eans Berg Valley teachers' forum Sonn c 
Secondary School, 
Paarl 
Relhar; Kraaifontei n canvassing blitz Lul u Johnson c 
3B Les lie Bid!! ., UCT women's issues rall v Miranda Xuhayse all 
B.J . Vorster Bldg., public forum Fester, Xoli swa Sibeko all 
Univ. of Stel lenbosch 
Bell ville Civic Centre mass meeting Man uel c 
802 City Centre, 7 1 NADEL panel Daniels all 
Loop St. , Cape Town 
Swellendam mass meeting ? c 
Gordon's Playground, Two Oceans court forum: Gabru c 
Kalk Bay orovincial £ovemment 
Matroosfontei n Civic public meeting Sonn c 
Centre 
FA WU Centre. NY I public meeting Tshwete A 
Guguletu 
Rylands High Sch<.~) 1 , Gatesv ille tenants' forum Omar c 
Mitchell 's Plai n 
Bergri ver Senior youth discussion: religion Imam Solomons, Nissen c 
Secondary School, and the ANC 
Wellington 
Alabama Hall , publ ic meeting ? c 
Ladismi th 
Faimays/Parkwood mass meeting ' ) c 
office 
Pi ketburg Civic Centre public meeting ? c 
St. George's Church, election forum debate ? al l 
Cape Town 
Windmi ll Res., forum Yengeni c 
Bredasdoro 
Pinelands Town Hall oubli c meeting Manuel , Barney Pitvana w 
Paarl Town Hall public meeting for the white de Lange, Bloch CIA 
communi tv 
Macassar Civic Centre oeoole's forum Pandor c 
Morningstar Civic public meeting W. V envoerd, Sonn c 
Centre, Durbanv ille 
Cravenby Civic Centre mass rally Brian Bunting, Sue van c 
der Merwe 
22 Venus Way, Ocean house meeting Teressa Solomon c 
View 
Woodstock Town Hall oublic meeting Manuel, Rasool c 
Wednesday, Readers' Di gest meeting Boesak c 
Aori l 20 House, Athlone 
2A Leslie Bldg., UCT meeting on economic oolicy Manuel al l 
Good Hope Centre, Teachers Against Racism Boesak, Sann, Shepher all 
Cape Town rall y Madladla, Vivian Carelse, 
Carolus 
Kalkstenfontein canvassing blitz Boesak c 
Surrey Estate canvassing blitz Boesak c 
Heideveld canvassing blitz Boesak c 
Leibrant van Niekerk public meeting Manuel , Pandor, Davies w 
Hall, Table View 
Good Hope Centre, NlJMSA nurses' rall y Manuel c 
Caoe Town 
Cape Tmrn Civic WCYF meeting ? c 
Centre 
Excelsior Hall farmworkers' rall y ? c 
(location?) 
Everite Hostels Everi te Workers' forum ? c 
(location?) 
Philani Clinic, Unathi Buntubakhe general meeting ? A 
Marcus Ga\·ey Square Rastafarian meeting ? ? 
(location?) 
Garlandale High debate ? c 
School , Athlone 
Pegas us Centre Athlone mini rally ? c 
(BABS), Aster St., 
Kewtown (Athlone) 
Huegennt College public meeting B. Ngcuka, Niehaus c 
Hall , Wellington 
HanoYer Park Civic rall y Boesak c 
Centre 
RiYersdalc Town Hall rall v Omar, Yengeni c 
Fi sh Hoek Civic public meeting Momberg, Asma! , M. w 
Centre Verwoerd 
Veldrif Community meeting Sonn c 
Hall 
Community Hall , meeting Boesak CIA 
Paarl East 
Thursday, Beaufort West teachers' rally Sann CIA 
April 21 
SACS Circle, Bellville Nylon Spinners workers ? c 
South 
Laingsburg Sonn c 
Good Hooe College panel discussion ? all 
Vanguard Hall , teachers' forum ? c 
Genadendal 
NG Church Hall, Prins rally ? c 
Albert 
Concordia Winkelsaal Homlee rally ? c 
& Civic 
Hall , Kyamandi oeoole's forum ? A 
Community Hall, public meeting Manuel c 
Cruiser Rd. , 
Strandf ontein 
D.F. Malan Hall , premiers' debate Boesak al l 
Ste llenbosch 
lJitsig mass ral ly ? c 
Friday. Excelsior I Secondary joint school s' meeting Sonn, Shepherd c 
April 22 School, Belhar Mdlalana, Boesak 
Sohn~e College, teachers and civi l servants Sonn CIA 
Worcester rall y 
Jameson HaJI , lJCT UCT ANC' Forum raJJy Boesak aJI 
Arthur's· Seat Hotel , seminar on affordable Hilda Ndude, Basil w 
Sea Point housing and the role of the Davidson, Thozami le 
building industry Botha, Sam Montsi, 
Boesak 
Athlone candidate walkabout Sonn and others c 
Saturday, NGK, Krnaifontein funeraJ for Matthew Boesak, Kalako c 
April 23 Marshall 
Eerste River funeraJ for Mrs. Arendse Boesak, Kalako c 
Tygm·alley Shopping infom1ation table Boesak c 
Centre 
near li brary, Pi ketburg oeoole's forum Sonn c 
New Horizon Sports rally Barbara Masekela CIA 
Ground, Plettenberg 
Bay 
Macassar Secondary raJl y Ramaphosa c 
School 
Vredenual rally Manuel c 
Homlee Stadium, rall y Mase kc la CIA 
Knysna 
Mondale School, NEHA WU civi l servants Ramaphosa, Boesak c 
Ponlands, Mi tchell 's ral ly 
Plain 
Belhar Secondary rall y Sonn c 
School 
SACTWlJ Hall , Salt SACTWU raJly Boesak c 
River 
Sunday, Hout Ray Harbour festival Mbcki , Boesak, Manuel CIA 
April 24 
Mbekweni (location?) memorial for Tambo Masekela, Boesak A 
Blue DownslEerste buriaJ of apartheid Boesak, Manuel c 
River procession and ral ly 
NY2 Guguletu mini sters' fraternal Mbeki A 
interdenominational 
elections service 
Sam~j Centre , -IB Hours to Freedom rally Mbeki , Boesak c 
Gatesville 
Bishop Lavis Sports rall y Sonn, Mbeki , Boesak c 
Ground 
uwc Women's League festival Nomatyala Hagana A 
Methodology for Appendix C 
I label "areas" according to the predominant "racial" group living in the general proximity 
where the event occurred. Classifying a location along these lines can be problematic. 
For example, in towns that are largely coloured, there may be a sizable African township 
nearby toward which the event might also have been targeted. Many from the township 
may have traveled to the coloured "area" to attend the event. Contextual detail of this sort 
is difficult to derive from a simple list of scheduled events. Thus, I have attempted to 
classify them using the following, admittedly imperfect yet perhaps sufficient, approach: 
I use six categories: C for mainly coloured communities, CIA for largely coloured areas 
with Africans living in close proximity, A for predominantly African communities, W for 
mainly white areas, "all " for locations at which an event would be expected to draw a mix 
of all three groups, and "?"for areas I did not know how to classify. Although some 
events in predominantly coloured rural areas might have attracted some whites -- thus 
necessitating a C/W category -- I assume that whites would have attended in far fewer 
numbers than coloured people. 
Also, I differentiate between C and CIA in most locations based on whether the given 
area had a "Black Local Authority" (BLA) according to the 1983 Tricameral System. 
This criterion was used in the November 1995 local elections law for allocating 
proportionally elected seats according to race. My assumption here is that although an 
event may have taken place in a largely coloured area, many Africans living nearby 
probably attended. The locations which had a BLA include the following: Ashton, 
Beaufort West, Ceres, George, Hermanus, Ikapa (including Langa, Guguletu and 
Nyanga), Khayelitsha, Somerset West, Mossel Bay, Oudtshoom, Paarl , Robertson , 
Stellenbosch, Strand and Worcester. Obviously, I consider the lkapa townships and 
Khayelitsha as African areas, rather than CIA. 
In these two ways, I have attempted to determine as closely as possible those "racial" 
groups toward which scheduled events were targeted. The conclusions that can be drawn 
from this information may be limited, but also may be useful. I have listed several 
cautions and possible constraints in Chapter Six. 
APPENDIX D (1-3): ANC Poster and Leaflet Production 
(includes provincial production and materials received from national office) 
1. African National Congress Posters and Leaflets I 
Produced hy Allie's Press During the 1994 Election Campaign 
Western Cape PrO\·ince 
DATE POSTERS LEAFLETS DESCRIPTION 
2+.Jan 3()( C Ash Relford 
26-Jan 30C 3,000 oeoole's forum 
26-Jan 5,000 0 Never A_gain .. . 
26-Jan I ,500 50,000 election rally - Athlone 
26-Jan 400 0 Wynberg election launch 
I 
28-Jan 300 C Wynberg TOTAL JAN: 
7-Feb 8,000 0 Mandela's Pledge to the Caoe 
7-Feb 300 10,000 Heideveld 
10-Feh -WO C Retreat 
10-Feb 300 -l,000 Bishoo Lavis 
I 0-Fcb 30f C Observatory/Mowbray 
23- Feb 300 C Write Off Debt... 
2+.Feb 500 10,000 Saldhana Bay 
2+.Feb 300 0 people's forum 
2+.Feb 300 C Ida' s Valley/Stellenbosch 
2+Feb 3()( C Guguletu 
2+.Feh 900 C Strand, N. Pine, Piesangstown TOTAL FEB: 
! -Mar 8()( C Mitchell's Plain 
I-Mar 500 G Sea Point 
I-Mar 300 (J Macassar 
I-Mar 300 -l,000 Bishop Lavis 
-l-Mar 5,000 20,000 Adelaide Tambo/Women's League/Atlantis 
-l-Mar 800 C Women's League 
-l-Mar 300 C Cloetesville I 
-l-Mar 500 C Carl Niehaus 
-l-Mar 1,800 -l0,000 Jay Naidoo I 
8-Mar 5,000 C Better Life for All/Winnie Mandela 
8-Mar 5,000 C Bantu Holornisa 
8-Mar 200 C Melanie and Willem Verwoerd 
8-Mar 0 10,000 Wes tern Cape 
8-Mar 3()( 0 VOIT: Manuel, van Eck; Omar. Manuel 
9-Mar 300 C Wolsley 
9-Mar 150 10,000 Electric City I 
9-Mar ]()( 0 Woodstock I 
JO-Mar 3()( C Belter Life for All 
I I-Mar 2()( C Mowbray 
11-Mar 350 C Lansdowne I 
l I-Mar 200 0 Strandfontein 






JI -Mar 200 S,000 Atlanti s 
13-Mar ( lS,000 Strand 
13-Mar 0 20,000 Eid message 
16-Mar J,500 0 Ocean View I 
16-Mar soc 0 Caoe Town Central 
17-Mar 2,000 0 ANC Youth League rall y 
17-Mar 300 0 Sharpeville commemoration 
17-Mar 300 0 Dennemere I 
17-Mar 1,000 0 Mandela - Eerste River 
17-Mar 0 30,000 Athlone 
18-Mar 300 0 Montana 
18-Mar 300 0 Garlandale 
19-Mar 300 0 Heideveld 
19-Mar 2SO 0 Wellington 
19-Mar 2,000 1,000 Mannenberg 
2.1-Mar 1,500 0 Ramaphosa speaks ... 
23 -Mar 0 80,000 Stoo the Third Force (Xhosa) 
23-Mar 0 120,000 Stop the Third Force (Afrikaans) 
23-Mar 600 0 morning tea with Cvril Ranrnohosa - Ronddx >sch 
23-Mar soc 0 Luxurama Theatre 
23-Mar 0 50,000 We Will Stop the Violence 
23-Mar 300 0 Constantia 
2.1-Mar 2,000 0 Kirstenbosch Peace Festi val 
n -Mar 800 0 Cyri l Ramaphosa - Crossroads 
23-Mar 1,500 30000 Cyril Ramaohosa - Eastridge, Mitchell 's Plain 
23-Mar 2,000 0 Grabouw 
23-Mar soo 0 Well ington 
23-Mar 30( 0 Tulbaugh 
23-Mar S,000 50,000 Peace ral ly - Elsie's Ri ver 
2-l-- Mar soc 8,000 Cyril Ramaphosa - Kraaifontein 
2-l-Mar ( 60,000 ANC students 
2-l-Mar 2()( 0 Maitland Town Hall 
2-l-Mar 5,000 0 voter educati on 
2-l-Mar S,000 0 repeat - voter education 
2-l-Mar ( 50,000 Mandela/Boesak 
2-l-Mar 30,000 0 voter ID 
2-l-Mar ( 10,000 Portlands, Mitchell 's Plain 
2-l-Mar c 1,000 Constantia 
2-l-Mar c 2,000 Marion Institute 
28--Mar c 8,000 Thornhill (Athlone) 
29-Mar 30C 5 000 Montana 
29-Mar ( 30,000 ANC Tertiary ... 
30-Mar 2 000 C Women's League 
30-Mar 100 2,500 Mitchell 's Plain 
31-Mar 200 1,000 Stellenbosch H.S. - people's forum Posters Leaflets 
3 1-Mar 0 10,000 Norma - W. League (Xhosa) 
3 1-Mar 0 100.00C Norma - W. League (English) TOTAL MAR: 89.850 772.SOC 
I-Apr 3()( 20,000 Franklin Sonn 
-l-A pr 0 10,000 Thornhi ll (Athlone) 
5-Apr 2,000 22,000 Youth League 
5-Aor 35( 0 Cape Town Central 
6-Apr 2,000 0 Chris Hani commemorati on 
6-Apr 5,000 0 Joe Slovo speaks - Hani commemoration 
6-Aor 5()( 125.0<X Beware Kriel's New NP (c nglish) 
6-Apr 50C 0 Save the Cape from Racism 
6-Aor 1,000 C Women's League - forum 
6-Apr 0 10,000 Stell enbosch 
7-Apr 200 5,000 repeat - Save the Cape from Racism I 
7-Aor 2,000 100,000 reocat - Beware Kriel's New NP (Afrikaans) 
7-Aor 0 75,000 repeal - Beware Kriel's New NP (Xhosa) 
7-Apr 3()( 0 Meet the ANC: Sonn, Carolus 
7-Aor 1,000 5,000 Sohnge College, Worcester 
7-Apr 0 50,000 repeat - Beware Kri el's New NP (Xhosa) 
7-Apr 0 50,000 repeat - Beware Kriel's New NP (Afri kaans) 
7-Apr 0 100,000 repeat - Beware Kri el's New NP (Engl ish) 
7-Apr 0 5,000 Women's League 
7-Aor 0 6 ,000 Cal l of Islam 
7-Apr c -l,000 women's forum 
8-Apr -lOC 10,000 Stellenbosch: Verwoerd, Man uel, Niehaus, Sonn 
8-Apr 200 2,000 Pniel I 
9-Apr 300 0 Grassy Park I 
9-A pr 300 5,000 mini-fes t l 
I 0-Apr 200 3,000 Bell vill e: Reneti a Bernard 
I I -Apr 15,000 200,000 Mandela festival (English) 
I I-Apr -l,000 150,()()(] Olvmoics Off! 
I J-Aor 1,000 10,000 Swellendmn (Xhosa) 
I I-Apr 0 20,000 Swellendam (Afri kaans) I 
11 -Apr c 250,000 repeat - Beware Kriel's New NP 
I I-Apr 0 10,000 Paarl I 
13-Apr 800 3,000 Claremont : Jan van Eck I 
13-Aor -ioo C Table View I 
13-Apr 0 50,000 repeat: Mandela festival (Xhosa) 
13-Apr 3,000 150,000 Athlone: Mandela speaks 
13-Aor 300 0 Two Oceans 
13-Apr 1,500 0 Blue Downs 
13-Apr 300 C Durbanville I 
13-Aor 500 o Tous Riven 
13-Apr 3,000 O Come Hear Nelson Mandela Speak 
13-Apr 0 -l0,000 Hanover Park 
13-Aor 0 260,000 Kriel's Cane Bocrestaat I 
13-Aor 0 150,000 Kriel's Cape Boerestaal I 
13-Apr 0 100,000 Kriel's Caoe Boerestaat I 
13-A pr c 10,000 Paarl: Boesak 
1-l-Apr c 5,000 Kuil s Ri ver: Manuel, Niehaus, Tshwete 
15-Apr 300 0 Paarl: Boesak 
15-Anr 2()( 0 Pinelands I 
15-Apr 1,000 0 Hanover Park 
15-A or 20C 0 Paarl I 
15-Aor 3()( ( Worcester 
15-Apr 500 C Steve Tshwete 
15-Apr 300 C Kuils River I 
15-Apr 300 C Eitsig 
15-Apr 300 C Ravensmead 
15-Aor 300 0 Kuils River I 
18-Apr 600 C Rocklands 
18-Anr 300 C Strandfontein 
18-Apr 300 0 Paarl 
18-Apr 300 0 Thornhill (Athlone) 
18-Aor 300 0 Heathfield 
18-Apr c 250 ,000 A Call from the Heart (English) 
18-Aor u 100 000 A Call from the Heart (Xhosa) 
18-Apr 0 150,000 A Call from the Heart (Afri kaans) 
18-Apr ( 15,000 Roe kl ands 
18-Apr 0 I 0,000 Mrs. Shapiro 
19-Aor 3()( ( Grassy Park I 
19-Apr 200 0 University of the Western Cape 
19-Aor 2,000 0 Strand 
19-Apr 300 0 Borland 
19-Apr 5,000 C Hout Bav 
19-Apr 1,200 C Athlone 
19-Apr 0 20,000 Multeno 
19-Apr 0 15,000 voti ng station 
19-Apr ( 5,000 Belhar 
19-Apr 0 -l0,000 Blue Downs 
21 -Apr 20,000 0 Mandela: Vote ANC 
21 -Apr 3,000 35,000 Nonhem Suburbs 
21-Apr 0 30,000 Hout Bay 
21-Aor c 3,000 Wvnberg 
21 -Apr 0 5,000 Macassar 
21 -Anr c 150,000 ANC Calling Special Votes 
21 -Apr c 8,000 Paarl Posters Leaflets 
21-Apr c 10,000 Worcester 
21 -Apr { 150 ()()( Mandela soeaks TOTAL APR: 83.85() 3.011.000 
TOTAL: 193,400 3,860,50(] 
NOTE: The data above is not entirely comprehensive, but is based on all records available from Allie's Press. It 
also does not include posters or leaflets paid for in cash by individual ANC branches. Allie's Press estimates 
that few leaflets and no more than 5,000 posters were produced on that basis. 
2. African National Congress Campaign Materials 
Received from the National Office During the 1994 Election Campaign 
Western Cape Province 
Compiled hy Quentin Joseph, A'.\C, April 1995 
Prepared by .\fan Eldridge. April 20. 1995 
Depar1111e/ll e>f f'olirica/ Srudies. Universiry of Cape Town 
DATE ITE\f TYPE 
-
YOLL\.1 E LA\"GL\GE DESCRIPTIO\" 
- ===...J. __.. - -------'==="=--===="-==C-- r - - -
- - :f t -.lan- hadge -- - ------.,..3...,..0-,-,00o.~-E-n-g.,-,Ii-s l,....1 ____ "\_1_ai_1_d_e_Ia-f~or_P_r_e-s1-· d-e-n-t"-,,.-.  ,.-.*----- ~ -·----i 
16-Feb manifesto 3,500 English A\"C maitifesto* 
~ ----------- -------,---,---_..._~~----'---------------------~ 
16-Feh man ifesto t.+,000 . .\frikam1s , A\"C mai1ifes to* 
16-Feb rmmifesto , 2.+,000 ,\J10sa ,A\"C maitifesto* , 
-~-Feh small Oag 8,000 n a A\"C Oag w logo in centre** 
16- Feh badge 8,000 .Engli sh "\1andela for President" *** 
17-Feh manifesto 72,000 Afrikaans A\"C manifes to* 
___ 3-\lar poster 3,500 English "\"ote A \"C for \\ ·omen's Right s" 
3-\lar sti cker 10,000 English "\landela for President" 
1--------------------,-~..,--,~~-----,...--~----------------~ 
3-\lar mai1ifesto 18,000 Xhosa A\"C manifes to* 
7-\ lar sticker 120,000 English "\1andela for President" 
7-\!ar painphlet 10,000 Engl ish women's forums 
____ 7-\ [ar pamphlet _______ 3_2_,0_0_0_ A_fr_i_ka_· a_1_1s ___ \\_·o_m_e_n_'s_f.,..o_ru_ m_s ___ .,--___________ _ 
7-\lar pamphlet 5,000 Xhosa women's forums I 
1-----~-~---~-----:-'-:-~'-::-- --------=-------------------j 
7-\lar painphlet I 0 ,000 Sotho women's fornms 
7-\lar manifesto 5,000 Afrikaai1s AS C maitifesto* 
9-\l ar mai1ifcsto 1,000 Afrikaai1s A\"C maitifesto ';' 
~-·---------
_____ .2- \l~mall O~f. _______ 6_,_00_C_J_n_a _____ ·-A,....\"..,..·c_ n=-a_,,_g_\_r ..,..l...,o-"'g_o_i_n_c_e_11_tr_c_*_* __________ _ 
10-\1ar poster 20,000 English "Johs, Jobs , Jobs" 
11 -\ 'lar manifesto 6,000 Engli sh A\" C maitifesto* 
~ ----1~\la~ ~1n~l_lfa11_ -_-_ -==8=·=0~00-=_-r_1-a~_- ---.-\ \"-:.-cc-, o=-ag- ,\-. -.,.l-oe'-oo--,-i1-1 -ce_1_1l_re-~:-: *,------··~----------· -
- I J ~ ~~hadg~ __ _ _____ 1-...,6,....,000~=-E:-no-=g77h_· s_h __ ---:c"~\...,lan:--d-=e_la:--fo-:r:-P-=-r_e.,,...s i_d_e_n_t "_'_;' "_·' :;._·---=-===-----·--
J .+-\ ! ar poster 10,000 Afrikaans "Jobs, Jobs, Jobs" 
1.+-:-\Iru:Sllcker - - - 70,000 Eng-Ii_s_h "\"landela fo--r-=r=-r-e...,s i-d'-e1-1t..,,."~--- -
---------'--~----~-------
__ 16-\lar poster 
16-\Iar 'isor 
25,000 Engli sh A~C for youth 
92,000 n a A:\C ballot stripe on Yi sor 
16-\lar "Zahalazo" hookl et l ,OOO 'English for dignitari es , not forclistrihution 
17-\ ·[ar ,·isor 8,000 n a A\"C ballot stripe on \·isor 
------ --- - --------- --~-------'.---------------\ 
18-\1ar small f1ag 50,000 ,n a iA\"C f1ag w logo in centre** 
j 
18-\lar hadge 10,000 Engli sh i"\fandela for President" *_*_*------------1 
21 -\ 'lar poster 10,000 Engli sh "Vote A \"C for Peace" 
21 -\lar poster 10,000 AfrikaallS "Vote A \"C for Peace " 
21 -\1ar poster 10,000 Xhosa "Vote ,\.'.\C for Peace" 
21 -\lar maiiifesto 500 English ,A\"C maitifcsto* 
21 -\far man if es to 3 .000 Afrikaans A:\C maiiifesto* 
f---------------~ 
23-\ 1ar poster 12,000 English "Vote A\"C for Free Education" 
2.+-\lar small f1 ag 20,000 n a ·A\"C Oag w logo in centre** 
25-\1ar small fl ag 3.+,000 · n a Al'C flag w · logo in centre** 
26-\1ar ·poster 20,000 Afrikaans 1 "~1an<lel a for President" : 
26-\lar poster 24,000 ;English "Vote A~C " w 1 Mandela's face 
28-\ tar painphlet 25,000 ·English ' "FiYe Reasons to Vote A\"C " 
28-\1ar pamphlet 29,800 English future of youth 
28-.\ lar sam pk bal I ot ___ ...__66_(""l,-OOO~'"=E=-n-""g-:c. _.,A,.-fk_·s_. - -'-':-::=--=- ----=-=----:-'::-:-:::-::- -
---- 29-.\1ar pmnphlet 35,000 ,Engli sh 
.pro,·incial ballot ! - -
; "Fi, ·e Reasons to \'ote A'.\C " 
I 
___ 29-.\far sample ballot__ , 375,000 ,Eng. Al'ks. 
29-.\.lar sample ballot 1 .W,000 Eng. Afks . 
1




: "\'ote A~C " w· ~1andela's face I 30-.\far 'poster : 16,000 :Engli sh 
- 31 -.\!ar pamphlet 14,000 'English ,"\'otc A'.'\C for Peace" I 
I-Apr sticker 70,000 English , .\1andela and children i I I 
I -. \ pr banner 70
1 
English 1A:\C ballot stripe I 
1-...\pr banner l-l-5 :English ~1m1dcla and children I 
1-...\pr billboard 21 unknown metropolitan Cape Town (9), rnral an:as (10) 
1-.!\pr badge 
1 
.5 ,000 English ~1andela and children 1 
5-Apr poster 7 ,500 , ~hosa ·"Mandela for President" 
5-.-\pr sticker : 20,000 English 1 "~1andela for President" 
5-Apr pamphlet ' 445,000 Afrikaans 1"FiYe Reasons to \'ote A'.\C " 
____ 5-A pr mm1ifesto _ __ 20,350 Engli sh 'A:\C manifesto* 
f-- -- 7-Aprposter 26,225 ,English 1"MandelaforPreside111" : 
I 
~~Apryan!pl~et l-l-0 ,000 English ."foe Reasons to \ 'ote A'.\C " 
_8-. ..\_prya~11phle! -- 3.-i,ocx( \ .hosa -- ·: "Fi~ R.easonslo\-01e .:-\"'.\-C1 '___ ·-t --- - ·-
8-. ..\p! _baf1::11er - -·- - 16 Engilsh A'.\C ballot stripe . -- ---
- - - --+--- ·----1- - --·--- --- -r--- ----- - - ---
8-. ..\pr, baJUler 10 \]10sa , . ..\'.\C ballot stripe 
8-. ..\pr bam1er - - -- ~-~LUfii.aans - _, ~L\'.\C b3.Ifo1 Slnpe -- +- -
r- -~ ~0pi-+po~!er_ _ -~- ~ J.~,ooo' Ei1ili sh--_--~Eiil-i s Hani commemOration- --~-----+---~---~ --_-- _ 
_____ !?_-..:....\pr p<2_s ler ______________ 8_,_0_0_0~E_1~1i,,~'l_i s_h __ ~O_l_i,_·e_r_T_ai_· _n_bo_ co_ m_n_1e_1_n_o_ra_lt_·o_n ___ ~------• 
______ l_l_- . ..\pr poster -1- ,500 Afrikaans ".\1Mdela for President" . 
_ -· _ Ll_-~..\_~·_129s tcr ___ _____ 8,000 Engli sh ".\landela for President" 
-· _ ~l_..=..:.\pr poste~--- _______ 3_,_0_00~1 \:_· 1_1o_s_a ____ "_\ _f;_111_d_e_la_ fo_r_P_r_e_si_d_en_t_" ____________ ~ 
_ _ I]-.-\ p_~:_12ampJ!_l e 1 _ __ 210,000 Afrikaans . "fi , ·e Reasons to \ ' ote . ..\'.\C " 
---
12-.\pr small flag 100,000 .n a A:\C flag" logo in centre** 
------------------~~-~---------------< 
12-. \pr poster 6,000 Engli sh Oli' er Tmnbo commemoration 
------~~------·--------~-------------------------! 
13-. ..\pr po~ te r 2,000 English ".\landcla for President" 
-----~~--------------~-------------------------< 
13-.\pr sticker 100,000 English , "I'm \' oting A'.\C " , ___ _ 
-- _ _!~_-. \pr manifesto 6 ,600 Engli sh A'.\C manifesto* 
1-k -\pr ballo t sticker 165,000 Eng. \:hosa A\:C ballot strip, incl . logo, name, mark 
------------"---------~'-- --=-------------j 
1.-1-. ..\pr poster 68,000 ·English .\.1andcla and children 
l----~~---------------~-------------------------
15-Apr sticke r 20,000 ,Euglish ' .\1andela and children 
,_ ___ 1_5_- ._..\~p_r sample ballot _______ 2_2_0_,000 _ _ .E_1_1g~·_' ._..\_fk_·s_. __ ' 1_ia_11_· o __ n_a_I _b_al_Io_t ____ ' __________ _, 
15-Apr small flag 20,000 ,n a ,A'.\C flag w logo in centre** 
19-Apr ballot sticker 800,000 ' Eng. :-Jiosa ;Ai\"C ballot strip, incl . logo, name, mark 
2-1--. ..\pr ball ot sticker ' 800,ooo :Eng. Xhosa A\:C ballot strip, incl . logo, name, mark 
------------t-~---~,-----~---,r=------, -------l 
* Thi s is the figure that \\·estem Cape A:\C records show were deliYered. A prmincial A'.\C · 
source-sa; s 111al tl1enationaf Ol'ilCe-clisPUte"dtill5ffgure,cTa1m:rng!O have sent a greater number. --i--------l 
'--;-* Thi s number-does 110!Tnclude hags that were deliYered before the period coYered by these reco~-: ------
**~'-Thi s llllOllll i-doesnotincJude badges that were deli\·ered before the period COYered by these records . 
-- - ~- --= : -=-== ~--~--==--:..: ~ ~ :~~~-=- -=--J-=--=---~-~--------· 
_________ ___________ ___ ...! Januarv Febrnarv l!ill:£h • --~A=p=n=·1'-----'T=O=T= . ..\=L 
Total Posters: 0 0 1 160,500 ' 168,225 328,725 
Total Pamphl ets .\lanifes tos : 0 I 13 ,500 19-1-,300 875,950 1, 183,750 
Total Stickers Badges: 30,000 . 8 ,000 , 226,000 ; 1,910,000 , 2, 17-1-,000 
Total Other: 0 , 8,000 , 1,29-1-,000 . -H 0.310 , 1,712,,) 10 
-
1,87-1- ,8(){) I TOT...\I , ITE\ IS: ' 30,000 , 129,SOO 3 ,36-l ,-1-85 5,398,785 
3. African National Congress Campaign Materials I I 
Received from the National Office During the 1994 Election Campaign 
Western Cape Province I I 
Compiled by Quentin Joseph, ANC, April 1995 I 
Prepared by Matthew Eldridge, April 20, 1995 
Department of Political S1udies, Uni1 ·ersity of Cape Town 
Sorted according to language I 
: I 
LANGUAGE DA TE ITEM TYPE VOLUME DESCRIPTION I 
I 
Afrikaans 16-Feb manifesto 14,000 ANC manifesto* 
Afrikaans 17-Feb manifesto 72,000 ANC manifesto* Feb: 86,000 
Afrikaans 7-Mar pamphlet 32,000 , women's forums 
Afrikaans 7-Mar manifesto 5,000 ' ANC manifesto* 
Afrikaans 9-Mar manifesto 1,000 ,ANC manifesto* 
Afrikaan~ 14-Mar poster I 10,000 "Jobs, Jobs, Jobs" 
Afrikaans 21 -Mar poster 10,000 "Vote ANC for Peace" 
Afrikaan!> 21 -Mar manifesto 3,000 ANC manifesto* 
Afrikaans 26-Mar poster 20,000 "Mandela for President" Mar: 8 1,000 
-
Afrikaans 5-Apr pamphlet 445,000 "Five Reasons lo Vote ANC" 
Afrikaans 8-Apr banner 48 ANC ballot stripe 
Afrikaans - - - 11 -Apr poster 4,500 "Mandela for President" ----- --
12-Apr pamphlet 210,000 "Five Reasons tu Vote ANC" 659,548-Afrikaans Apr: 
-
Eng./Afks. 28-Mar sample baJlot 660,000 provincial ballot 
Eng./ Arks~ 
-
29-Mar sample ballot 375,000 national ballot -- . 
Eng./Afks. 29-Mar san1ple ballot 40,000 provincial ballot Mar: 1,075,000 
-
Eng./ Afks. 15-Apr sample ballot 220,000 national ballot Apr: 220,000 
Eng./Xho sa 
-
14-Apr hallo! sticker 165,000 ANC ballot strip, incl. logo, name, mark 
En~./Xhosa 
-
19-Apr ballot sticker 800,000 ANC hallot strip, incl. logo, name, mark 
--
-
Eng./Xhosa 24-Apr ballot sticker 800,000 ANC ballot strip, incl. l ogo, ~ Apr: 1,765,000 
English - - - -- 31 -Jan badge 30,000 "Mandela for President" *** Jan : 30.000 
E nglish 
-
16-Feb manifesto 3,500 ANC manifesto* 
English 
- -· 
16-Feb badge 8,000 "Mandela for President" *** · Feb: I 1,500 
EngliSh -
- --
3-Mar poster 3,500 "Vote ANC for Women's Rights" --
English 3-Mar sticker 10,000 "Mandela for Presidelll" 
- -
English 7-Mar sticker 120,000 "Mandela for President" 
English 7-Mar pamphlet 10,000 women's forums 
English 10-Mar poster 20,000 "Jobs, Jobs, Jobs" 
-
English I I-Mar manifesto 6,000 · ANC manifesto* I 
Engl~- I 1-Mar badge 16,000 "Mandela for President" *** I 
Engli sh 14-Mar sticker 70,000 ' "Mandela for President" ! 
English 16-Mar poster I 25,000 ANC for youth I I 
English 16-Mar "Zabalazo" booklet 1,000 for dignitaries, not for distribution I 
English 18-Mar badge 10,000 "Mandela for President" *** I 
English 21-Mar . poster 10,000 "Vote ANC for Peace" 
Engli sh 21-Mar manifesto 500 ANC manifesto* 
English 23-Mar poster 12,000 "Vote ANC for Free Education" I 
English 26-Mar poster 24,000 "Vote ANC" w/ Mandela's face I 
English 28-Mar pamphlet 25,000 , "Five Reasons to Vote ANC" . 
English 28-Mar ,pamphlet ; 29,800 1 future of youth I 
English 29-Mar · pamphlet 35,000 "Five Reasons to Vote ANC" 1 
English 30-Mar poster I 16,000 "Vote ANC" w/ Mandela's face I I 
English 31-Mar pamphlet 14,000 "Vote ANC for Peace" Mar: 457,800 
Engli sh 1-Apr sticker 70,000 Mandela and children 
English 1-Apr 'banner 70 ANC ballot stripe 
Engli sh I-Apr banner 
' 
145 Mandela and children 
Engli sh I-Apr badge : 5,000 Mandela and children 
Engli sh 5-A pr sticker 20,000 ·"Mandela for President " ; 
English ' 5-Apr mani festo 20,350 · ANC mani festo* 
Engli sh 7-Apr poster I 26,225 · "Mandela for President" ' ' 
English 8-Apr pamphlet 140,000 , "Five Reasons to Vote ANC", 
English 8-Apr banner 16 ,ANC ballot stri pe 
' 
English 8-Apr poster 35 ,000 Chri s Hani commemoration 
English 8-Apr poster 8,000 Oliver Tambo commemoration 
English 11-Apr poster 8,000 , "Mandela for President" 
English 12-Apr poster 6,000 Oliver Tambo commemoration 
Engli sh 13-Apr poster 2,000 , "Mandela for President" 
Engli sh 13-Apr sticker 100,000 , "I'm Voting ANC" 
Engli sh 13-Apr manifesto 6,600 ANC manifesto* 
English 15-Apr poster 68,000 Mandela and chi ldren 
Engli sh 15-Apr sticker ' 20,000 Mandela and chi ldren Apr: 535,406 
n/a 16-Feb small fl ag 8,000 ANC flag w/ logo in centre** Feb: 8.000 
n/a 9-Mar small fl ag 6,000 .ANC flag w/ logo in centre* * 
n/a I I -Mar small fl ag 8,000 ANC fl ag w/ logo in centre** 
n/a 16-Mar visor 92,000 ANC ballot stripe on visor 
-
n/a 17-Mar visor 8,000 ANC ballot stripe on vi sor ------
n/a 18-Mar small fl ag 50,000 ANC fl ag w/ logo in centre** ----
n/a 24-Mar small fl ag 20,000 ANC fl ag w/ logo in centre** 
- - --
n/a 25-Mar small fl ag 34,000 ,ANC flag w/ logo in centre** Mar: 2 18, 000 - ------· 
n/a 12-A pr small fl ag I 00,000 ANC flag w/ logo in cen tre** 
n/a 15-Apr small fl ag 20,000 ANC flag w/ logo in centre** Apr: 120.000 
Sotho 7-Mar pamphlet I 0,000 women's forum s Mar: 10,000 - ------ -
unkno\\·n I-Apr bi llboard 21 metropolitan Cape Town (9), Apr: 21 
Xhosa --- 16-Feb manifesto 24,000 ANC manifesto* Feb: 24,000 
--· --
Xhosa 3-Mar manifesto 18,000 ANC manifesto* --- ---·- ---
Xhosa 7-Mar pamphlet 5,000 women's forums 
Xhosa 21 -Mar ]X)Ster 10,000 "Vote ANC for Peace" Mar: 33,000 
Xhosa· 5-A pr poster 7,500 "Mandela for President" ----
Xhosa 8-Apr pamphlet 54,000 "Five Reasons to Vote ANC" 
·-
Xhosa 8-Apr banner 10 ANC ballot stripe 
Xhosa 1 I -A pr poster 3,000 "M311dela for President" Apr: 64,510 
' 
* This is the fig ure that Western Cape ANC records show were deli vered. A provincial ANC 
source says that the national office di sputed this fi gure. cl aiming to have sent a greater number. 
** Thi s number does not include fl ags that were delivered before the period covered by these records. 
*** Thi s amount does not include badges that were deli vered before the period covered by these records. : 
I ' I 
I ' 
I 
Janugn' Februa[y March April TOTAL 
Total Engli sh: 30,000 11 ,500 457,800 535,406 1,034,706 
Total English/Afrikaans: 0 0 1,075,000 220,000 1,295,000 
Total Afrikaans: 0 86,000 , 81,000 659,548 826,548 
Total English/Xhosa: 0 0 0 1,765 ,000 1,765,000 
Total Xhosa: 0 24,000 33,000 64,510 12 1,510 
Total Sotho: 0 0 , 10,000 0 10,000 
Total not applicable (n/a): 0 8,000 218,000 120,000 346,000 
Total unknown: Q Q Q fl fl 















APPENDIX E: Newspaper Advertising Data 
List o.fWestem Cape ANC Campaign Advertisements Collected 
publication pa2e header 
Argus 8 Should Anyone Walk 
Away from the Elections? 
You Be the Judge. 
South 7 Our Plan: 2. Putting a Stop 
to Crime and Violence. 
Argus 7 Just How Fair Is the Cape? 
Argus 21 Our Plan: Why Ten Years 
Free Quality Education 
Makes Sense. 
Argus 14 These Are the People Who 
Will Bring Jobs, Peace and 
Housing to the Western ... 
Weekly Mail 12- Our Plan: 3. Making 
and Guardian 13 Education Free and Equal 
for All. 
Weekend Argus 18 The ANC Stands for the 
Protection of All People's 
Property. Which Is Why 
We're ... 
Weekend Argus 7 How Will the ANC 
Preserve the Proud 
Tradition of the Muslim 
Community? 
Sunday Times 8-9 Our Plan: 4. Building 
Houses and Improving 
Services 
Cosmopolitan 208 I Have Prayed. I Have 
Laughed. I Have Sung. 
And I Have Cried. But 
Until Now .. 
Southeaster 8 (same as above) 
Weekend Argus 11 We Can't Live in Peace and 
Have Dignity If We're All 
Living in the Same House. 
description 
list of 6 ANC 
election law 
proposals 


































1 w/ quote, 
other w I profile 
of woman 
"crowded" bold 
white letters on 
black 
background 
date publication I page I header description 
March 6 Sunday Times n/a Our Plan: 5. Improving the 2-page spread, 
Lives of Women. bucket & mop 
w/ mikes, 
statement 
March 20 Sunday Times 30- This year, the NP is group of young 
31 spending 3 times more on black students 
each White pupil than on writing on floor 
each ... 
March 20 Sunday Nation 16- (same as above) 
17 
March 23 Cape Times 7 The National Party photos of Kriel 
Government Is Said to Run and de Klerk 
Guns and Hit Squads. 
Don't Let... 
March 25-26 Southeaster 5 495 000 people in the "unemployment 
Western Cape don't have "line 
jobs because of the NP. 
March 25-29 Southeaster 8 The NP spends 3 times group of young 
more on educating White children staring 
pupils than Coloured, out broken 
African ... windows 
March 26-27 Weekend Argus 19 Ten years of free, quality Archie 
education for every child is Vergotine 
exactly what this country ... endorsement 
March 26-27 Weekend Argus 17 l call on all God-fearing, Franklin Sonn 
decent, principled people to endorsement 
join me in saving ... 
April 2-3 Weekend Argus 11 (same as above) 
April 2-3 Weekend Argus 13 The ANC has a workable Ngconde 
plan for the half a million Balfour 
unemployed people in the ... endorsement 
April 3 Sunday Nation 9 What the NP Is Doing ... NP column 3 
What the ANC Will Do. photos, ANC 
column jobs, 
ed., peace 
April 4 Southern 4 Join Us and Vote ANC pictures of 20 
Suburbs Tattler endorsers 
April 8-12 Southeaster 5 Only the ANC has the Achmat Davids 
(South) broad support to realise the full-page 
proud vision of Sheik endorsement 
Yusuf ... 
April 10 Sunday Nation 9 It Takes a Brave Person to Hani speaking 
Fight. But a True Hero to at microphone 
Make Peace. 
April 10 Rapport, Metro 5 (same as above but in 
Afrikaans) 
April 15 Cape Times 4 (same as above) 
April 15 Cape Times 5 (same as above) 
April 17 Sunday Times, 8 This Is the Reality of 46 woman 
Metro Years of National Party standing over 
Rule ... casket 
I date publication I page I header description I 
April 17 Sunday Times, 7 Apartheid's Men Still Want mugshots of 
Metro to Run the Cape. Now Is Kriel + 4 
the Time for You to Stop ... 
April 17 Sunday Times, n/a (same as above) 
Metro 
April 17 Sunday Times 11 After April 27 there will be 2-page spread: 
something more important Mandela photo 
than an ANC government opposite 
statement 
April 17 Sunday Nation 16- (same as above) 
17 
April 17 Rapport, Metro 5 (same as above but in 
Afrikaans) 
April 22 Argus n/a (same as above) 
April 23-24 Weekend Argus 32- Racism ... a dirty word for a Trojan Horse 
33 dirty attitude and dirty photo of SAP 
~cks. On April 27 YOU shooting 
m ... 
April 23-24 Weekend 7 (same as above) 
Argus, Special 
April 23-24 Cape Times n/a (same as above) 
April 23-24 Weekend Argus 17 The Whole World Wants to single bold 
See a Change. Vote ANC white statement 
on black, short 
msg. below 
April 23-24 Weekend Argus 21 We add our voices to the detailed list of 
people who trust the ANC endorsements 
to build a better life for all by "sectors" 
in ... 
April 23-24 Weekend Argus 19 Unite the People of the bold white 
Cape. Vote ANC letters on black 
background 
April 23-24 Weekend Argus 23 For the people of the Boesak portrait 
Western Cape, there is only 
one choice. 
April 24 Sunday Times, 15 Now, on April 27 Where 6 crosses w/ 
Metro Are You Going to Put Your names of dead, 
Cross? Stop the National... e.g. Biko 
(COSATU) 
April 24 Sunday Times 24 Working Together with the truncated ballot 
People, the ANC Has Won w/ x in space 
the Right for All South ... nexttoANC 
April 24 Sunday Nation 3 (same as above) 
April 24 Rapport, Metro 3 (same as above but in 
Afrikaans) 
April 24 Sunday Times 28 KwaZulu/Natal Deserves 2-columns 
the ANC Plan comparing 
IFP/NP deeds 
to ANC plan 
date publication I page I header description 
April 24 Sunday Times, 17 For 46 Years the National Black text on 
Metro Party took away white 
everything, except our background 
dignity. Don't... 
April 24 Rapport, Metro 13 (same as above but in 
Afrikaans) 
April 24 Sunday Times, 6-7 Dear Friends Our hour has 2-page spread: 
Metro almost come ... Boesak portrait 
opposite letter 
April 24 Rapport, Metro 8-9 (same as above but in 
Afrikaans) 
April 27 Cape Times 9 The NP Has No Plan. But 2 columns: NP 
It Does Have a Record of "failures", ANC 
Failure. The ANC Has a plan item-to-
Plan ... item 
April 27 Cape Times 8 Let us vote in such Mandela 
overwhelming numbers portrait, quote, 
that we show everyone statement 
how ... 
n/a nla n/a Look Through the Chaos to dot matrix 
Find Hope. pattern puzzle 
n/a n/a n/a Our Plan: 2,5 Million Jobs multiracial 
and Free Education group photo of 
kids, people of 
diff. "jobs" 
n/a nla n/a Why We're Going to Vote white on black 
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APPENDIX G: Advertised List of Candidates for Provincial Parliamenf 
rank name race sector 
1. Allan Boesak coloured church 
2. Cameron Dugmore white activist 
3. Vincent Diba African activist 
4. Lemmo Kalako African activist 
5. Johnny Issel coloured activist 
6. Ms. Hilda Ndude African local government 
7. Chris Nissen coloured church 
8. Ebrahim Rasool coloured mu slim 
9. Ms. Tasneem Essop coloured COSATU 
10. Leonard Ramatlakane African COSATU 
11. Ms. Nomaindla Mfeketho African civic 
12. Russel McGregor coloured COSATU 
13. Rose Sonto African civic 
14. Ms. Lynne Brown coloured education 
15. Tony Ruiters coloured COSATU 
16. Yusuf Gabru coloured education 
17. Garth Strachan white SACP 
18. Joe Cupido coloured health 
19. Ms. Rampi Ramotsamai African civic/women 
20. Ms. Nontsikilelo Mgayiya African civic/women 
21. Ms. Virginia Engel coloured development 
22. Enver Daniels coloured activist/law 
23. Ms. Theresa Solomon coloured activist 
24. Ms. Rashieda Abdullah coloured muslim 
25. Noel Williams coloured rural 
26. Lanval Reid coloured rural 
27. Sorub Oosthuizen coloured rural/union 
28. Ms. Rhoda Joemat coloured education 
29. Stan Nyongwana African youth 
30. Lizo Ngqunwana African Umkhonto we Sizwe 
31. Mcebisi Skwatsha African youth 
32. Ms. Connie September coloured COSATU 
33. Arthur Jacobs coloured civic 
34. Dhesigen Naidoo Indian COSATU 
35. Ms. Xoliswa Sibeko African women 
36. Mbulelo Grootboom African rural 
37. Ben Tengimfene African sports 
38. Lizo Kapa African civic 
39. Ms. Zora Mehlomakulu African civic 
40. Mandia Gxanyana African COSATU 
41. Neville Naidoo Indian youth 
42. Ms. Nobom Sonto African women 
tonly the infonnation contained in the first two columns was advertised by the ANC -- see the Argus, 
February 24, 1994, p. 14. Data for the "race" and "sector" columns were provided by Strachan. The list 
includes 20 coloureds, 18 Africans, 2 whites and 2 Indians, and 14 women and 38 men. Please note that 
this list differs slightly from the final list submitted to the IEC (see Appendix H). 
+source: "Notice 294 of 1994, Independent Electoral Commission, Publication of Lists of Candidates," 
Government Gazette, Pretoria: Government Printer, vol. 345, no. 15618, March 31, 1994. The list includes: 
21 coloureds, 15 Africans, 3 whites, and 2 Indians, and 14 women and 37 men. A* indicates where 
changes were made to the list of provincial candidates advertised in February 1994. 
APPEND IX I: Methodology 
In this appendix, I outline my methodology for examining the principal reasons for and 
ramifications of the AN C's defeat in the Western Cape. I begin by exploring six research 
questions and explain why I have chosen them. In light of these questions, I then detail 
my approach for gathering and assessing empirical data. I note the types of evidence I 
sought to collect, and how I collected them, measured them, and determined their validity 
and reliability. 
Research questions 
I derive my first two research questions from the assumption that the ANC's campaign 
may have been influenced by contextual factors such as the history of the province, 
socioeconomic similarities or differences between ethnic groups, the electoral system and 
voters' political attitudes. I attempt to examine the possible role of these factors by 
posing the following questions: 
1. How might the history, demographics and electoral system of the Western 
Cape have influenced ANC strategy, and how did they? 
2. What impact might knowledge of voters' political attitudes have had on ANC 
strategy, and what was the actual impact? 
I also assume that the ANC's key strategic decisions may be discernible, and that 
additional contextual factors such as intraparty dynamics and the issue of ethnicity 
may have affected these decisions. My four remaining research questions thus 
include the following: 
3. What primary strategic decisions did the ANC make and why? 
4. What were the internal dynamics of these decisions at the provincial level? 
5. How did the ANC's national campaign priorities affect the development of its 
provincial strategy? 
6. What was the role of ethnicity in shaping ANC strategy, and how did the 
ANC address the "coloured question," given its commitment to nonracialism 
yet predominantly African membership? 
Types of evidence to be collected 
Based on my research questions above, I decided to collect three main categories of 
evidence. First, expert analyses of key historical events and trends, important 
demographic features, and the origins and nature of the electoral system would help me 
to answer question number one. Since I had no great knowledge of any of these subjects, 
I would have to rely on conclusions of other scholars and information they cite. Second, 
with regard to question two, survey research findings might indicate what the crucial 
political attitudes among the electorate were. 
The third category of evidence would apply to all of the questions. Two particular kinds 
of information would be useful: a) perspectives of individuals inside the campaign and b) 
available evidence of campaign appeals to voters. Perspectives might offer insight on 
what the strategic decisions were, how they were made and what factors were involved. 
Evidence of appeals might reflect the party's strategic decisions, and indicate the extent to 
• .. 
which the perspectives could be substantiated by observable data. It seemed to me that 
crucial features of these appeals would include the following: 







Secondary research enabled me to locate evidence in the first two categories above. 
Writings by experts on Western Cape history and the development of the electoral system 
provided essential information and analyses. I found useful data and observations on 
Western Cape demographics in a chapter written by Robert Mattes, Hermann Giliomee 
and Wilmot James. Also, a report prepared by Mattes for the Human Sciences Research 
Council on the political impact of opinion polls in South Africa's 1994 elections offered 
particularly helpful analysis, and data from a wide range of surveys. 51 
Interviews 
Primary research -- conducting interviews, observing events, gathering materials and 
compiling other data -- provided evidence in the third category. I chose to pursue 
soParties had agreed to ban political advertising on television throughout the campaign, and to permit radio 
advertising only during the final weeks before the election. 
SI see footnotes in Chapters One and Two for more information on these sources. 
interviews with individuals at three different levels of the campaign: provincial managers, 
party candidates and grassroots organizers. See Appendix A for a list of the interviews I 
conducted. I reasoned that those who ran the campaign might give me invaluable input 
on strategic decisions in which they may have participated personally. Candidates and 
local organizers, on the other hand, might share how they perceived strategic decisions as 
"insiders" who generally operated outside of campaign headquarters. How their views 
compared to those of provincial managers might tell me something about intraparty 
decision maldng and the flow of information, either from the campaign leadership 
downwards, or from the grassroots toward! the top. 
Obsenling events, gathering materials 
Attending rallies and collecting materials proved the most complex and time-consuming 
of my research efforts. I chose to focus on several mostly coloured and some white areas 
near Cape Town in which at least some speeches and materials were likely to be in 
English. These included the communities of Athlone, Bellville, Cape Town, Claremont, 
Grassy Park, Hout Bay, Mitchell's Plain, Mowbray, Retreat, Rondebosch, Sea Point, 
Steenberg, Table View and Woodstock. I also gathered evidence in a few Afrikaans-
speaking, largely coloured communities, including Delft, Grabouw, KJeinvlei and 
Macassar, and in the Xhosa-speaking, almost exclusively African township of Guguletu. 
I chose these target areas based on the foUowing assumptions: 
• given that the electoral system was a form of proportional representation, 
parties might concentrate on the most highly populated areas -- I anticipated 
that the ANC would direct most of its appeals toward communities in the 
Cape Town metropolitan area 
• since polls suggested that up to one-third of the electorate was undecided and 
most undecideds were coloured, a) the ANC might focus efforts on coloured 
areas near Cape Town and b) by observing activities and gathering data in 
those communities, I might be able to obtain a useful sample of the party's 
efforts provinciallys2 
• observing and collecting most information in English would maximize my 
efficiency and the breadth of information I could gather -- after all, I did not 
speak Afrikaans or Xhosa, the other two main languages in the Western Cape, 
and having data translated into English would pose time and financial costs 
• observing at least a few events and collecting some materials in Afrikaans and 
Xhosa would give me an idea, with the help of translation, of whether these 
appeals were roughly similar to those the party was using in English 
Following on these assumptions, I decided to make observations in and gather materials 
from targeted areas in four particular ways: 
1. attend and take handwritten notes at as many ANC rallies and 
events as possible 
2. compile public statements and documents issued by the campaign 
s21 later found support for this assumption from my interviews. ANC officials identified most of the 
coloured communities I had chosen as the ANC's primary target areas, and indicated that the bulk of the 
party's efforts took place there. See Chapters Four and Five. 
3. gather samples of canvassing materials and posters 
4. collect campaign advertisements from major Western Cape newspapers 
See appendices for lists of rallies and events both observed (Appendix B) and scheduled 
(Appendix C), and newspaper advertising data (Appendix E). 
Compiling other data 
I sought to obtain other data from the ANC and relevant contractors on its event 
scheduling, provincial newspaper advertising, leaflet and poster production, and receipt 
of materials from the party's national campaign headquarters. I compiled weekly lists of 
scheduled campaign events. The ANC's advertising agency in the province, Hunt 
Lascaris, gave me information on which national newspaper ads were run in the Western 
Cape, when and in which publications. 
To complement these data, Prof. Eve Bertelsen of UCT's English Department allowed me 
to copy her nearly comprehensive collection of ANC newspaper ads. Her contribution 
greatly supplemented my own, limited compilation of ads from the Argus, Cape Times, 
and Weekly Mail and Guardian. 
The ANC produced all of its provincial leaflets and posters through one printing 
company, Allie's Press. This firm provided me nearly complete records of what kind of 
items were created, how many, when and, in some cases, for which geographic area (see 
Appendix D). Also, the provincial ANC received many materials from the national 
office -- the party kept a record of these and allowed me access to it. 
Data measurement 
I decided to weigh my primary research data in two separate categories: qualitative and 
quantitative. With respect to qualitative data such as notes from speeches or interviews, I 
broadly sought to identify main points and themes, and make generalizations about them. 
In regard to quantitative information, I attempted to measure ANC campaign appeals 
through a detailed content analysis of speech themes, event locations, and language use in 
posters and leaflets. (See Appendix F for a matrix of themes used in observed speeches, 
and a description of the methodology used to prepare it). 
Validity and Reliability 
Representativeness and bias 
The wide range of data, materials, observations and interviews included in my research 
offers critical information for answering the research questions outlined above. 
Admittedly, much of my evidence reflects an urban bias. The fact that I gathered the vast 
majority of my data in the greater Cape Town area means that I excluded rural 
communities, with the exception of Grabouw, and other large towns such as Hermanns, 
Worcester or Atlantis. Nevertheless, the ANC's records and my interviews with 
campaign leaders suggest that the bulk of the party's resources were devoted to the areas 
which I covered. Thus, despite my focus on urban data collection, I believe that my 
evidence may be largely representative of campaign efforts throughout the province. 
With regard to my collection of newspaper advertisements, the ANC and its advertising 
agency were only able to provide me comprehensive data on those national ads which 
appeared in the Western Cape. Hunt Lascaris and its parent company in Johannesburg, 
Eurospace Africa, refused -- allegedly due to staffing constraints -- to give me any 
information on the particular ads placed by the provincial ANC campaign. My collection 
of ads includes many of the provincial ones, but I do not necessarily have a representati_ve 
sample or know in which publications they appeared. In addition, my provincial ANC 
leaflet and poster production data from Allie's Press are, for the most part, 
comprehensive. Allie's Press, however, admits that its records omitted a few orders 
placed by the provincial campaign office and others by individual ANC branches. 
I believe that my interviews with senior campaign officials have given me a useful range 
of perspectives on provincial-level decision making. Interview subjects included many, 
though not all, key players in the campaign leadership. Some did not make themselves 
available for comment, despite persistent attempts over a period of several months -- e.g., 
Allan Boesak, Bulelani Ngcuka and Trevor Manuel. In any case, while the views 
reflected in my interviews do not represent a complete spectrum, they perhaps mark a 
generally representative one. I would add that my decision to interview only a few 
candidates and branch-level organizers means that I cannot necessarily draw sweeping 
conclusions from their comments. Rather, their viewpoints may only suggest what those 
of other individuals at their levels of the campaign might be. 
The fact that I held my interviews after the elections means that the comments of those 
interviewed must be considered carefully. Interview subjects' perceptions of campaign 
decisions and events might have shifted in the period since they took place --
recollections of details may have become less clear, and interpretations may have 
changed based upon subsequent input. Subjects also may have tempered their comments 
to me for fear of divulging secrets useful to political opponents. In addition, the AN C's 
loss in the region, among a host of other factors, may have further influenced their 
remarks. For example, they may have wished to put a certain, political "spin" on the 
election outcome. These concerns do not eliminate the usefulness of the interviews, they 
merely caution one from viewing these statements uncritically. 
It is important to note that, even though many of my data are largely representative of the 
AN C's efforts provincially, one should be cautious about drawing conclusions from it. 
The existence of correlations, of course, does not necessarily imply a causal link. Take 
speeches by candidates at rallies and events, for example. What if I show that, in my 
sample of observed remarks, candidates consistently mentioned affirmative action more 
than any other issue? This does not necessarily mean that the party -- the Western Cape 
ANC -- held affirmative action to be the most important issue. This kind of sweeping 
conclusion would depend on a host of factors, such as the extent to which the campaign 
leadership briefed candidates on what issues to highlight, the degree to which candidates 
abided by leaders' guidance, and whether this varied from area to area, or time to time. It 
would be perhaps more reasonable to conclude, in this case, that affirmative action was 
an important issue to the ANC and that its prominence in candidates' remarks probably 
reflects this. I qualify my analysis of speech themes further in Chapter Five. 
Validity 
My assumptions may be subject to falsification. For instance, I chose to focus on 
coloured areas based on the assumption that the ANC would be doing the same. If 
someone were able to show that, despite campaign leaders' stated intentions and my 
strong evidence of this focus, a) there actually were a significant number of events and 
resources devoted to African areas, and b) most of these events and resources were not 
documented or widely publicized outside of these areas, then my conclusions about this 
focus would be seriously weakened. The ANC could be said to have run two major 
campaigns, each having significant emphasis but different levels of profile. My 
interviews with ANC leaders who were responsible for efforts in these areas suggest that 
this was not the case, but if it were then it would at least partly falsify my analysis. 
This reasoning holds true for my urban bias and language focus assumptions as well. For 
example, if one could demonstrate that a) significant, unreported efforts took place in 
rural areas that relied on local resources, and b) these represented a significant part of the 
campaign even though provincial leaders were not aware of them or would not say, then 
my assumption about an urban focus would be partly incorrect. Or, if campaign appeals 
in Xhosa-speaking and Afrikaans-speaking areas actually differed greatly from those in 
English-speaking ones, then my findings based mainly on English appeals would not be 
nearly as representative as I assume. 
APPENDIX J: Selected Political Cartoons 
Sources 
Cartoons appearing in body of dissertation: 
Page xii: Cape Times, February 24. 
Page 6: Weekly Mail and Guardian, March 11-17. 
Page 34: Cape Times, April 22. 
Page 53: Cape Times, April 13. 
Page 71: Weekly Mail and Guardian, April 15-21. 
Page 104: Weekly Mail and Guardian, February 11-17. 
Page 120: Cape Times, March 31. 
Page 142: Cape Times, April 15. 
Page 155: Weekend Argus, April 2-3. 
Cartoons in this appendix (in order of appearance): 
n/a 
Weekly Mail and Guardian, April 15-21. 
Cape Times, March 10. 
Weekly Mail and Guardian, March 11-17. 
Cape Times, March 15. 
Weeklv Mail and Guardian, March 25-30. 
Cape Times, February 22. 
Weekly Mail and Guardian, February 25 to March 3. 
Cape Times, April 19. 
Weekend Argus, April 16-17. 
Cape Times, April 28. 
Cape Times, March 8. (Madam & Eve series) 
Cape Times, March 18. 
Cape Times, March 17. 
Cape Times, March 14. 
Cape Times, March 15. 
Cape Times, March 10. 
Cape Times, March 11. 
Cape Times, March 21. 
Cape Times, March 22. 
Cape Times, March 29. 
Cape Times, March 30. 
Cape Times, March 31. 
Cape Times, March 25. 
Cape Times, April 4. 
Weekly Mail and Guardian, March 31 to April 7. 
Weekly Mail and Guardian, April 22-28. 
Cape Times, April 18. 
Cape Times, April 14. 
Cape Times, April 12. 
Cape Times, April 28. 
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''You remember we left Namibia because you said a black government would make a mess of the country? ... 
So why are we going back?" 
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"Pick your polling station .... That queue's for the Good Hope Seminary, that one's for the Civic Centre, that 
one's for Salt River Market Hall and that one's for the Good Hope Centre." 
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"And now an entrant from South Africa, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, who has refused to compete against anybody 
else and is showing his form in his own solo event - skating on thin ice." 
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